pro

Are you pressed for time and haven’t started working on your assignment yet? Would you like to buy an assignment? Use our custom writing services for better grades. Even if your deadline is approaching fast, our writers can handle your task right when you need it. Our writers will complete your order from scratch and make sure it’s completely unique.


Order a Similar Paper Order a Different Paper

I have uploaded some references and workshop questions will help in assignment 

Please read the instructors carefully

1. Use of Case Studies on Assignment to Illustrate Concepts

Literature for two major case study programmes for Olympics 2012 and Crossrail (or
Elizabeth Line) have been provided on the Moodle site and used to illustrate the
Management of Programmes and Portfolio concepts/theories on the module. These
can be used and referenced to support assignments or alternatively if one other case
of your own choice can be used however it must be sourced from ‘real life’
programmes or portfolios and fully referenced.

project for further context. You will have the opportunity to critique current practice in
project management drawing on any of the concepts from this module to provide
justification for your answers for this assessment which must be supported by evidence
from the literature (academic books and journal articles). You may also cite from
professional bodies and Institute websites e.g. Association of Project Management
(APM), Project Management Institute (PMI), Chartered Management Institute (CMI),
Government and Industry websites but there must be a balance with the use of
academic references. However, use of ‘wikis’ is to be avoided.

2. This assignment covers all learning outcomes (LOs) for this Module which are:

1. Evaluate the significance of Programme and Portfolio management.

2. Appraise the significance of developing and maintaining a comprehensive business case
for a programme.

3. Critically review the significance of benefits management and its impact on programmes

4. Synthesise, the latest research on programme management and portfolio management.

3. Assignment Objectives (Your Task):

1- Critically review the role of Governance and Methods (i.e. Managing Successful
Programmes and Management of Portfolios) to deliver Programmes and Portfolios in an
effective way. Support your answer with literature and best practice for Managing Successful
Programmes and Management of Portfolios (LO4).

(Use case study programmes for Olympics 2012 in London)

– Synthesise, the latest research on programme management and portfolio
management.

2- Evaluate the significance of Projects, Programmes and Portfolios and their management in
relation to the successful delivery of an organisation’s strategy. Justify your answer supported
by evidence from the literature and provide fully referenced ‘real-life’ case example to
illustrate (LO1, LO4).

(Use case study programmes for Olympics 2012 in London)

– Evaluate the significance of Programme and Portfolio management.

– Synthesise, the latest research on programme management and portfolio
management

3- Appraise the significance of developing and maintaining a business case with robust
benefits for a programme. Please ensure you illustrate your theory using a fully referenced
‘real-life’ case (L02, LO3, LO4).

(Use case study programmes for Crossrail Elizabeth Line in London)

– Appraise the significance of developing and maintaining a comprehensive business
case for a programme.

– Critically review the significance of benefits management and its impact on
programmes

– Synthesise, the latest research on programme management and portfolio
management.

• Please in Objective 3 use this Information Presented in the Business Case is along 5 dimensions
APMBoKV7 (2019): p44-p45

• – Strategic Context – The compelling case for change
• – Economic Context – Return on investment based investment appraisal of options
• – Commercial Approach – Sourcing Strategy and Procurement Strategy
• – Financial Case – Affordability to the Organisation
• – Management Approach – Roles, Governance* structure, life cycle

4. Assignment format:

Discussion paper of 3,250 words (+/-10%) (excluding diagrams, references and
appendices). Use a report structure with a contents page, headings, sub-headings,
page numbers, an introduction, main body of the work covering objectives 1, 2, 3 and
4, conclusion, list of References and Appendices.

Students should use APA 7 for referencing.

5. Instructor

Needs wider evidence from the academic literatures literature to support your arguments,
including relevant theory and constructs covered from this Module for the theoretical
underpinning.”

Ensure that all of the statements, which you make, are supported by evidence. Critical
analysis.

You may consult other credible sources including professional websites, Industry websites and
government sources.

More accurate referencing is required and wider use of sources. In particular please make sure
that your online sources are correctly cited in APA 7 style using the name of the webpage
rather than the website address.

Case studies for the assignment can be used to illustrate concepts and assessment and these
Crossrail (Elizabeth line); plus one other but MUST be FULLY referenced

Use in the Introduction:

-According to the paper what is the difference between Governance and management?

-What are the key differences between projects, programs and portfolios?

-What are the two approaches to governance?

-How might conflicts/contradictions arise between the management and governance of projects
and programmes?

-Define Governance and deferent view

Use in the conclusion:

-What you did summarized
-What you found
-What dose it mean

Managing Programmes and
Portfolios (MPP) Module M32494

Interactive Workshop:
Lessons Learned from

London Olympics 2012 –
Programme Management

London Olympics 2012

• Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) established by an Act of Parliament April
2006 – public funded body to resource, procure and deliver major
construction works

• Bid cost £4.036bn to Final cost £9.325bn increase of 131%

• Fixed deadline for Olympic Games Opening Ceremony July 2012

SUMMARY

6 THE BUDGET FOR THE LONDON 2012 OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES

6 This increase in cost estimates, along with a
reduction in anticipated private sector funding, means
that public sector funding for the Games has increased
by £5.906 billion (Figure 2). The costs to be covered by
this increase in funding include £1.173 billion of tax3
which will ultimately flow back to the Exchequer. On the
basis that the Department has confirmed to us that the tax
liabilities associated with the Games will be met entirely
from Exchequer funding, this means that the net increase
in public sector funding should be £4.733 billion. The
funding increase of £5.906 billion includes contingency of
£2.747 billion which the Department has made clear to us
may not be used in full.

7 The main reasons for the difference between the cost
estimates at the time of the bid and the budget announced
in March 2007 are:

n A new provision of £2.747 billion for programme
contingency (including £337 million of tax).

n A new provision of £836 million for tax, following
the Treasury’s confirmation that the Olympic
Delivery Authority would be liable to VAT in the
normal manner and unable to reclaim it (which,
although a real cost to the Games, will flow back to
the Exchequer).

n A new estimate of £600 million for policing and
wider security (which remains subject to further
oversight and scrutiny).

n An increase in the Olympic Delivery Authority’s
programme delivery budget from £16 million to
£570 million (the original estimate of £16 million

at the time of the bid was based on the costs of a
small Urban Development Corporation and did
not include the costs of complex site logistics, or
a delivery partner to undertake programme and
project management which the Department and the
Delivery Authority deem necessary for successful
delivery of the venues and infrastructure).

n A decrease in anticipated private sector funding
from £738 million to £165 million. This excludes,
however, the significant increase in the estimated
private sector contribution to the Olympic Village
which is outside of the budget. It also excludes any
receipts from future sales of land and property after
the Games, out of which the Government has since
estimated, in June 2007, that £675 million would be
available for repayment to the National Lottery.

8 From the outset of any programme or project it
is vital to use sound processes to establish a clear and
accurate budget. The budget should not only set out the
costs involved and the funding to meet these, but also the
main benefits to be delivered, with a clear statement of
any underlying judgements and assumptions. It enables
stakeholders to plan and progress with confidence and
certainty, and establishes a baseline against which to
assess progress and performance. A programme of the
scale, complexity and profile of the 2012 Games gives rise
to a high level of inherent risk and uncertainty, and the
need for significant judgements and assumptions about
future costs and benefits. This increases the importance of
adopting a rigorous and sound approach in establishing a
budget for the Games.

2 The difference between the estimates at the time of the bid and the March 2007 budget

Source: National Audit Office drawing on information from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport

March 2007 budget
(£ million)

9,3252

1652

9,3252

9,3253

Difference
(£ million)

6,027

(573)

5,289

5,906

Estimate at the time of the bid
(£ million)

3,2981

7381

4,0361

3,4193

Net cost of the Games to be met from public sector funding

Expected private sector contribution4

Gross cost of the Games4

Public funding available

NOTES

1 See paragraph 34 on page 15.

2 The Department told us that, should the anticipated £165 million private sector funding not materialise, this would be met from within the contingency
provision (which is included within the £9.325 billion) or from a reduction in costs. Therefore, the gross and net cost of the Games as stated here are the
same, with the £9.325 billion representing the Department’s upper limit on public funding for the Games.

3 See paragraph 37 on page 18.

4 The figure for gross cost of the Games includes the expected public sector contribution to the cost of the Olympic Village, but does not include the gross
cost of the Village itself, which is expected to be largely funded by the private sector. Similarly, the figure for expected private sector contribution does not
include the expected contribution to the cost of the Village.

3 £1.173 billion is the sum of £836 million and £337 million as set out in notes 5 and 6 to Figure 6 on page 16.

The budget for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, National Audit Office HC 612 Session 2006-7 20 July 2007

Olympic Delivery Authority Core Costs

• Olympic Delivery Authority Costs
– Building New Venues and facilities (including legacy

conversion)
– Upgrading and enhancing existing facilities (i.e. at

Weymouth)
– Transport Infrastructure
– Programme Management
– Site Security

• Infrastructure and Regeneration Costs (preparing ground to
enable construction)

• Staging Costs (broadcasting, sponsorship)
• Wide Costs

– Improving transport links in London
– Policing to support games in London

The budget for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, National Audit Office HC 612 Session 2006-7 20 July 2007

The Nature of Different Programme Types

2 Guide to developing the Programme Business Case

Chapter 1: Introduction

Figure 1. The different nature of different programme types
Focus of programme

Making and delivering
C

o
n

st
ru

ct
io

n
,

En
g

in
ee

ri
n

g
,

Sy
st

em
s

&
I

T

C
h

an
g

e
M

an
ag

em
en

t
Po

lic
y

&
St

ra
te

g
y

External or societal changeOrganisational change

N
at

u
re

o
f

p
ro

g
ra

m
m

e

Vision-led, Outcome driven,
Ambiguity and clarity co-exist,

Proactive adjustment to scope, loose levers

Vision-led, Benefits driven,
Good clarity / Some ambiguity,

Reactive adjustment to scope, clear levers

Specification-led, Output driven,
High clarity / Low ambiguity,

Reactive adjustment to scope.

Making and delivering: where the change being delivered is based on making and delivering
new facilities, the programme will tend to be led by the specification of the outputs required –
Figure 2, bottom left. There will be relatively low levels of ambiguity about what the programme
is to deliver. The scope will be reasonably well defined and adjusted according to circumstances.

Organisational change: where the change is more focused on changing the way an organisation
works, the programme will tend to be led by a vision of the desired outcome and the benefits
it will deliver – Figure 2, (middle). There will typically be some level of ambiguity about what the
precise changes are and how they will be delivered; but there are fairly clear levers that can be
employed to achieve the vision.

External or societal change: where the change is focused on interventions and improvements
in society, the programme will be driven by the desired outcome, but will typically be highly
ambiguous and complex to define in terms of what it will involve – Figure 2, (top right). The
scope may need to be adjusted as ambiguities are clarified over time.

Developing a Programme Business Case applies to all types of programmes and needs to be
undertaken by trained people who have the capabilities and competencies to undertake the
tasks involved.

How does a programme align with the strategic planning process?
A programme is a major undertaking for most organisations and that involves significant
funding and change for the parties involved.

Figure 2 below shows a typical environment for programme management.

(HM Treasury, 2018)

Interactive Workshop

• Please read and refer to the following two
Olympic Games Learning Legacy papers on
Moodle:

– Kintrea K (2012). Learning Legacy Lessons Learned from the
London 2012 Games Construction Project, Programme
Management, Olympic Delivery Authority, April 2012.

– Mackenzie I and Davis A (2012). Learning Legacy Lessons
Learned from the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games
Construction Programme, Olympic Delivery Authority, October
2012.

For Discussion in Groups

1. What was the Olympic Delivery Authority’s (ODA’s) approach to
programme management? and what was key in each of these
areas?

2. The ODA appointed a Delivery Partner (DP) – What experience did
they require from the appointed DP? what was their role in the
programe? And why did ODA have this as a preferred approach.

3. Explain why the Olympics was a programme? (refer to the
definition of a programme) and What were the key elements of the
programme?

4. What 4 areas were critical within Programme Management?

5. What were the reasons for the cost increases (bid v outturn)?

6. Were the Olympic Games a success? And why?

Reflection

• Reflect on the Case Study in the context of
Programme Managament and the material covered

Managing Programmes and
Portfolios (MPP) Module M32494

Projects, Programmes & Portfolios

Objectives LO1

• Evaluate the Significance of a Programme and
Portfolio

What is a Project? & Project Management?

• Project = A temporary organisation, usually
existing for a much shorter time, which will deliver
one or more outputs in accordance with a
specific business case. A particular project may
or may not be part of a programme. Whereas
programmes, deal with outcomes, projects deal
with outputs” (MoP, 2011)

• Project = ”A unique, transient endeavor
undertaken to bring about change and to achieve
planned objectives” (APM, 2019).

Projects are…. (APM, 2019)

• Unique, time bound
– Uses project management techniques to focus on the key objectives

• Risk aware
– Only mitigate high priority risks

• Capital funded
– Funded by loans, investment capital etc.

• Specialist skills
– Range of skills (need is temporary)

• Create outputs
– Also know as products or deliverables

• Focussed on standard of output
– Continuous improvement of process

Project Management Definitions

• The application of processes, methods, knowledge,
skills and experience to achieve specific objectives
for change (APM,2019)

• Planning, monitoring and control of all aspects of
the project and the motivation of those involved in
it to achieve the project objectives on time and to
the specified cost, quality and performance (MoP,
2011)

Project Management (ILX MoP, 2019)

Project Management is about…

• Defining the rationale for the investment
• Capturing project requirements
• Developing project scope
• Preparing a Business Case to justify the investment
• Securing corporate agreement and funding
• Selecting the life cycle
• Developing the Deployment Baseline
• Developing and implementing the Project Management Plan
• Leading building and motivating the project team
• Managing risks, issues and changes on the project
• Controlling, monitoring and controlling progress against the plan

(schedule)
• Managing costs against the project budget
• Maintaining communications with stakeholders and the project team
• Handing Over and Closing the project in a controlled fashion when

appropriate

What is a Programme & Programme
Management?

• Programme = “A temporary, flexible organization created to
co-ordinate, direct and oversee the implementation of a set of
related projects and activities in order to deliver
outcomes and benefits related to the organization’s
strategic objectives. A programme is likely to have a life
that spans several years” (MoP, 2011).

• Programme = ”A unique, transient strategic endeavor
undertaken to achieve beneficial change and incorporating a
group of related projects and business-as-usual (activities)”
(APM, 2019).

• Programme Management = “The action of carrying out the
co-ordinated organization, direction and implementation of a
dossier of projects and transformation activities (i.e.
programme) to achieve outcomes and realise benefits of
strategic importance to the business” (MoP, 2011).

Benefits of Programme Management

• All projects are focussed on the strategy

• Projects are planned in the optimum order, recognising the dependencies
between them to minimise delays

• Project outputs are transitioned into outcomes and benefits realised

• Infrastructure projects are justified by the programme business case

• Economies of scale:
– Cost reductions by procuring resources across several projects

together instead of one at a time
– One programme office to support all projects instead of multiple

project offices

• Risk managed at programme/strategic level

• Wider stakeholder community is engaged throughout.

The Nature of Different Programme Types

2 Guide to developing the Programme Business Case

Chapter 1: Introduction

Figure 1. The different nature of different programme types
Focus of programme

Making and delivering

C
on

st
ru

ct
io

n,
En

gi
ne

er
in

g,
Sy

st
em

s
&

IT

C
ha

ng
e

M
an

ag
em

en
t

Po
lic

y
&

St
ra

te
gy

External or societal changeOrganisational change

N
at

ur
e

of
p

ro
gr

am
m

e

Vision-led, Outcome driven,
Ambiguity and clarity co-exist,

Proactive adjustment to scope, loose levers

Vision-led, Benefits driven,
Good clarity / Some ambiguity,

Reactive adjustment to scope, clear levers

Specification-led, Output driven,
High clarity / Low ambiguity,

Reactive adjustment to scope.

Making and delivering: where the change being delivered is based on making and delivering
new facilities, the programme will tend to be led by the specification of the outputs required –
Figure 2, bottom left. There will be relatively low levels of ambiguity about what the programme
is to deliver. The scope will be reasonably well defined and adjusted according to circumstances.

Organisational change: where the change is more focused on changing the way an organisation
works, the programme will tend to be led by a vision of the desired outcome and the benefits
it will deliver – Figure 2, (middle). There will typically be some level of ambiguity about what the
precise changes are and how they will be delivered; but there are fairly clear levers that can be
employed to achieve the vision.

External or societal change: where the change is focused on interventions and improvements
in society, the programme will be driven by the desired outcome, but will typically be highly
ambiguous and complex to define in terms of what it will involve – Figure 2, (top right). The
scope may need to be adjusted as ambiguities are clarified over time.

Developing a Programme Business Case applies to all types of programmes and needs to be
undertaken by trained people who have the capabilities and competencies to undertake the
tasks involved.

How does a programme align with the strategic planning process?
A programme is a major undertaking for most organisations and that involves significant
funding and change for the parties involved.

Figure 2 below shows a typical environment for programme management.

(HM Treasury, 2018)

Project and Programme Management
(ILX MoP, 2019)

Coal Power Station to Nuclear:
Outputs & Outcomes (ILX MoP, 2019)

• Outputs = Tangible or intangible product delivered by a project (i.e. deliverables or product).

One project concerned with buying land, another produce plans for a new power station

• Outcomes = Changed behaviour that results from use of an output and leads to realisation of a benefit.

Instead of burning coal to generate electricity we are using nuclear energy – benefit to reduce Co2

Projects v Programmes (APM, 2019)

Programmes Projects

Tend to be long term endeavours Shorter time frame

Based on achieving a strategic vision Focussed on delivering outputs on
time, on cost to the required standard

Has a business case

Has a business case but
infrastructure/enabling projects rely in
the programme business case for
justification

Focussed on creating outcomes and
benefits Focussed on delivering outputs

Greater ability deliver economies of
scale

Less ability to deliver any economy of
scale

Wider group of stakeholders Restricted group of stakeholders

Manages the dependencies between
projects

Manages the dependencies within
projects

Situations where Programmes could be used…

• Large construction project:
– High speed 2 (HS2) rail

• Split into different projects land aquisition, tunnel
construction, signaling, rolling stock, stations and local
infrastructure (access roads).

• Local Community Initiative:
– To provide stronger, greener, safer communities (vision)

• Split into different projects for street lighting, street furniture,
health awareness and community policing.

• Organisational change:
– Virgin and O2 merged in a 50:50 Joint Venture in June 2021 with

a programme to rationalize operational departments of both
organisations

• Split into different projects for marketing, cost saving by merging call
centres, combining technologies, rebranding, sale.

What is a Porfolio? & Portfolio Management?

• Portfolio = “The totality of an organization’s investment in
the changes required to achieve its strategic objectives “ (MoP,
2011).

• Portfolio = “A Portfolio of projects and/or programmes used to
structure and manage investments at an organizational or
functional level to optimize strategic benefits or operational
efficiency” (APM, 2019).

• Portfolio Management “The totality of an organization’s
investment (or segment thereof) in the changes required to
achieve its strategic objectives” (MoP, 2011).

• Portfolio management “The selection, prioritisation and
control of an organisation’s projects and programmes in line with
its strategic objectives and capacity to deliver’ (APM, 2019)

Portfolio Management (ILX MoP, 2019)

Typical Environment for Portfolio and Programme
Management

3Guide to developing the Programme Business Case

Chapter 1: Introduction

Figure 2
Internal or External operating environment

Political, Economic, Sociological, Technological

Influence and Shape

Define Scope and Prioritise

Initiate, Align and Monitor

Implement and Deliver

Bring About

Policies, Strategies, Initiatives and Targets

Programmes

Projects and related activities

New or Transformed Business Operations Services

Outcomes Achieved and Benefits Realised

Organisations achieve their vision and mission through business strategies, policies,
initiatives and targets that are influenced and shaped by the political, economic, sociological,
technological, and legal environment in which they operate.

These business strategies consist of strategic portfolios that scope, define and prioritise the
programmes needed to deliver the agreed business changes, outcomes and benefits.

The programmes within these strategic portfolios, in turn, initiate, align and monitor the
projects and activities required to deliver the necessary outputs. These outputs may consist
of new products and services, new processes and service capabilities, or changes to business
operations. But it is not until the projects deliver and implement the required outputs into
business operations, to improve organisational capabilities and achieve outcomes, that the full
benefits of the programme can be achieved.

A continual process of alignment is required to ensure that the programme remains linked to
strategic objectives, because even as programmes are implementing changes and improvements
to business operations, they may need to respond to changes in strategies or to accommodate
new initiatives and policies.

A case study showing the relationship between strategy, programmes and projects is
provided at Annex A.

What is the importance of the Programme Business Case using the Five
Case Model?
The Programme Business Case is important because programmes will only deliver their intended
outcomes and benefits if they are properly scoped, planned and costs justified from the outset.

Preparing a programme business case using the Five Case Model provides decision makers
and stakeholders with a proven framework for structured ‘thinking’ and assurance that the
programme:

(HM Treasury, 2018)

Projects, Programmes & Portfolios

Source: (APM, p18, 2021)

Host Organisation (Strategic Objectives)

Portfolio

Business-as-usual

Projects

Programme Programme Programme

Environment

Programme

Portfolio

Situations where Portfolios could be used…

• “Levelling-up the North” – Central government needs
to establish a range of programmes and projects to
improve (see: https://www.centreforcities.org/levelling-up/#work)

– Living standards
– R&D
– Transport Infrastructure
– Education
– Health
– Well being
– Housing
– Crime
– Local Leadership

Situations where Portfolios could be used…
(Rayner & Reiss, 2013)

• A building supplies merchant decides to expand from 8th to 4th

largest chain in the country – add home DIY and services to their
business historically focused on the building trade.

• Decided to establish 3 programmes:
– Store expansion programme

• Objective to increase from 40 to 70 stores
– Home services programme

• To launch a range of services to home owners
– Fitted kitchens and bathrooms

– Manufacturing programme
• Manufacture certain product lines previously bought in

– Would mean factory building, production line,
warehousing, stock control plus new distribution

• Other small projects included:
• IT/MIS, Human Resources, Accounts, Larger carpark

Characteristics of Portfolios, Programmes and
Projects

Aspect Project Management Programme Management Portfolio Management

Scope Narrow, focused on delivery of
defined products.

Wide scope focused on delivery of
capability that will make possible
realization of expected benefits.

All of initiatives (programmes &
projects) for the organization as a
whole.

Success
Criteria

On-time, on-budget, on-
specification creation of
defined produces.

Realisation of expected business
benefits.

Overall contribution to the
organization’s strategy of its
complete portfolio of programmes
and projects.

Timescale Time needed to create and
deliver defined products
typically expressed in months.

Time needed to create the new
capability and transition activities –
typically years.

Ongoing business as usual activity
with no anticipated end date.

Approach to
change

Projects should be clearly
defined and change strictly
controlled to minimize impact
on TCQ.

Change is inevitable and embraced
with impact reviewed against the
business case. Frequently
uncertainties at start. Leadership
should focus on constant learning
and refinement.

Objectives is to structure portfolio
so as to optimize the organistion’s
benefits against the total
investment being made and risk
taken.

Typical
Planning

Detailed planning to manage
delivery of the defined
products.

High level plans, providing guidance
and oversight of component
projects, focus on independencies of
projects and resolution of conflicts.

Overall processes and
communications to establish
contributions and costs of the
whole portfolio.

Typical
Controls

Monitor and control tasks to
ensure on-budget, on-time
and on-specification delivery
of defined products.

Monitor component projects and on-
going work through governance
structures.

Monitor aggregate performance of
whole portfolio, in terms of
benefits realized and contribution
to organizational objectives.

Rayner and Reiss (2013, p18)

References

• APM (2019) APM Body of Knowledge Seventh edition, Association of
Project Management, Princess Risborough, Buckinghamshire.

• APM (2021) APM Project Management Qualification Study Guide,
Princess Risborough, Buckinghamshire.

• HM Treasury (2018) Guide to Developing The Programme Business
Case.

• ILX MoP (2019) Management of Portfolios MoP, User Guide, V1.7.

• MoP (2011) Management of Portfolios 2011 Edition, AXELOS Limited.

• Rayner P & Reiss G (2013) Portfolio and Programme Management
Demystified – Managing Multiple Projects Successfully, Routeledge.


MPP – review of academic research


Review of:


The management of project management: A conceptual framework for project governance

1) According to the paper what is the difference between Governance and management?

2) What are the key differences between projects, programs and portfolios?

3) What are the two approaches to governance?

4) How might conflicts/contradictions arise between the management and governance of projects and programmes?


Evaluating the Quality of An Academic Research Paper – A General Guide

The questions below offer a general framework with which to evaluate academic papers which may be useful for your studies: –

1. Does the abstract adequately summarise the article?

2. Does the introduction fully set the context for the research?

3. Is there an adequate overview of relevant literature in the area?

4. Are the terms adequately defined?

5. Are the limitations and or strengths of existing studies discussed?

6. Is a critical or descriptive perspective adopted

7. Are there any gaps or oversights?

8. Is the sample large enough for any conclusions to be valid?

9. Are the research methods clearly described?

10. Are data gathering and analysis techniques and tools transparent and visible?

11. Is it clear what data sets are being used?

12. Do we learn a sufficient amount about the context in which the research was conducted?

13. Is the writing style clear or is there evidence of vagueness and / or repetition?

14. How successful is the paper in demonstrating an ability to move beyond description critically analyse data?

15. How easy is it to follow the thread of the argument? Is it coherent, well-structured or muddled?

16. Are there any unsupported statements / assertions?

17. Is the data related back to existing research in the area?

18. Are any quotations included supported by sufficient commentary?

19. Does the paper develop new theoretical insights or add constructively to existing theory?

20. Is use made of statistical significance?

21. Are the statistics mainly descriptive rather than confirmatory?

22. Are there any exaggerated claims?

23. What do you like about the paper? Why?

24. What do you dislike about the paper? Why?

25. Are the interpretations consistent with the result?

26. How well is the interpretation of the results linked to the theoretical background?

27. How strong is the conclusion?

28.
Does the study show anything new, innovative or of particular interest?

29. If a theoretical or a philosophical perspective is employed, what is this perspective?

30. Is this consistent with the problem, methodology, data collection and the analytical techniques?

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Governance, Methodologies and Methods –
Workshop

For Discussion in Groups

1) What was the approach to governance on the London Olympics
2012 case study?

2) Why was programme governance and assurance critical to the
London Olympics 2012?

Be prepared to present back to the wider group.

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Developing Capability – Workshop

For Discussion in Groups

What is the importance of developing capability in organisations?

2) How was developing capability managed in the London Olympics 2012 Case Study?

3) What are the benefits of developing capability within organisations?

Be prepared to present back to the wider group.

image1.jpg

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Leadership, Challenges and Leading Programmes – Workshop

For Discussion in Groups

What were some of the leadership challenges in the London Olympics 2012 case?

How do you think they these were proactively managed?

What do you think are essential elements for successful leadership of projects and programmes?

Be prepared to present back to the wider group.

image1.jpg

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Stakeholder Engagement – Workshop

In Groups: –

1) Create a stakeholder power / interest matrix for the London Olympics 2012 stakeholders.

2) Draft a communication plan for the key stakeholders in the case.

3) Are there differences in the way a programme manager and a project manager would deal with stakeholders? What are they?

Be prepared to present back to the wider group.

image1.jpg

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Projects in Context – Workshop

For Discussion in Groups

1) What is the importance of reviews and audits in the delivery of a project or programme?

2) How was project and programme monitoring undertaken on the London 2012 Olympics
case?

3) How have reviews and audits impacted on the delivery of the London 2012 Olympics?
Provide evidence from the case.

Please review the Learning Legacy documents by Kintrea & the APM and McKenzie & Davies
to inform your discussion.

Be prepared to present back to the wider group

White Paper

The Functions of Governance

1 www.mosaicprojects.com.au

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.

For more White Papers see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI.php

Over the last decade or two, governance has been an

emerging area of interest, growing in importance and the

focus of increasing legislative interest.

The objectives of governance were defined in 2002 by Sir

Adrian Cadbury and in 2004 by the OECD. The objective

of ‘good governance’ adapted from the definition by Sir

Adrian Cadbury (2002) is generally accepted as: “……

holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. The

governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require

accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests

of individuals, the organisation and society”.

The necessary principles and practices needed to implement governance have also been thought through and

defined, probably the most comprehensive being the Australian Institute of Company Directors ‘Corporate

Governance Framework1’.

What’s missing is a clear description of the ‘functions of governance’ similar to the widely accepted

‘functions of management’ developed by Henri Fayol (1841 – 1925). Fayol defined the five functions of

management in his 1916 book Administration Industrielle et Generale, as:

M1 To forecast and plan,

M2 To organise

M3 To command or direct (lead)

M4 To coordinate

M5 To control (French: contrôller: in the sense that a manager must receive feedback about a process

in order to make necessary adjustments and must analyse the deviations.).

Management undertakes these functions through management structures and committees such as project

control boards. A more detailed discussion of the functions and principles of management is contained in

our White Paper: WP1094 The Functions of Management2 Given these functions of management are still

generally accepted more than 100 years after their publication; they cannot also be the functions of

governance (assuming governance and management are different).

The Six Functions of Governance

Governance is the action of governing an organisation by using and regulating influence to direct and control

the actions and affairs of management and others3. It is the exclusive responsibility of the ‘governing body’,

1 For more on the AICD ‘Company Directors, the Corporate Governance Framework ‘ see:

http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Publications/Company-Director-magazine/A-
framework-for-good-director-practice

2 See WP1094 The Functions of Management:
https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/WhitePapers/WP1094_Defining_Management.pdf

3 For more on the definition of governance see:
https://mosaicprojects.wordpress.com/2014/04/21/defining-governance-what-the-words-mean/

White Paper

2 www.mosaicprojects.com.au

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.

For more White Papers see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI.php

the person, or group accountable for the performance and conformance of the organisation (in a commercial

organisation, the Board of Directors)4.

The functions of governance were originally defined in Dr. Lynda Bourne’s article The Six Functions of

Governance5. They are:

• G1 – Determining the objectives of the organisation expressed through its vision and mission

statements and implemented through its strategic plan. The objectives define the purpose of the

organisation, and describe how the purpose will be fulfilled. The strategic plan is a key interface

between management and the governing body:

o The governing body determines the organisation’s objectives;

o There is shared responsibility to develop an effective strategy to achieve the objectives;

o Management is responsible for implementing the strategy through the efficient and effective

use of the organisation’s limited resources6.

• G2 – Determining the ethics of the organisation; defining what values, morals and attitudes

matter in the creation and evolution of the organisation – values rarely change. How much

importance is genuinely given to factors such a sustainability, corporate social responsibility,

customer satisfaction and stakeholder engagement over profits and short-term movements in the

share prices. Ethics are based on morals and values and define the rules or standards governing the

conduct of people within the organisation. They answer key questions about the organisation such

as: ‘what do we stand for?’, ‘what do we not want to lose?’, and ‘what do we want to be?’. The

organisation’s values should be an integral part of assessing every potential employee’s suitability

to join the organisation and where people fail to live up to the values require appropriate actions to

help the person change or exit the organisation.

The ethical standards of any organisation are set by the behaviours of people at the top and cascade

down the hierarchy7. Some core values underpinning the organisation’s ethics both internally and

externally may include:

o Integrity, steadfastly applying high moral principles.

o Honesty, being truthful and open.

o Competence, ensuring our advice, opinion and decisions are based on experience and facts.

o Conformance, to all relevant legal, regulatory and other standards deemed necessary or

important by the wider society within which the organisation operates. Conformance should

go beyond merely complying with the ‘letter of the law’ to embrace the spirit of the

documents and aspirations of the wider society.

o Benevolence, treating all with respect and kindness.

o Sustainability, protecting the wider environmental and social spheres within which the

organisation operates (ESG8).

4 For more on corporate governance see: https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/WhitePapers/WP1033_Governance.pdf

5 Bourne, L. The Six Functions of Governance. PM World Journal Vol. III, Issue XI – November 2014.

Download from: https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/PDF_Papers/P188_Six_Functions_of_Governance.pdf

6 The efficient use of resources includes avoiding over commitment through the use of prioritised decision making and
selection processes such as project portfolio management to achieve the optimum overall outcome for the organisation.

7 For more on the ethical foundations of policy see:

8 For more on ESG see:
https://mosaicprojects.wordpress.com/2014/10/29/stakeholders-generate-profits-for-shareholders/

White Paper

3 www.mosaicprojects.com.au

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.

For more White Papers see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI.php

o Stewardship9, protecting resources under your control for the future.

• G3 – Creating the culture of the organisation: this is a more subtle process and deals with the way

people interact with each other. Culture is the environment in which work gets done, and is

embedded in the people working for the organisation, it naturally evolves as a company grows or

changes and requires continuous nurturing and management. The governing body decides on the

culture it wants and influences the operating culture of the organisation through the people it

appoints to executive positions. The most important function of a governing body is appointing the

organisation’s executive management team, and the guidelines they impose on the executive

defining how they will in turn select and appoint other levels of management and the

organisation’s staff, contractors and suppliers. Culture is created by people.

Governmentality10, the willingness of people to ‘be governed’ and to support the governance

system is at the centre of an effective culture. Other aspects include: how supportive the

organisation is, how innovative, how risk seeking/averse, how open and transparent, how mature

and professional, and how tolerant is it. It is impossible to have innovation as a key objective,

which requires sensible risk taking if the organisation’s culture is intolerant of failure. Some

important aspects of a constructive culture include:

o Leadership

o Openness and transparency

o Fairness

o Enterprise and attitudes to sensible risk taking

o Commitment both to the organisations and its values

o Confidence

o Respect

o Accountability and responsibility

• G4 – Designing and implementing the governance framework for the organisation. The

governing body is accountable for the performance of the organisation, and retains overall

responsibility for the organisation it governs; however, in most organisations the governing body

cannot undertake all of the work of governance itself. To ensure the efficient governance of the

organisation various responsibilities need to be delegated to people within the organisations

management11. The governance framework defines the principles, structures, enabling factors and

9 Stewardship is an important governance concept. It includes:

• Fealty: A propensity to view the assets and resources at one’s command as trust for future generations rather
than available for selfish exploitation.

• Charity: A willingness to put the interests of others ahead of ones own.

• Prudence: A commitment to safeguard the future even as one takes advantage of the present.

• Responsibility: The obligation to undertake actions to protect and make proper use of the assets and
resources being governed.

• Accountability: Accepting responsibility for the systemic consequences of one’s actions and decisions.

• Equity: A desire to see that rewards are distributed fairly, based on contribution rather than power.

10 See R. Müller, S.Pemsel, J.Shao. Organisational enablers for project governance and governmentality in project-
based organisations. International Journal of Project Management (Pre press).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2014.07.008

11 The governance and management structures needed to effectively govern and mange projects and programs is
discussed in The management of project management: A conceptual framework for project governance, see:
https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/PDF_Papers/P162_The_Management_of_Project_Management_IJPM.pdf

White Paper

4 www.mosaicprojects.com.au

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.

For more White Papers see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI.php

interfaces through which the organisation’s governance arrangements will operate by delegating

appropriate levels of authority and responsibility to managers and other entities.

• G5 – Ensuring accountability by management:

o For the ethical and cultural environment, they develop and maintain within the organisation.

o For the stewardship and proper use of the resources entrusted to their care.

o For the accomplishment of the strategic plan and fulfilment of the organisation’s objectives.

• G6 – Ensuring compliance by the organisation: providing relevant stakeholders with assurance of

the organisation’s compliance with its regulatory, statutory and legal obligations, as well as

monitoring and directing the performance of its management and staff as they work towards

achieving the organisation’s objectives, working within the organisation’s ethical and cultural

framework and supporting the values established by the governing body.

To implement the functions outlined above12, the governing body (in order of development) has to:

• Understand the concepts of good governance – concepts are abstract ideas framed in general terms;

• Determine the objectives of both the organisation and its governance;

• Determine the respective functions of both the governance and management systems13;

• Establish the principles of governance to be used, these are the fundamental propositions that

define the way system of governance will operate, and acceptable behaviours for the organisation;

• Document the policies that are to be used to implement the principles;

• Work with management to establish appropriate procedures, processes and practices to be used by

the organisation;

• Oversight the specific methods and tools (methodologies) used by management and other people

within the organisation to achieve its objectives14.

• Implement accountability (usually various forms of reporting and meetings with management),

and assurance functions (usually various forms of internal and external audit15) that provide the

governing body with the necessary degree of confidence that the organisation’s management and

workforce (including external suppliers and contractors) are in full compliance with the

governance system described above. The governing body needs the skills and structure such as

properly resourced ‘board sub-committees’ to be able to receive, and understand the significance

of, the various management and audit reports and to validate the effectiveness of its management,

and its auditors and the audit processes.

12 These ‘functions of governance’ are very similar to, and support the independently developed Carver Policy

Governance® Model, see: http://www.carvergovernance.com/model.htm

13 For more on management and governance systems see:
https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/WhitePapers/WP1084_Governance_Systems.pdf

14 The definitions of these terms are discussed in Governance processes and terminology, see:

15 Audits take many forms and require different types of expertise to be effective. Some of the more important include:
– Financial and taxation audits (both legally mandated and internal compliance audits);
– Safety, risk, Intellectual Property (IP), and security audits (cyber security is an emerging area of significance);
– Various supplier and supply chain audits (usually focused on compliance with legislation outlawing practices
such as ‘the bribery of foreign officials’, ‘the use of child labour’, and ‘modern slavery’ – even if these practices
do not place the organisation in breach of the law in its home territory, they create reputational risks);
– Quality audits of all types (both internal and focused on the supply chain);
– Cultural audits (demonstrating a robust ethical culture is becoming increasingly important, this type of audit starts
by considering the ‘tone at the top’ and focuses on the ‘soft controls’ that drive behaviour throughout the
organisation.

White Paper

5 www.mosaicprojects.com.au

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.

For more White Papers see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI.php

In a well governed organisation, the key driver for its objectives will be a clearly enunciated ‘customer value

proposition16’. By focusing on the needs of the stakeholders the organisation exists to serve17, its strategic

objectives can be refined and from this base management effort focused on activities that directly contribute

to fulfilling the organisation’s purpose, and feedback provided to the governing body on how this is being

achieved.

Mapping the functions of governance and management:

The governing body appoints, provides direction to and oversees the functioning of the organisation’s

management and makes the ‘rules’ the organisation’s management and staff are expected to conform to.

Management’s job is to achieve the objectives of the organisation; working within its ethical and cultural

framework, whist complying with the ‘rules’ and providing assurance back to the governing body that this is

being accomplished. The mapping of the relationship between Fayol’s functions of management and the

functions of governance are set out below:

Management functions are assumed to be hierarchal with the governance inputs

cascading down to lower level functions.

16 Peter Drucker: “the purpose of a business is to create a customer”. The purpose of any organisation is to create value

for the stakeholders it exists to serve.

17 Understanding what is valuable to your stakeholders / customers is complex and involves more than simple financial
considerations. However, if the stakeholders do not feel the organisation contributes or creates value for them, they
will go elsewhere (and without customers there is no long-term possibility of the organization remaining viable). For
more on perceptions of value see: https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/Mag_Articles/SA1038_Who_Values_Value.pdf

White Paper

6 www.mosaicprojects.com.au

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.

For more White Papers see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI.php

Governance Functions Management Functions

G1 To determine the objectives of the organisation M1 To forecast and plan

G2 To determine the ethics of the organisation M2 To organise

G3 To create the culture of the organisation M3 To command or direct (lead)

G4 To design & implement the governance framework M4 To coordinate

G5 To ensure accountability by management M5 To control

G6 To ensure compliance by the organisation

Conclusion

The governance system and the management system are symbiotic, but whilst being mutually

interdependent, the two systems fulfil very different functions18. A well governed organisation is designed to

allow these two systems to work together to the benefit of the organisation’s overall stakeholder community.

The amount of time and effort devoted by the ‘governing body’ to compliance and accountability can be

significantly reduced if the organisation’s objectives, ethics and culture are sound.

_____________________________

First published 15th November 2014, augmented and updated.

Downloaded from Mosaic’s PMKI
Free Library.

For more papers focused on Governance see:

https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI-ORG-005.php

Or visit our PMKI home page at:
https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI.php

Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.

18 For more on governance and management systems see:

https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/WhitePapers/WP1084_Governance_Systems.pdf

1

The remit and task given to CLRL was to define a preferred
scheme for Crossrail line 1 and prepare for an authorisation
process, as well as to study possible routes for a Crossrail line 2.
A  sum of £154  million was allocated for this work, with the
authorisation process expected to begin in late 2003. An  outline
‘earliest practical’ timetable (Figure  2) was included in the first
information brochure produced by CLRL to accompany its official
launch in January 2002.

1. Introduction

The £14·8 billion Crossrail project to deliver the new Elizabeth line
east–west railway across London, UK, has had a long and tortuous
gestation. The history of the project goes back so far that it cannot be
encompassed here, so this paper concentrates on the most recent and
relevant history of the scheme that starts operating in 2018.

The paper covers route option selection, consultation and design
development, starting from the creation of Cross London Rail
Links (CLRL) in 2001 and concluding with agreement to deposit
the Crossrail parliamentary bill in 2004. Information on the earlier
history can be found on the Crossrail website (Crossrail, 2017) and
in ‘CrossRail: Scope, background and feasibility’ (Fergusson, 2001).

2. Creation of CLRL

On 3 May 2001, Britain’s transport ministers Angus Macdonald
and Keith Hill announced to the houses of parliament that the
UK Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) and Transport for London
(TfL) would work together on project definition and design
development of a new cross-London rail link. The  project had
been recommended by SRA’s London East–West Study published
in December 2000 (Figure 1) and included in the London mayor’s
transport strategy in 2001.

SRA and TfL then established a joint-venture company limited
by guarantee, with a board and seconded staff drawn from both
organisations. Staff included the ‘care and maintenance’ team
from London Underground, which, since the original 1992
Crossrail parliamentary bill failed in 1994, had administered the
safeguarding directions for Crossrail and the Chelsea–Hackney
line. These had been put in place by the transport secretary to
protect the routes from conflicting development.

The company was named Cross London Rail Links (CLRL) and set
up offices at 1 Butler Place adjacent to TfL’s headquarters at Windsor
House. The first chairman of CLRL was Christopher Benson, who
had long experience in property development and the City of London,
and the chief executive was Norman Haste, who had led the project
to build the second Severn crossing and managed the preliminary
work for Heathrow Terminal 5. Two  other key appointments were
Jon Willis, formerly head of transport planning at TfL, as head of
planning and Keith Berryman, who had led the London East–West
Study work at SRA, as director of operations and development.

Crossrail project to deliver London’s
Elizabeth line: from options to
parliamentary bill
Simon Bennett BEng, FCILT, MCIPR, GMICE
Head of Learning Legacy, Crossrail Limited, London, UK

The Crossrail programme to deliver the Elizabeth line east–west railway across London, UK, was authorised by the Crossrail
Act 2008. It was the culmination of 6 years of planning and development work by an organisation called Cross London
Rail Links (CLRL), which was created for the purpose as a joint venture between the Strategic Rail Authority (succeeded
by the Department for Transport) and Transport for London. This paper explains the planning and development work,
from the creation of CLRL in 2001 until agreement was given to deposit the Crossrail parliamentary bill in 2004.

Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers
http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/jcien.17.00006
Paper 1700006
Received 09/02/2017 Accepted 27/06/2017
Keywords: history/government/infrastructure planning

Civil Engineering

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

ICE Publishing: All rights reserved

Figure 1. SRA’s London East–West Study

Civil Engineering

2

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

of the City financial district. This included significant business
and residential development in the area around Canary Wharf.
Providing greater capacity to cater for further growth in that area
was seen as a key benefit of an east–west project. In addition, the
development of the former London Underground East London line
into the London Overground network had had the effect of turning
Whitechapel into a significant transport hub.

As a result, the work to define a preferred scheme for line 1
concentrated on the route options outside the centre, with a tunnel
extending further east than the safeguarded route, and stations at
Whitechapel and Isle of Dogs being included, at least as options, in
all the routes considered.

A long list of options (Figure  3) was identified through desk
study using the team’s planning, engineering and operational
experience. These options were drawn widely so as not to miss
possible opportunities. They therefore included longer distance
routes (such as to Oxford in the west and to Clacton or Southend in
the east) as well as options to replace existing services, which had
not previously been considered in the long gestation of Crossrail
(such as taking over the Metropolitan line to Uxbridge).

The long-list options were assessed using a multi-criteria
assessment appropriate to the level of information that could
practically be identified across such a large range of options in
a short time. This provided a comparative rather than exhaustive
assessment. The criteria used were

■ cost (operating and capital)

3. Route option development

One of the findings of the London East–West Study was to
confirm that there were very few practical routes for a new east–
west tunnel through the centre of London. Essentially only the
routes already established by safeguarding directions for an east–
west Crossrail and the Chelsea–Hackney line in the early 1990s, or
a route below and along the River Thames were practical. The latter
would not offer relief to the most congested London Underground
lines and presented difficult construction issues, in particular at
stations, so was not recommended.

The Crossrail route safeguarded in the 1990s was for a scheme
running from a point just west of Paddington station to a junction
with the Great Eastern main line to the east of Liverpool Street.
Stations were included at Paddington, Bond Street, Tottenham
Court Road, Farringdon and Liverpool Street and sites for the
surface works relating to these stations, known as ‘areas of surface
interest’, were included in the safeguarding.

The effect of the safeguarding had been to sterilise a number of
potentially valuable development sites for over 20 years. It was felt
that ignoring these sites and selecting new options for demolition
would create unjustified new impacts and possible opposition so
it was decided at an early stage to stick as far as possible to the
safeguarded alignments and station locations through the central
area of London.

Since the mid-1990s the geography of London had changed
somewhat, with greater development taking place to the east

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2012 2014

Year

A
ct

iv
it

y

Develop route options
Option selection

Outline design
Prepare for consent

Consent process
Tender design

Tender preparation
Tender period

Implementation
Rail service begin

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10

Crossrail line 1
Crossrail line 2

Note: This is a draft outline of the earliest practical timetable.

Figure 2. Outline activity programme (from ‘Crossrail means…’ brochure)

To Aylesbury

High
Wycombe

Reading

Slough

Chesham

Liverpool
StreetPaddington

Watford
Junction

Heathrow

Charlton Plumstead

Shenfield

River Thames

Dartford Ebbsfleet

Southend

Grays

Stratford
Uxbridge

Alternative
routes

km 100

Figure 3. 2002 potential route options map (from stakeholder consultation document)

Civil Engineering

3

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

moved into the construction phase, but this includes the challenges
of the expectation of instant response when using social media.

The stakeholder consultation booklet was published in May
2002 and set out five corridors for possible Crossrail services,
including two alternative routes on corridor 5 between Canary
Wharf and Woolwich (Figure 5). The key attributes of each route
were set out in summary including commentary on the areas
served, interchanges which would be provided, the impact on other
services, engineering works expected to be required and the likely
benefits. The document also set out the draft appraisal framework
CLRL intended to use (see Supplementary Table 1), to seek views
on whether it was appropriate to enable a robust decision.

A workshop was held in July 2002 to consult interested and
experienced stakeholders, such as the local planning authorities,
on the appraisal framework to ensure that there would be support
for the decisions taken. A total of 151 responses were received to
the stakeholder consultation. Mostly in the form of several-page
letters, these were combined into a report that enabled the views to
be considered during the workshop process to compare the options.

The appraisal framework was applied by choosing a ‘reference
case’ project and scoring each criterion for the options as equal,
better or worse than the reference case, with three levels of positivity
or negativity. The reference case was essentially the widest extent of
the options, with routes to Watford Junction and to Reading (and
Heathrow) in the west and to Shenfield and to Ebbsfleet in the east.
The  route to Aylesbury via Amersham was not included in the

■ benefits (time savings, international connections, regeneration,
social exclusion, town centre regeneration, regional access,
strategic interchange, capacity, congestion relief)

■ environmental impacts
■ required statutory consents (railway industry and construction)
■ engineering and operational feasibility.

A series of reports was produced summarising the performance
of groups of options to the east and west of London against
these criteria. Comparing these alongside the responses from
early discussions with key stakeholders, particularly railway
organisations, enabled CLRL to identify a shortlist to take to a
more detailed appraisal. A  notable result was to confirm, as had
been recommended by the London East–West Study, that Crossrail
should be a metro railway, typically serving all stations on a route.

The alternative, providing a service that would run fast to the
central area and then stop frequently, would be suboptimal as it
would mix modes of operation and create a challenge to design a
train that could cope with high passenger numbers in the centre as
well as provide the expected comfort over long distances.

4. Route option selection

The next step was to assess the shortlisted routes using the
then relatively recently introduced ‘new approach to appraisal’.
Alongside this, a stakeholder consultation was undertaken to seek
the views of potentially affected planning authorities, but also
regional government, government and non-governmental agencies
as well as critical transport, planning, environment and business
groups. A full public consultation was not undertaken at this stage
as it would run the risk of blighting property values on routes that
might not eventually be chosen. The  decision was to arrive at a
preferred route then consult publicly with that route as the base
option.

The project published a stakeholder consultation document
(CLRL, 2002) (Figure  4), including placing it on the Crossrail
website where it could be viewed publicly. This led to some
responses to the stakeholder consultation being received from
private individuals. It  is worth noting, and may be surprising to
some, that the use of online media for communication was still in
its infancy in the early 2000s. Modern projects need to embrace
web-based communication fully, as indeed Crossrail did as it

Figure 4. Stakeholder consultation document cover

River Thames

To Aylesbury

Reading

Slough

Chesham
Watford
Junction

Heathrow

Charlton Plumstead

Shenfield

Dartford Ebbsfleet

Alternative
routes

km 100 Liverpool
StreetPaddington

Stratford

Figure 5. 2002 shortlisted corridors

Civil Engineering

4

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

would have been incompatible with providing a below-ground Crossrail
station at Woolwich due to the impact on the station environment of
diesel traction and the substandard passenger platform train stepping
distances required to provide clearance for container wagons. Given
that the Docklands Light Railway extension to Woolwich Arsenal was
about to open, providing new journey opportunities as well as additional
capacity between Woolwich and central London, it was accepted by
CLRL that Woolwich station be deleted.

After the additional consultation on the Kingston branch, a further
comparative appraisal was performed, which produced the 2003
preferred route (Figure 8). The Watford branch was dropped, which
avoided a possible issue in the days before London Overground took
over the provision of services to Watford Junction on the Watford
DC line. This was that the introduction of Crossrail services would
have significantly reduced or even removed train services at South
Hampstead and Kilburn High Road stations. The  question of a
surface or tunnelled route between the Great Western main line and
Gunnersbury remained unresolved. This was because of the cost of
the tunnel and the below-ground station at Turnham Green, and the
disruption to road and rail traffic of the surface route because of
level crossings. As a result these were both included as options.

5. Preferred option consultation

The Crossrail business case for the preferred route was
presented to the Department for Transport (DfT) and this led in
July 2003 to the transport secretary announcing a review of the
business case and at the same time calling on CLRL to carry
out public consultation. The consultation was planned to run for
12 weeks to accord with then current guidance and good practice.
Crossrail set objectives for the consultation to identify and contact
a wide range of stakeholders, to identify their concerns and, where
practical, mitigate them.

To ensure the consultation reached as many people as possible,
a public awareness campaign was held in advance to communicate
the preferred route and encourage people who wished to be
consulted to contact the project. To avoid the summer holidays, the
awareness campaign ran from mid-September and the consultation
took place from October to December 2003. By  this time it had
become clear that the surface route on corridor 6 was not practical
and the route for consultation was therefore as shown in Figure 8.

reference case because there had been significant responses to the
consultation from railway organisations, local authorities and others
that Crossrail should avoid impacting the Chiltern line, which was
performing well under a long-term franchise.

The results were presented to the Crossrail board in November
2002 with a recommendation that the reference case scheme be
pursued, including stations at Whitechapel, Isle of Dogs, the Royal
Docks and Woolwich. However, during 2002 the executive team at
the SRA had changed and, after the board meeting, the SRA was
successful in getting agreement that CLRL be instructed to
consider a sixth corridor. This would be a branch serving Kingston
via Richmond, connecting the Great Western main line at North
Pole to the North London line north of Gunnersbury, either through
a new chord at the west end of North Pole depot, or a new tunnel.
The  reason for this addition was to enable Crossrail to address
capacity issues at Waterloo station, which had become a concern to
the new team at the SRA, by attracting journeys away from stations
on the South West main line.

An addendum to the consultation document was published (Figure 6)
and the additional local authorities the new route would serve were
consulted in January 2003 (Figure 7). The SRA also wanted to enable
the Crossrail tunnel under the Thames between the North Kent line
and North London line at North Woolwich to carry freight trains. This

Heathrow Shenfield
Hayes and
Harlington

Ealing
Broadway Stratford Ilford

Manor
Park

Seven
Kings

Chadwell
Heath

Gidea
Park

Brentwood

Goodmayes Romford
Harold
Wood

Forest
Gate

Kingston Ebbsleet
Crossrail

Hampton
Wick

Strawberry
Hill

Custom
House

Slade
Green

Stone
CrossingBelvedere SwanscombeRichmond Gunnersbury

Teddington Twickenham Kew
Gardens

Isle of
Dogs

Abbey
Wood

Erith Dartford GreenhitheActon
Central

Paddington Tottenham
Court Road

Liverpool
Street

Bond
Street Farringdon Whitechapel

Chiswick
Park

Existing station
Possible new station
Existing surface line
Surface option
Tunnel option
Portal (tunnel entrance and exit)

Figure 7. 2003 preferred route with corridor 6 options

Figure 6. Corridor 6 addendum

Civil Engineering

5

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

and vibration from the operation of additional trains and possible
ground settlement due to tunnelling works. The  Crossrail team
were aware these concerns were most likely to arise and so for
this consultation round the team produced a series of explanatory
factsheets (Figure 10) to address the issues and explain the likely
mitigation measures to be used.

The responses were reviewed and collated to identify the key
issues and a report was produced, which was used by Crossrail to
decide whether changes could be made. The detail of the process,
results and response from the consultation is contained in an
aggregated consultation report CLRL produced when the Crossrail
bill was in parliament (CLRL, 2005).

6. Review of business case

The UK transport secretary then appointed Sir Adrian
Montague, a senior civil servant, to review the Crossrail
business case. His  report, Crossrail Review (Montague, 2004),
recommended that the project should proceed but also noted
that the scheme was not an attractive proposition for a public–
private partnership and therefore, and thanks to the receptiveness
of London business representative groups, the government
should consult on legislation to enable the London mayor to

The consultation programme involved holding information centres
at locations along the route, close to proposed stations or significant
works. The consultation team was joined at these events by engineers,
planners and environment specialists from the wider CLRL team to
answer detailed questions (Figure 9). Having specialists available was
extremely helpful as matters of concern could be addressed directly.
The  team supported those experts to communicate with consultees
by providing briefings to develop communication skills, ensure the
scheme was understood and that likely impacts were neither under- nor
over-played, and that all proposals were presented as subject to change
as a result of the consultation and/or further development work.

Meetings were arranged with local authority officers, local
and national politicians, and local community, business and
environment groups, which had been identified from desk and web
searches as well as those who responded to the initial consultation
and awareness campaign.

As the publication of the route would put property at risk of blight,
a major exercise was also carried out to contact all owners of land
and property that might be affected by the project. Letters were sent
offering a meeting with TfL property surveyors. The  explanatory
booklets on compulsory purchase and compensation (DCLG, 2001a,
2001b) were very useful in providing an independent explanation of
the operation of the national compensation code for property to be
acquired or affected. The aim was to ensure that no affected property
owner would find out through visiting an information centre.

Some of the areas where concerns were raised were

■ Hanbury Street, Spitalfields: construction of a shaft for
ventilation, emergency escape and for launch of tunnel boring
machines in an area of dense housing and narrow streets

■ Richmond: construction of a dive-under to the east of Richmond
station to allow Crossrail trains to access the through-Windsor line
tracks to serve stations beyond Richmond to Kingston, including
the acquisition of parts of back gardens adjoining the railway

■ Mayfair: routing of tunnels south of Oxford Street
■ Romford: construction of a depot and the need for a dive-under

to access the depot that would require land from a playing field
■ Shenfield: lack of benefit from the proposed services at a

station where longer distance services call and, therefore, offer
faster journeys to Liverpool Street than would Crossrail.

As well as the opposition to the works in these specific locations,
the general concerns were noise from construction traffic, noise

Heathrow Shenfield
Hayes and
Harlington

Ealing
Broadway Stratford Ilford

Manor
Park

Seven
Kings

Chadwell
Heath

Gidea
Park

Brentwood

Goodmayes Romford
Harold
Wood

Forest
Gate

Kingston Ebbsleet
Crossrail

Hampton
Wick

Strawberry
Hill

Custom
House

Slade
Green

Stone
CrossingBelvedere SwanscombeRichmond Gunnersbury

Teddington Twickenham Kew
Gardens

Turnham
Green

Isle of
Dogs

Abbey
Wood

Erith Dartford Greenhithe

Paddington Tottenham
Court Road

Liverpool
Street

Bond
Street Farringdon Whitechapel

Existing station
New station
Existing surface line
Tunnel
Portal (tunnel entrance and exit)

Figure 8. 2003 preferred route

Figure 9. Crossrail staff meeting the public at an information centre

Civil Engineering

6

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

■ delete the route to Kingston via Richmond as the costs of
the tunnel and underground station at Turnham Green were
disproportionately high and the benefits low for a route that
would only carry 12 trains per hour

■ shorten the western route to terminate at Maidenhead, with
Crossrail trains serving all stations, thus avoiding the cost of
electrification between Maidenhead and Reading, a relatively long
distance with only one intermediate station (electrification between
Maidenhead and Reading is now being delivered for the Intercity
Express programme, so services to Reading have been added to the
Elizabeth line without the need for infrastructure work) (Figure 11).

A second public consultation was held, named round 2, delivered
in a similar way to the first round, with some improvements.
A consultation document (CLRL, 2004) (Figure 12) was produced,
which summarised all the details of the proposed scheme, and set out
how the scheme had changed in response to the results of round 1.
The suite of factsheets was developed into a larger number of ‘policy
statements and position papers’ modelled on documents that had
been successfully used by the Channel Tunnel rail link project.

The final innovation was two fixed ‘information exchanges’
established in a shop unit at Farringdon station and in exhibition
space in Spitalfields. Each was open for 2 days per week throughout
the 12-week consultation period. More detail on the management
of the consultation and the responses received can be found in the
aggregated consultation report.

Responses to round 2 were more informed about the scheme.
This is reflected in the fact that while the numbers of responses
to each round were very similar, round 2 raised 7472 separate
comments within 2836 responses, whereas round 1 had only
produced 3710 issues from 2893 responses. The  total number of
visitors to information centres and exchanges during round 2 was
10 125, an increase on the 7244 who attended during round 1.

Alongside the consultation events, the team commissioned
market research with two purposes: to check that promotion of the
consultation was effective and people were aware that they could
give their views, and independently to gauge support for the project.
It is often difficult to understand overall reactions because those who
support a scheme often do not respond to a consultation because they
think it will happen whatever they say. The research found that 36%
of residents within postcode areas that would be served were aware
of the project. It also found that 73% agreed that the project would
ease overcrowding and 64% considered it ‘good value for money’.

levy businesses to provide some of the necessary funding. This
ultimately bore fruit, as described in a companion paper on
funding by Buck (2017).

The review also recommended that further work be done on the
extent of the project. After the retirement of Benson, Montague
was appointed chairman of CLRL Limited and a further round
of development and consultation began with the intention of
depositing a hybrid bill in November 2004.

7. Public consultation round 2

Revisions to the project scope recommended by the Crossrail
Review (Montague, 2004) and following further work were to

Noise and vibration

Crossing the Capital Connecting the UK

Noise and vibration

Figure 10. Example explanatory factsheet

Shenfield

Stratford Ilford

Manor
Park

Seven
Kings

Chadwell
Heath

Gidea
Park

Brentwood

Goodmayes Romford
Harold
Wood

Forest
Gate

Ebbsleet
Crossrail

Custom
House

Slade
Green

Stone
CrossingBelvedere Swanscombe

Isle of
Dogs

Abbey
Wood

Erith Dartford Greenhithe

PaddingtonActon
Main Line

West
Ealing

SouthallWest
Drayton

Heathrow

LangleyBurnhamMaidenhead Tottenham
Court Road

Liverpool
Street

Bond
Street

Ealing
Broadway

Hayes and
Harlington FarringdonHanwellIverSloughTaplow Whitechapel

Existing station
New station
Existing surface line
Tunnel
Portal (tunnel entrance and exit)

Figure 11. 2004 route

Civil Engineering

7

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

closely with local authorities; for example, to allow for further
intensification of development at the new stations.

The incremental approach to consultation, while it was forced on
the project by the several steps required in getting approval to proceed,
worked very well to inform the public. This was demonstrated by the
number of ‘no comment’ responses dropping considerably and the
number of specific issues raised per response rising between the two
consultation rounds. It was undoubtedly useful to anticipate the likely
issues and field expert staff at events to ensure people’s questions
could be answered as immediately and fully as possible.

It would have been helpful if the full suite of information papers
had been signed off between CLRL and the DfT at an earlier
stage. This would have enabled more detail to be given during the
consultation phase about the promoters’ approach to addressing
matters of concern, such as settlement, noise and vibration and
property acquisition. That they were not was perhaps due to the
DfT only becoming closely involved when the SRA was abolished
and after the two consultation rounds had taken place.

Finally, despite the project’s efforts at researching the likely
petitioners, more effort could have been made to involve a wider
range of consultees at the earliest stage, particularly among those
who would gain from development and might therefore assist
with the costs. The  project assumed a non-commercial stance
with consultation and, as a result, perhaps did not derive benefits
for other stakeholders, which could ultimately have improved the
case for the scheme. The growth of the web mentioned in Section 4
will also enable future projects more easily to identify and contact
stakeholders and engage fully with them.

Acknowledgements

The author is very grateful for the assistance of Keith Berryman
(director, CLRL 2001–2011), Bernard Gambrill (former head of public
affairs, CLRL 2002–2006), David Taylor (head of route protection
and development) and Sarah Goodburn (helpdesk manager) for
providing their recollections and reviewing the author’s work.

The revisions to the scheme resulting from the work
recommended by the Crossrail Review and the responses to
round 2 fed into the production of a new business case, on the basis
of which the project was given authorisation to proceed to prepare
a bill to authorise the scheme. The experiences and learnings from
the bill process are the subject of a separate companion paper
(Bennett, 2017)

8. Conclusions

While CLRL did not meet its initial aim of beginning the
authorisation process in late 2003, the reasons were not within
the company’s control. It  is notable that several key decision
points coincided with parliament rising for summer recess in
the relevant year, and this demonstrates the extent to which even
schemes of national significance with cross-party support are
subject to external programme impacts. Future schemes could
perhaps avoid this by choosing the development consent order
authorisation route. This was not available to CLRL, but there are
other advantages to the hybrid bill process which would need to be
weighed up.

The new approach to appraisal has since been superseded by
the ‘Webtag’ process for appraisal, but the lesson to consult on
the methodology to be used with those who might challenge the
results remains relevant. Keeping local authorities briefed limited
the scope of their petitions to the way Crossrail would be delivered
rather than what was planned. Having said that, CLRL could have
been more aware of land-use planning priorities and worked more

References

Bennett S (2017) Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth line – the
parliamentary bill process. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers
– Civil Engineering, http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/jcien.17.00014.

Buck M (2017) Crossrail project: finance, funding and value capture for
London’s Elizabeth line. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers –
Civil Engineering, http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/jcien.17.00005.

CLRL (Cross London Rail Links) (2002) Stakeholder Consultation. CLRL Ltd,
London, UK.

CLRL (2004) Crossrail Business Case. CLRL Ltd, London, UK.

CLRL (2005) Aggregated Consultation Report. CLRL Ltd, London, UK.

Crossrail (2017) www.crossrail.co.uk/route/crossrail-from-its-early-beginnings
(accessed 15/06/2017).

DCLG (Department for Communities and Local Government) (2001a)
Compulsory Purchase and Compensation Booklet 1: Compulsory Purchase
Procedure. DCLG, London, UK.

DCLG (2001b) Compulsory Purchase and Compensation Booklet 4:
Compensation to Residential Owners and Occupiers. DCLG, London, UK.

Fergusson JC (2001) CrossRail: Scope, background and feasibility.
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Transport 147(2): 61–69,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/tran.2001.147.2.61.

Montague A (2004) Crossrail Review. The Stationery Office, London, UK.

Figure 12. Round 2 consultation document

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Creation of CLRL
    • Figure 1
    • Figure 2
  • 3. Route option development
    • Figure 3
  • 4. Route option selection
    • Figure 4
    • Figure 5
    • Figure 6
    • Figure 7
    • Figure 8
  • 5. Preferred option consultation
    • Figure 9
    • Figure 10
  • 6. Review of business case
  • 7. Public consultation round 2
    • Figure 11
    • Figure 12
  • 8. Conclusions
  • Acknowledgements
  • References
    • Bennett S (2017)
    • Buck M (2017)
    • CLRL (Cross London Rail Links) (2002)
    • CLRL (2004)
    • CLRL (2005)
    • Crossrail (2017)
    • DCLG (Department for Communities and Local Government) (2001a)
    • DCLG (2001b)
    • Fergusson JC (2001)
    • Montague A (2004)

0

Project complexity and systems integration:

Constructing the London 2012 Olympics and Paralympics Games

Andrew Davies* and Ian Mackenzie**

*School of Construction and Project Management

The Bartlett Faculty of the Built Environment

University College London

1-19 Torrington Place

London WC1E 7HB

**Innovation & Entrepreneurship Group

Imperial College Business School

Imperial College London

South Kensington Campus

London SW7 2AZ

*Corresponding author:

Tel: +44(0)20 3108 3073

Email: [email protected]

1

Abstract

Our study of the London Olympics 2012 construction programme showed that systems integration is

one of the major challenges involved in delivery of a complex – “system of systems” or array –

project. Organizations cope with complexity by decomposing a project into different levels of systems

integration with clearly-defined interfaces and buffers between levels and individual component

subsystems. At the “meta systems integration” level, an organization has to be established with the

capabilities to understand the total system, manage external interfaces with the multiple stakeholders

and coordinate the integration of its component parts. At the “system integration” level, efforts are

made to manage each individual system as a loosely-coupled, relatively self-contained subsystem with

defined interfaces to coordinate interdependencies with other parts of overall array. Establishing

processes to maintain stability whilst responding dynamically to uncertain and changing conditions is

one of the most challenging aspects of systems integration.

Key words: managing projects, managing programmes, managing organization, managing innovation,

engineering and construction

2

1. Introduction

Large-scale engineering, construction and infrastructure projects are complex and notoriously

difficult to manage (Miller and Lessard, 2000; Scott, Levitt and Orr, 2011). Despite the growing

number of large-scale infrastructure projects executed around the world and opportunities to use

lessons learnt to improve performance, most are late, over budget and fail to achieve their original

objectives (Morris and Hough, 1987; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003). The term

“megaprojects” is frequently used to describe the largest, most challenging and complex category of

infrastructure projects involving investments of $1bn or more in the construction of transportation,

energy, water, waste and telecommunications infrastructure (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; Flyvbjerg

et al, 2003; Marrewijk, 2006; Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis and Veenswijk, 2007; Sanderson, 2012).

Although prior research emphasizes the size, risk, uncertainty, schedule urgency and institutional

processes associated with megaprojects (Miller and Lessard, 2001; Flyvbjerg et al, 2003; Scott et al,

2011) the concept of complexity receives little or no attention. This is surprising because megaprojects

require an exceptional level of organizational and managerial capability because of their complexity.

We selected the London Olympics and Paralymics 2012 construction programme for our

research setting because we had a rare opportunity to answer the following research question: How

can an organizational structure and process be established to cope with a high degree of project

complexity? The London Olympics is one of several high-profile infrastructure megaprojects

conducted in the UK over recent years such as the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (High-Speed 1),

Heathrow Terminal 5 and Crossrail projects. For many individuals and organizations involved, these

projects were complex and difficult because they exceeded their prior experience and capabilities.

Learning from other projects and relevant international experiences, new models have been

established for delivering these complex projects based on flexible risk-sharing contracts, integrated

project teams and delivery partner organizations (Gil, 2009; Davies, Gann and Douglas, 2009).

The complexity of a project can be defined as a system in terms of the number and variety of

components and interdependencies among them (Baccarini, 1996; Shenhar and Dvir, 1996; Hughes,

1998; Williams, 1999; Dvir, Lipoveskey; Shenhar and Tishler, 1998; Hobday, 1998; Shenhar, 2001;

Shenhar and Dvir, 2007). Components produced by numerous different organizations have to be

3

integrated into a functioning system. The integration challenge is greatest when components are in

reciprocal interdependence (Thompson, 1967); a situation found in complex projects where the actions

of each party must be mutually adjusted to the actions of other parties (Morris, 2013). Several studies

have identified systems integration as the core organizational capability required to deal the

interdependency, uncertainty and change found in complex projects (Sayles and Chandler, 1971;

Sapolsky, 1972; Morris, 1994; Hughes, 1998; Prencipe, Davies and Hobday, 2003). The systems

integrator coordinates the network of organizations involved in the phases of design, construction,

integration, testing, commissioning and handover of a fully operational system. It comprehends how

components and subsystems interact when joined together in a complete system, manages the

uncertainty caused by their integration and balances the need for stability and flexibility when plans

have to be adjusted and conditions change.

Our study of the London Olympics helped us to identify the core systems integration

capabilities required to deal with the most complex type of project – a “system of systems” composed

of an array of individually complex systems joined together to achieve a common system goal. Our

findings suggest that organizations cope with complexity by decomposing a project into different

levels of systems integration with clearly-defined interfaces and buffers between levels and individual

component subsystems. At the “meta systems integration” level, the client or sponsor responsible for

the project faces a number of choices about how to establish a systems integrator with the capabilities

to understand the total system, manage external interfaces with the multiple stakeholders and

coordinate the integration of its component parts. Meta systems integration can be performed in-house

by a large client, an experienced prime contractor or joint-venture delivery partner established on a

temporary basis and disbanded on completion of the project. At the “system integration” level, efforts

are made to manage each individual system as a loosely-coupled, relatively self-contained subsystem

with defined interfaces to coordinate interdependencies with other parts of overall array. Establishing

processes to maintain stability whilst responding dynamically to uncertain and changing conditions is

one of the most challenging aspects of systems integration. Standardized, consistent and carefully

planned processes which serve to freeze components of a system into a given position have to be

unlocked to introduce the mutual adaptation required to deal with change.

4

The paper is divided into the following sections. In a review of the literature, Section 2

identifies systems integration as a structure and process created to coordinate multiple organizations

and deal with the reciprocal interdependency found in complex projects. Section 3 introduces the

methods used and the case study and analysis of the London Olympics construction programme is

presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the role of systems integration as a structure and process

for coping with project complexity and concludes by suggesting some promising avenues for future

research.

2. Conceptualizing project complexity

2.1 System complexity, interdependence and integration

Efforts to define the complexity of projects often refer back to systems theory and the idea

that an organization can be treated as a complex system of interacting component parts (Boulding

1956; Simon, 1962; Bertalanffy, 1968). Component subsystems are interacting because the behaviour

of one component depends on other components. Interactions occur at different levels in a hierarchical

system: among subsystems (inter-component linkages) and interactions within subsystems (intra-

component linkages). Using the metaphor of a building, Simon (1962) suggests that outside walls

insulating the building from the environment represent the boundary of the system. The internal rooms

and walls between them define the boundaries and interactions among subsystems. The partitions

dividing each room into cubicles define the boundaries and interactions within subsystems. In a

“nearly decomposable system”, interactions among subsystems are only weakly connected because the

behaviour of each component is more independent – or insulated – from other components (Simon,

1962: 473).

Subsequent research distinguished between tight or loosely-coupled interactions in the design,

production and operation of complex systems (Weick, 1976; Perrow, 1984). A tightly-coupled system

has little or no slack or buffers among its component parts because the behaviour of one component

(e.g. a design change) directly affects what happens in other components. A loosely-coupled system is

nearly decomposable because the behaviour of each component is less dependent on other

components; it can be modified or adjusted without directly affecting other components.

5

Influenced by systems thinking, early contributions to contingency theory argued that

organizations – including project and matrix structures – can be viewed as systems designed to deal

with different environments (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967;

Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1973; Mintzberg, 1983). Organizations are segmented into differentiated

units (e.g. design, engineering, production and marketing) with specialized functional knowledge,

working styles, differing points of view and behaviour. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) argued that each

part of an organization is designed to deal with a part of the external environment and linked together

by an “integrator” to promote collaboration and resolve conflicts required to achieve an organization’s

objective. Complex projects are often difficult to coordinate and have to devote considerable resources

to integration because they have highly differentiated cross-functional structures involving in-house

units and multiple parties (Galbraith, 1973; Morris, 2013: 58).

Building on Thompson (1967: 54-55), project management scholars suggest that

interdependencies among differentiated parts of a project can be pooled, sequential or reciprocal

(Baccarini, 1996; Williams, 1999; Morris, 2013). In pooled interdependency, each part provides a

discrete contribution to the project, irrespective of other parts. This occurs in a loosely-coupled, nearly

decomposable system where tasks can be performed in isolation by one party without impairing the

activities of other parts of the project. In sequential interdependency, one organization’s output

becomes an input for another part because there is a direct serial relationship between tasks (e.g. time-

sequence project scheduling tools). In reciprocal interdependency “each unit involved is penetrated by

the other” (Thompson, 1967: 55) and the outputs of each unit become inputs for others. This occurs in

a tightly-coupled system where tasks performed by organizational units have to be modified to match

the actions of others (e.g. concurrent engineering to perform related tasks in parallel). All projects

have pooled interdependency, some have sequential and pooled, and the most complex projects have

reciprocal, sequential and pooled (Morris, 2013; 57).

…………………………..

Insert Figure 1 about here

…………………………..

6

Thompson (1967) helps us to identify three mechanisms of coordination or integration for

addressing project interdependencies (Morris, 2013) (see Figure 1). Integration by standardization

establishes the internally consistent rules, relatively stable routines and processes required to deal with

pooled interdependency. It ensures that actions taken by one part or phase of the project are consistent

with others. Integration by planning creates carefully-defined schedules to govern the actions of

sequentially interdependent parts of a project, match the activities of multiple parties in advance and

manage changes in specifications and requirements against defined goals and schedules. Project

planning tools define interdependent tasks in a network diagram and determine the overall pace of the

programme and measure its progress against dynamically changing conditions (e.g. PERT or Critical

Path Method). Planning ahead of time helps to prevent known problems from happening and identifies

the contingency needed for dealing with them when they do occur. Integration by mutual adjustment

involves gathering new information, working collaboratively and responding to emergent, unforeseen

problems in real-time. Mutual adjustment and rapid adaptation is important in large, urgent and

complex projects where parties are in reciprocal interdependence (Morris, 2013: 57).

2.2 Project complexity and uncertainty

Hirschman (1967) was among the first scholars to treat projects as temporary systems of

interacting components. He recognized that the complexity challenge is not size itself, but the

difficulty of establishing a structure and process to coordinate, adjust and fit together the parts into a

coherent whole and respond dynamically to unpredictable interdependencies and changing conditions

over a defined period of time. More recent project management research also builds on systems theory

to define projects in terms of the number of differentiated components (or “system size”), the

interactions (or degree of interdependencies) among them and their arrangement in the hierarchical

structure (Hobday, 1998; Gholz, 2003; Davies and Hobday, 2005; Sommer and Loch, 2004; Loch,

DeMeyer and Pich, 2006; Shenhar and Dvir, 2007). The outcome or product of each project

comprised of different combinations of hardware, software and intangible services is treated as a

hierarchical system composed of a number of interacting components, subsystems and entire systems.

Projects can be classified according to increasing degree of complexity ranging from

relatively simple components and subsystems to more complex systems and system of systems

7

projects. A component (e.g. radio base station) can often be undertaken in-house by a functional

department or cross-functional project team, whereas more complex systems (e.g. an aircraft or

airport) require a network of suppliers coordinated by a large organization – such as a prime contractor

or joint-venture – reliant on formal, elaborate and bureaucratic processes of reporting and control.

Despite efforts to distinguish clearly between them, the concepts of complexity and

uncertainty are connected. Uncertainties range from a known or foreseeable event whose impact on

the project can be anticipated in advance to entirely unforeseen events with unpredictable

consequences (Loch et al, 2006). Although the progress of each component or subsystem can often be

anticipated, it is difficult to predict how components will interact when joined together as a system

because of the interdependence of components and uncertainty caused by their coordination

requirements (Saposky,1972: 252).

Complex projects contain several internal sources of uncertainty. First, the introduction of

new technology into a project increases the possibility that it will be late, over budget and fail to

achieve its original specifications (Shenhar 1993). Such technological uncertainty may be reduced by

integrating tried and tested components and freezing the design as early as possible. When new

technology is incorporated in a project the “integrator has to cope with unrecognized or ill-defined

interfaces and the endless changes that have taken place in the specifications” (Sayles and Chandler,

1971: 258). Second, the novelty or uncertainty of the project’s outcome on completion of a project at a

future point in time is associated with difficulties in defining user requirements and customer needs up

front (Loch et al, 2006; Shenhar and Dvir, 2007). Third, the urgency or criticality of the time available

to complete the project is a source of temporal uncertainty. The predictable conditions found in routine

projects can be planned well in advance, whereas more urgent and time critical projects depend on

rapid and mutual adaptation in response to dynamically changing and unpredictable conditions

(Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Shenhar and Dvir, 2007). Pace can be “time-based” when planned

actions are initiated by temporal milestones, benchmarks and schedules and “event-based” when

mutually adjusted actions are initiated by events (Gersick, 1994). Project pace creates the sense of

urgency, shared goals and strategic focus required to help coordinate multiple parties, control the

process and manage uncertainty (Grabher, 2002; Jones and Lichtenstein, 2008).

8

External sources of uncertainty are associated with the fact that tasks performed in complex

projects are affected by the action of other elements, organizations and stakeholders in the

environment within which a system is conceived and delivered (Hughes, 2004; Geraldi, Maylor and

Williams, 2011; Scott et al, 2011). The concept of “extended systems” refers to the interactions with

broader social, political and communities affected by these projects (Morris and Hough, 1987; 212).

External uncertainties include the status or profile of the project, support from different stakeholders,

alignment or divergence between stakeholder interests, the transparency or openness of project

participants, and behavioural aspirations of human actors involved or impacted by the project. The risk

of social misalignments, cultural differences, ecological damage or political conflicts makes a

complex project uncertain and particularly when they are “situated in urban or semi-urban areas and

tend to have considerable social, environmental, and distributive impacts (Scott et al, 2011: 46).

2.3 Complex projects and systems integration

To understand the challenges involved in the integration of multiple and interdependent

components it worthwhile revisiting studies of large-scale systems during the Cold War. Several

authors emphasize the importance of systems integration as the core organizational structure and

process required to manage the integration of complex weapons and aerospace projects such as

ballistic missiles (Atlas, Titan and Polaris) and Apollo moon landing missions (Sayles and Chandler,

1971; Sapolsky, 1972; Morris, 1994; Hughes, 1998; Sapolsky, 2003; Gholz, 2003). Systems

integration is now widely used to coordinate the design and production of complex products, systems

and infrastructure in military and civil markets (Hobday, Davies and Prencipe, 2005). Systems

integration is a separate task from component and subsystem development and manufacturing. A

systems integrator has to understand how components and interfaces are designed fit together in the

whole system. It coordinates and controls the network of contractors and suppliers involved in the

design of components and subsystems, construction of physical components and subsystems, and

integration, test, commission and handover of a fully operational system (Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt,

2001; Prencipe et al, 2003;; Davies, Brady and Hobday, 2007). The systems integrator must “nurture

the in-house capability…to know more about the total effort than any of the contracting parties”

(Sayles and Chandler, 1971: 319).

9

Systems engineering and project management capabilities are required to conceive, design and

coordinate the development and deployment of large-scale systems involving multiple disciplines and

many participating organizations (Sapolsky, 2003). Systems engineering emphasizes interoperability:

the requirement that each component or subsystem works in concert with other components or

subsystems. Components are carefully defined with “clean interfaces”, integrated into a functioning

system and tested to detect unexpected interactions so that the system performs as originally intended

when it goes into operation with the final user. Project management emerged as a managerial

discipline alongside systems engineering to ensure that the process of integration is well planned and

multiple parties involved are coordinated throughout the project life cycle (Johnson, 2003).

The systems integrator relies on formal contractual agreements, shared goals, planning and

persuasion to encourage the close cooperation between diverse parties involved in supplying

component parts of a system, addressing interdependencies among them and accomplishing system-

wide goals (Sayles and Chandler, 1971). A process has to be established to control how changes in the

design of one component impact on other components. Designs change frequently during the early

development of a complex project and only slowly become “stabilized” as engineers and managers

solve problems (Johnson, 2003: 42). By “freezing” the design, the systems integrator prevents further

changes in that part of the system. Subsequent changes have to be communicated to all affected parties

and approved by a “change control board”.

Systems integrators have to make tradeoffs in the interest of system-wide goals rather than the

interests of organizations that design or produce the system. Organizations involved in supplying a

component may have an incentive to hide some information from oversight efforts, fearing that full

disclosure of information might for example lead to the renegotiation of fees (Gholz, 2003: 292). The

systems integrator must encourage parties to report data in favourable ways to avoid giving a biased

picture of progress. They have to “penetrate” other organizations, establish processes to increase the

“visibility” of a neglected component or ill-defined interface and encourage parties involved to

uncover the problem and take the action needed to solve it (Sayles and Chandler, 1972).

Building on prior research (Gholz, 2003), we can identify two main levels of systems

integration in complex projects (see Table 1). At a lower level of complexity, “system integration”

10

combines various components and subsystems jointly performing multiple functions into an entire

system or platform to meet a specific client’s requirements (e.g. aircraft, weapon system,

communications network or building construction) including services (e.g. maintenance, training,

support and product upgrades) provided during the operational life of a system. Rarely undertaken by

a single organization, component and subsystems suppliers are typically coordinated by a prime

contractor responsible for defining user requirements, product definition, systems integration, testing

and verification.

…………………………..

Insert Table 1 about here

…………………………..

At a higher level of complexity, “system of systems integration” joins together a dispersed

and large-scale array of platforms and systems, each with a specific purpose, to achieve a common

goal (e.g. an airport, urban mass transit system, the English Channel Tunnel or a national missile

defence system). These array projects are often spread over a wide geographical area, developed over

time as new systems are added in an evolutionary way and comprised of a great variety of systems and

platforms projects. Often organized as programmes, array projects are usually coordinated by “an

umbrella organization that deals mainly with the financial, logistical, and legal issues and is

responsible for contracting and controlling the offices of the systems projects that make up the array”

(Shenhar and Dvir, 2007: 105). While large and experienced clients or prime contractor organizations

can be appointed to coordinate array projects, temporary joint-venture organizations – such as a

special purpose vehicle – are often established to represent the interests of the client and gain access to

a broader base of capabilities than one organization alone can provide.

Previous research concentrates on the system level (Prencipe et al, 2003; Hobday, Davies and

Prencipe, 2005; Davies and Hobday, 2005; Davies et al, 2007; Shenhar and Dvir, 2007), but rarely

addresses system of systems integration (an exception is Davies, Gann and Douglas, 2009). We call

this “meta systems integration” because it depends on the ability to preside over and understand all of

the system of systems well enough to make tradeoffs and reach decisions in the interest of overall

system goals. One of the biggest challenges is that a system of systems crosses so many organizational

11

boundaries. The different customer organizations and stakeholders involved have strong independent

identities, often conflicting interests, motivations and priorities for scheduling and allocating funding.

Each organization will try to influence the development of the system of systems by pushing for their

preferred definitions of systems specifications and user requirements (Gholz, 2003: 298). Figure 2

illustrates the differences between system integration and meta systems integration.

…………………………..

Insert Figure 2 about here

…………………………..

3. Research aims and methods

Our research examined the organization and process established to deliver the London

Olympics 2012 construction programme. The case was selected because it represented a high degree

of project complexity. Undertaking a single case study provides a theoretically sound way of studying

the process and context of organizational change (Pettigrew, 1990). As long as it is carefully chosen, a

case can be used to develop generalizations about how things work which may be appropriate and

valid for a larger number of samples (Flyvbjerg, 2006). We classified the construction of the Olympics

as a system of systems/array project and examined the organizational structure and processes used to

coordinate the overall system, each individual system and interdependencies between them.

Rather than seeing the informants and practitioners involved in our research as data collection

sites, we worked closely with them – using an engaged scholarship approach (Van de Ven, 2007) – by

participating in workshops and meetings to explore the research problem, review relevant literature

and identify the concepts required to understand how an organization can be established to deal with

complexity. We gathered data through interviews and official documents, presentations, contracts,

baseline reports, the trade press (e.g. Institution of Civil Engineers, 2011; New Civil Engineer, 2011).

Interviews were undertaken between December 2010 and September 2011 during the final stage of

construction and handover to LOCOG (the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and

Paralympic Games) responsible for preparing for and staging the Games. Interviews – each typically a

minimum of one hour in length – were conducted with 32 senior managers, such as the chairman,

CEO, directors, project managers, project sponsors and project directors (see Appendix A). To

12

maintain anonymity we refrain from referring to interviews with named individuals and have placed

several “power quotes” in table so that their comments remain non-attributable.

Our interviews were undertaken in two phases to understand the structure and processes

established to manage the two levels of integration: the system of systems (the programme level) and

individual systems contracts (the project level). In the first phase of interviewing, we focused on the

management and structure of the overall programme with interviews conducted within the Olympic

Delivery Authority (ODA) who acted as the client for the programme and CLM – the temporary joint

venture between CH2MHill, Laing O’Rourke and Mace – which was formed specifically to act as the

ODA’s “delivery partner”. The interviews focused on how the ODA and CLM worked together as an

umbrella organization and meta systems integrator to oversee, coordinate and integrate each project

within the overall programme. In a second phase of interviewing, our focus shifted to five specific

system projects identified by key interviewees to address the complexity of different systems projects

including: the Olympic Stadium, the Velodrome, the Aquatics Centre, Athletes Village, International

Broadcast Centre (IBC)/Media Press Centre (MPC) and largely temporary structures (Basketball,

Handball and Eton Manor). Interviews with the ODA project sponsor and the CLM project manager

were complemented with interviews with the relevant Tier 1 principal contractor (project director).

The interviews addressed the ways in which each individual project fitted within the overall

programme, whilst being tailored to meet specific systems needs and circumstances.

We produced summaries of each interview and coded them to address the organizational

action required to deal with different dimensions of complexity including the segmentation of the

project into component parts and interdependencies among them. Interview findings were used to

produce six short embedded case studies of the challenges involved in delivering the permanent and

temporary venues projects. A manuscript analysing the entire construction programme, including the

individual system projects, was made available and read by several senior interviewees to check,

validate and verify our findings.

4. Case study of a complex project: constructing the London 2012 Olympics

This section presents our case study findings and analysis of the London 2012 Olympics

construction programme.

13

4.1 Project characteristics

London was awarded the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games on 6th July 2006. The promise

of creating a lasting legacy for London was key to winning the bid and influenced the approach used

to design and construct the venues and connecting infrastructure. The ODA was set up in 2006 as a

temporary client and public sector organization responsible to oversee the design and construction of

the Olympic Park infrastructure, venues, Olympic Village and transport systems. It was responsible

for handing over the Olympic venues to the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and

Paralympic Games (LOCOG), the private sector organization responsible for staging the Games.

Planning permission for the Olympic Park was secured in October 2007 and construction started in

May 2008.

The project life cycle was divided into six phases:

 Year 1 (2006-2007): this phase handed over the 600 acre Stratford site to the ODA

 Year 2 (to Beijing 2008): the “demolish, dig and design” phase prepared the site for the “big

build” phases

 Year 3 (to 27 July 2009): the “big build” (foundations) phase prepared for the construction of

Olympic Park infrastructure and venues

 Year 4 (to 27 July 2010): the “big build” phase (structures)

 Year 5 (to 27 July 2011): the “big build” phase (completion)

 Year 6 (to 2012): the phase was a year of testing in the run up to the Games

The final cost of £6.8bn was well within the original £8.1bn allocated to construct the

programme and completed on time in July 2011, 13 months before the games started on 27th July

2012, providing LOCOG with sufficient time to test the venues and use the feedback from the trials to

prepare for the Games. The construction programme consisted of over 70 individual projects (planned,

approved and managed by principal contractors) including 14 temporary and permanent buildings,

20km of roads, 26 bridges, 13km of tunnels, 80 hectares of parkland and new utilities infrastructure.

The major venue projects were clustered on the Olympic Park (Olympic Stadium, Aquatics Centre,

Velodrome, IBC/MPC media centre and Athletes Village), many of which were individually large,

14

high-cost and complex. All venues were connected by new infrastructure including utilities networks,

roads, bridges, energy centre and pumping stations. Olympic Park is the size of London’s Hyde Park

and a quarter of the size of Beijing’s Park with the same number of venues. As an indication of the

scale of task, 12,635 people worked on the Olympic Park and Olympic Village during the peak period

of construction at the end of March 2011. A summary of the permanent and temporary venues which

we studied in our research is provided in Table 2.

…………………………..

Insert Table 2 about here

…………………………..

In the following case study, it is helpful to distinguish between the programme and projects.

Large and complex projects are often broken down into many individual subprojects and managed as a

programme. A programme refers to the managerial approaches used by organizations to achieve a

strategy, vision or defined goal by coordinating the diverse interests and priorities between interrelated

projects (Maylor, Brady, Cooke-Davies and Hodgson, 2006; Pellegrinelli, Partington and Geraldi,

2011). Where appropriate we use the term programme to describe the array of interrelated projects

involved in constructing the venues and infrastructure. We use the term project to refer to specific

system such as the Olympic Stadium project and Velodrome project. Each principal contractor was

responsible for managing its own chain of subcontractors. For example, Carillion’s IBC/MPC project

involved 50 Tier 1 and 50 Tier 2 suppliers. The rest of this section provides an in-depth analysis of the

structure and process established to construct the London Olympics.

4.2 Complexity, systems integration and interdependency

The organizational structure established to construct the Olympics venues and infrastructure

was arranged in two interacting levels of systems integration to match the complexity of the project

(see Table 3). The task of meta systems integration was undertaken jointly by the ODA and CLM.

Performing the role of client, the ODA established the goals of the programme, worked closely with

the delivery its partner to plan the programme, monitored progress against those goals, and provided a

single interface between the overall system and its external environment. CLM was appointed as

delivery partner and systems integrator for the programme and interfaces with individual projects.

15

Principal contractors were responsible for integrating and delivering individual system projects

(venues and infrastructure) against time, cost, quality and other strategic objectives and assisting in the

coordination of interfaces with adjacent systems. The suite of contracts used on the Olympics

programme were designed to support clearly-defined procedures and forge the collaborative

relationships between the ODA, CLM and PCs required to deal with unpredictable, ill-defined

interfaces and changing conditions found within and between each project. Figure 3 shows the

relationship between project and programme levels and Figure 4 provides a simplified view of the

different levels of systems integration used on the London Olympics.

……………………………………………..

Insert Figures 3 & 4 and Table 3 about here

……………………………………………..

4.3.1 Meta systems integration: the client

After winning the Olympics bid the ODA faced the challenge of integrating a large-scale and

complex system of systems in a densely-populated part of a major city. The Olympic Park had to be

constructed and available for use by a fixed date across a constrained site involving multiple systems

which became increasingly interconnected as more venues were constructed. At the same time, the

ODA had to engage with many stakeholders and institutional interests associated with the programme

such as government, local authorities, railway authorities and local community groups involved in

shaping the programme and defining its outcomes.

As the client responsible for delivering the programme, the ODA considered the idea of

assuming in-house responsibility for systems integration, but soon recognized the difficulties it would

face in attempting to attract people with experience, skills and knowledge needed to manage such a

challenging programme:

“We obviously appointed CLM because with the best will in the world, going through as a

public sector organization we could not recruit world class individuals as quickly as possible

going through the route of public procurement” (ODA interview).

The ODA originally considered appointing a large prime contractor (e.g. Bechtel) for

programme management and multiple contractors for project management. But after some

consideration decided that a new joint-venture organization established as a “clean sheet of paper” was

16

required to deal with the complexities involved in delivering the construction programme, whereas it

was felt a prime contractor might be unwilling to change, explore alternatives or abandon its

established routines. David Higgins, the ODA’s Chief Executive, believed that the systems integrator

should encompass the broad-based capabilities required to manage the programme and interface

individual system projects. This role would have to be performed by a delivery partner organization

bringing together firms with a track record in the successful delivery of large and complex

programmes and projects (Hone, Higgins, Galloway and Kintrea, 2011: 7). Table 4

The ODA’s competitive tendering process emphasized “compatibility of working style” and

“capability to deal with problems”. CLM was selected as the preferred international consortium and

delivery partner for the programme. Each partner in this special purpose vehicle brought distinctive

capabilities, experience and complementary assets. The US firm CH2M Hill had a track record as a

programme manager and an ability to integrate component parts of complex projects, including

previous Olympic construction projects. Laing O’Rourke and Mace successfully worked together as

major contractors on the £4.3bn Heathrow Terminal 5 – one of the largest and complex recent UK

projects. Laing O’Rourke had strong capabilities in construction delivery and Mace was renowned for

its expertise in project management. Ian Galloway, recruited from Bechtel to lead CLM, was the only

CLM employee; all other CLM staff were contractually connected to their parent companies. By

appointing CLM, the ODA could tap into the skills and expertise found in three large firms which it

needed to manage different phases of the project. At its peak, CLM employed around 600 staff. If the

250 ODA staff are included, the overall programme management cost around 10% of the programme

expenditure.

The task of meta systems integration was divided between the ODA and CLM (see Table 4).

The relationship between the two organizations is clarified by one manager:

“ODA was a thin, intelligent client and, you know, a lot of our job was about, you know,

helping, sort of, set up the machine and then almost create the space around the machine, the

big delivery machine” (ODA interview).

The ODA concentrated on dealing “upwards” by establishing a single interface between the overall

project and the often conflicting interests of around 750 stakeholders including the London’s Mayor,

17

sporting bodies, LOCOG, Greater London Authority, five London boroughs, International Olympic

Committee and British Olympic Association. CLM was responsible for keeping the ODA fully

informed about the progress of the project measured against the schedule, managing “downwards”

across the overall programme and acting as project manager in collaboration with principal contractors

on each major construction project.

The ODA and its assurance team participated in media and parliamentary enquiries, obtained

financial support and sought government approval for any significant proposed changes in scope.

Under the ODA’s leadership, the delivery partner and principal contractors were driven by the primary

time and cost objectives of the programme, but expected to achieve a number of secondary objectives

published as six priority themes (see Appendix B), such as sustainability and health and safety. The

ODA published a strategy for each of them, including specific objectives and principles applied across

the programme, cascading down from CLM to principal contractors and beyond.

…………………………..

Insert Table 4 about here

…………………………..

4.3.2 Meta systems integration: delivery partner

The division of meta systems integration tasks allowed the ODA to provide oversight and

assurance for the programme and gave the CLM the autonomy needed to manage the programme and

projects. The ODA acted as a buffer protecting its delivery partner from outside “interference” added

to the system by external stakeholders which could make integration more difficult. Our analysis of

different levels of systems integration performed by the ODA, CLM and principal contractors (PC) is

illustrated by quotations from our interviews in Table 5. CLM worked as a “consultant” for the ODA

with an amended NEC3 Professional Services Contract. This collaborative form of contract provided

CLM with incentives to meet various milestones and targets and aligned the objectives of the ODA

and CLM, and between CLM and the principal contractors (e.g. CLM and Lend Lease on the Athletes

Village project).

…………………………..

Insert Table 5 about here

…………………………..

18

The ODA and CLM had to find a way of working collaboratively and openly as virtually

integrated organization during the planning, design, construction and handover of the venues to

LOCOG. The relationship between the two organizations adjusted over time to address the changing

requirements and different phases of the programme. Joint review meetings held throughout the

programme served to align their organizational models, capabilities and resources (Hone et al, 2011:

7). In the start-up planning phase when the ODA and CLM were first established, they were co-

located in an off-site location to build a team between the client and delivery partner and align their

strategic objectives, processes and culture. CLM directors formed part of the ODA’s executive

management team. Forging a relationship based on trust and openness was facilitated by holding joint

team events and social activities. When the programme moved from planning into design and

construction, a decision was made not to co-locate ODA and CLM organizations. The core ODA team

continued to work at the planning head office in Canary Wharf, whereas the CLM team moved to the

various construction offices on site at Stratford. When CLM co-located with Tier 1 suppliers, the core

organizational linkage shifted to the CLM and contractor levels of the system. This geographical

separation of the central ODA organization and CLM teams reflected the new division of tasks. The

ODA performed the role of client and project sponsor and CLM worked to achieve overall programme

outcomes and ensure that each project was delivered against defined goals.

Acting as the client’s programme and project manager, CLM managed each individual

contract, administered the change control process and provided assurance that each principal

contractor was achieving its targets and keeping pace with the programme. Its main challenge was

establishing a structure to manage the meta systems integration process:

“If you take the components we have on the Olympic park individually, there’s probably

nothing overly complex; if you put them all together, that’s where the complexity is. That’s

really meant that we’ve had to focus a lot of our time and effort, on integration” (CLM

interview).

CLM created layered structure to manage different levels of systems integration:

“Make sure you have the ability to manage integration. Integration is a huge huge…This is

about management and integration, and flexing all the different layers. So, you had this layer

cake of how we would approach the whole project programme. So, it’s really about how you

structure – it’s all about structuring and how you’re going to deliver things” (CLM interview).

19

Different phases of integration were managed during the life of the programme including

design, construction and operational handover. Digital technologies and software tools were

established to coordinate each phase of integration (e.g. Project Wise and Project Documentation

Management System). In the design phase, CLM had to manage interdependencies between adjacent

projects. A “Design Interface Schedule” system showed how a design change in one part such as a

venue impacted on other parts of the programme. In the construction phase, CLM attempted to

simplify the integration process by dividing the management of systems into relatively self-contained

“vertical” buildings (the permanent and temporary venues) and interconnected “horizontal”

infrastructure (utilities, roads and bridges):

“On most development sites you build the infrastructure, then you build the vertical buildings.

Here they tried to do the infrastructure and the vertical building simultaneously, so that’s why

integration has been a challenge… ideally we would, some of the infrastructure projects we

would have liked to have had finished earlier” (CLM interview).

In the operational handover phase, CLM was “pulling the whole thing together to make sure it

operates as one” (CLM interview).

CLM established standardized processes, reporting procedures and documentation tools to

coordinate the overall programme and interdependencies between systems. Vertical procurement of

the buildings created a buffer around each system project, which helped to define and limit the number

of interfaces with other systems and infrastructure. As one manger put it: “So you drop a cylinder over

it and say everything inside that cylinder belongs to the PC [principal contractor]” whereas

“infrastructure has all been procured horizontally” (CLM interview). Each contractor could focus on

its task of designing and integrating specific systems because “In venues they get their own area – so

you can make your contractor king of their island, if you like, though not many of them are islands”

(CLM interview). The Olympic Park surrounding these islands was divided into four zones and teams

of engineers and managers were responsible for understanding:

“How each of the areas of the park would be integrated together… there’s all the integration

that goes around making the park work…But then you sit at the end of it with a massive kit of

parts, and it creates a huge integration problem” (CLM interview).

20

With so many system projects occurring simultaneously and in sequence on a constrained site,

the most frequently occurring situations and problems from start to finish were associated with

“integration” (Hansford, 2010). The reciprocal interdependency between systems was about:

“The complexity of inputs and the complexity and the understanding of the inter-relationship

between those inputs. And what is one contractors’ input is another contractor’s output. It’s a

system approach” (CLM interview).

Despite efforts to limit the number of interactions and minimize interface problems, all of the systems

were interconnected and some projects such as infrastructure works had interfaces with every other

part of the park. As one manager explained, CLM:

“Have broken it down into its components. But obviously there is a degree of managing those

interfaces between the contractors, so they do all touch each other, and where their scope

ends, the next one begins” (CLM interview).

CLM created an integration process to identify how slippages or changes in one venue or connecting

infrastructure (e.g. water and energy supply) impacted on others. CLM established “programme

integration” group and organized “integration committees” to manage the park as a complete system,

with interfaces between 15-20 contractors working at any particular time. The CLM integration group

originally functioned as a central organization with the oversight required to understand how all the

components fitted together. As the programme moved towards completion, the group operated in a

more decentralized way as construction progressed to deal with issues at the individual project level.

…………………………..

Insert Tables 5 & 6 about here

…………………………..

4.3.3 System integration: principal contractors

Meta systems integration processes and tools were applied consistently across the programme,

whereas the integration of each system (e.g. the Velodrome and Olympic Stadium) was planned and

managed relatively independently by a principal contractor. The ODA used a variety of NEC3

contracts with the principal contractors to address the specific requirements, challenges and

complexity of each project. Contracts for individual venues were held by the ODA and CLM managed

the individual contractors and connections between them. Project delivery was finalized when the

21

accepted programme was agreed with the principal contractor responsible for individual systems,

including the work breakdown structure, schedule, milestones and risk allocation.

Under this contractual approach, principal contractors were encouraged to exploit their own

distinctive capabilities and prior experience to create solutions tailored to the requirements of specific

venues and infrastructure:

“We were given the freedom to determine how we were going to deliver the targets that the

ODA were setting. And we all do things slightly differently because of the circumstances we

found ourselves in, it’s largely driven by the nature of the venue and program issues and

suppliers and so on” (PC interview).

Principal contractors were expected to find their own way of meeting individual targets and schedules

for their project and implementing the ODA’s Priority Themes such as the Health and Security theme.

Risks were reduced by appointing principal contractors and coalitions of subcontractors with tried and

tested capabilities developed by working together on previous complex projects.

Individual system projects largely corresponded to a single venue such as the Velodrome or a

component of the system-wide infrastructure (e.g. utilities). The projects ranged in complexity from

the iconic Aquatics Centre with its unique roof design to the relatively standardized, modular and

reusable systems used to build the Athletes Village and temporary venues. For example, whereas on

the Athletes Village the project team preformed “one thing 3,000 times”, on the Aquatics Centre there

were few opportunities for standardization because the team did “3,000 things once” (Stimpson,

2011). The most complex projects (Aquatics Centre, Velodrome and Olympics Stadium) were

procured using versions of NEC3 Option C (target price with pain/gain), a form of target cost contract

to promote collaboration and the flexibility to expose issues and face known risks, deal with

unexpected situations and explore opportunities to improve performance. Each project had its own

contingency fund and contractors were incentivized to deliver projects within agreed target costs.

Venue projects based on less complex designs and standardized reusable components (e.g. IBC/MPC)

were procured using more traditional NEC3 Option A (fixed price) Design and Build contracts. The

procurement strategy for the Athletes Village eventually used a combination of Construction

Management and Design and Build contracts. A “Managed Package” was appropriate for the

temporary venues (basketball, water polo and Eton Manor) given that their unusual requirements were

22

less attractive to conventional contractors used to building venues, but not dismantling them. CLM

assumed role of principal contractor and project manager for the temporary venues and let the work

out as packages to a list of framework contractors for engineering, construction, modular buildings,

temporary seating and fit out.

Integrating individual projects into the overall array had to be carefully managed. The

independence and autonomy of principal contractotrs had to be preserved, whilst encouraging the

collaboration and responsiveness needed to deal with interdependencies with adjacent venues and

common infrastructure. As one of the principal contractors explained:

“We’re an island site but there are still interfaces. For example, the bridges contracts were

really tricky for CLM and the contractor and they were really tricky for us because we had

some awkward interfaces at the end of the bridges. We had literally one man working on

bridges interfaces for a year, and that was closely interfaced with the CLM design managers.

So there were certain areas where we interfaced closely, where the external technical review

teams had to do their stuff. We interfaced closely on that” (PC interview).

Dealing with such reciprocal interdependencies could not be addressed by one organization on

its own. It required the continuous interaction, and penetration of, all affected parties. The ODA and

CLM appointed representatives to work closely on site as part of co-located, integrated project teams

with principal contractors. The pairing of an ODA executive (project sponsor) and CLM executive

(project manager) applied across all the system projects (and bundles of smaller projects). The ODA

project sponsor was responsible for defining the project goal, securing approval for the project

business case and managing stakeholders. The ODA sponsor worked with the CLM delivery partner

manager, who was responsible for working with the principal contractor to deliver the project against

programme objectives.

4.4 Systems integration: balancing stability and change

The ODA and CLM created standardized, stable and consistent process to coordinate the

development of multiple systems, minimize unexpected interactions and respond flexibly to deal with

problems that might hinder progress of the individual project and the overall programme. A balance

had to be struck between stability and change:

“You can’t have constant change, there have to be fixed points where things that have been

completed and issued to others to work to. If you change after that date, and that then means

that another contractor has to change what they’re supplying to accommodate that, then they

23

could have a cost, so making it clear that this is your cost now to this contractor to make

changes after the agreed completion date, you know, your design is frozen, if you want to

change it, they have a compensation that may end up being deducted from your contract

value” (CLM interview).

Those elements that could be firmly fixed at the beginning were forced by the programme’s deadline,

funding constraints, the physical requirements of site and capacity of systems. Carefully-prepared

plans, schedules and deadlines guided the performance of the delivery partner and principal

contractors, helped to anticipate risks in advance and mitigate them when they occurred. Programme

management processes ensured that tasks performed in one part of the project were predictable and

consistent with those undertaken by organizations working in other parts. Emergent events, interface

problems and unfolding situations that could not be foreseen in advance depended on the capability of

the organizations involved to respond flexibly and rapidly to change (see Table 6).

…………………………..

Insert Table 6 about here

…………………………..

The pace, planning and scheduling of the London Olympics programme was dictated by an

“immoveable deadline”. The project was time-critical because the games had to open on 27th July

2012. The ODA and CLM recognized that although the construction schedule could not be

manipulated, a realistic budget and secure contingency was needed to cope with the risks and

uncertainties surrounding the project. The original budget of £2.4bn was insufficient and after six

months of work by the ODA and CLM the final budget was announced in Parliament in March 2007.

It was set at £9.3bn and included a contingency of £1.2bn. The ODA’s budget for construction was

£8.1bn. The CLM strategic planning team established a baseline definition of the detailed scope,

budget, schedule, risk and interfaces of the programme which was published as the 500-page “Yellow

Book” in November 2007. This document was revised and published as the “Blue Book” in November

2009 to account for the numerous changes in scope that had occurred since the original publication.

The baseline documents became the main point of reference for scheduling the work to be

done on the programme and individual projects and monitoring how the budget was spent during

construction. The construction programme was divided into four yearly phases, with milestones

24

published for each year. Building most of the venues ahead of schedule introduced some temporal

contingency into the programme. Annual phases were translated into more specific target objectives

and milestones for the individual systems, setting out clearly how each project was expected to

perform against the overall programme schedule. Deadlines published online and therefore subject to

public scrutiny provided an added incentive to avoid schedule slippages.

The ODA and CLM established a monitoring and assurance process to ensure that each

project provided detailed, regular and accurate information on progress in terms of budget, scheduling

and performance. This process helped to increase the visibility of unexpected problems, ill-defined

interfaces or changes in specifications. Monthly reports provided information to measure progress,

forecast costs and changes in schedule, scope or budget using an early warning “traffic light” tracking

system to identify issues in order of importance. Issues flagged as red or amber were identified in

monthly meetings by the programme team, but dealt with at the project level. When emergent issues

were identified, the project teams would estimate the additional costs and time needed to solve them.

An assurance process was established to avoid schedule slippages associated with the introduction of

change. The ODA was responsible for challenging individual project teams and monitoring the

performance of CLM and the principal contractors. Monthly trend reviews involving the ODA and

CLM allowed senior managers to identify trends which might not be apparent at lower levels.

A highly-structured change control process was established to uncover, report and document

problems hindering progress, provide vital information about integration problems and poorly

performing or neglected parts of the system and make the changes required to keep the programme on

track. Any significant change proposed by the principal contractor had to have CLM’s and the ODA’s

approval. At the end of each month, project teams reported any changes to the “Change Control

Board” chaired by the ODA chairman. During the early phase of the programme, as many as 45

people in a room would discuss monthly reports. This number gradually reduced to as few as 6 people

as the programme reached completion. This change control process “flushed things up to the surface

quickly so you could address and deal with them” (ODA interview).

Dealing with unforeseen problems depended on intense collaboration among the contracting

parties and “an organizational culture that was highly-action oriented” (Hone et al., 2011: 8):

25

“I think it was really the dynamic of having enough, you know, good people, excellent people

with a real attitude of, you know, rapid assessment and decision making, be able to see issues,

discuss them, make decisions and move on” (ODA interview).

The ODA and CLM “wanted to work by persuasion and by consensus, but from a position of strength”

(ODA interview). The use of workshops and informal meetings to build consensus around problems

and solutions helped to achieve and maintain a close alignment of ODA and CLM over time. As

another manager emphasized: “I always tell my guys is, anybody can manage the steady state; when

things go wrong, it’s about how we solve problems together – contractually, commercially, co-

operationally” (CLM interview). Working in close proximity in co-located project teams over an

extended period of time fostered the shared understanding, trust and openness required to identify

emergent problems at an early stage and strive collaboratively to find innovative solutions:

“Management action has been very much about how we make a decision, right or wrong. It

might all sound simple, this, but the complexity of what we’re working with has been very

changeable. So, that’s worked well. It’s getting the visibility” (CLM interview).

Several examples from our study of systems projects illustrate how parties involved identified

problems, adjusted their plans and responded flexibly to unexpected and dynamically changing

situations. First, ISG, the principal contractor responsible for the Velodrome, identified an opportunity

to reduce costs and save time by changing the roof design from a steel to a “cable net” roof. After

some consideration, CLM agreed to this radical change to the original design, including incurring the

risk of purchasing 13,500m of cables before the design was finalised. The ODA provided time to

evaluate the proposal and ultimately accepted the change even though it exacerbated short-term time

pressures. In an attempt to shift the risk to the principal contractor, the ISG’s contract was changed

from target price with pain/gain to fixed-price. The cable net roof took only nine weeks to construct

rather than the six months for the steel roof. Second, as a result of the economic downturn in late

2008 private funding was no longer available to pay for two systems: the Athletes Village and the

IBC-MPC. The ODA’s decision to switch to public funding triggered a re-appraisal of design and

encouraged the principal contractors and CLM to develop lower-cost schemes. In the original plan, for

example, the Athletes Village would have been built by the private sector and leased to LOCOG for

the Games. The ODA solved the problem by using contingency money and other savings on the

programme to fund construction of the Village and recover the money by selling the development after

26

the Games. The ODA renegotiated Lend Lease’s contract and most of the buildings were procured

with the principal contractor using a lump-sum, design and build contract. Third, as principal

contractor responsible for the Aquatics Centre, Balfour Beatty gained the ODA’s approval to change

the roof design from a tied arch structure to one using single span trusses so that it could introduce a

more efficient method of construction without altering the roof’s iconic shape. Fourth, facing the

possibility of a significant overspend, McAlpine, the principal contractor for the Olympics Stadium,

decided to re-engineer the original design to reduce costs and save time. As a result, the contractor

managed to build the stadium within budget (close to £496m) and over two months ahead of schedule.

4.5 Complexity and context

A number of contextual factors shaped the programme and added to its complexity such as

status of the project, pressures to succeed and the economic crisis of 2008 which called for new

approaches to funding and the allocation of risk. As Sir John Armitt, the ODA’s Chairman,

emphasized the “Olympic project is the most high profile that you could imagine” (Kortekaas, 2012)

and a significant factor facilitating the overall progress of the programme was the so-called “Olympics

effect” (Mackenzie and Davies, 2011). A desire not to avoid the poor performance of recent public

projects – such as the heavily over budget and delayed Wembley football stadium – and the fact the

Olympics was the world’s most prestigious sporting event fostered a widespread attitude that this was

“a once in a lifetime opportunity, so you don’t want to get it wrong, because if you do, it’ll be apparent

to everyone in the industry. That’s quite a motivator” (CLM interview).

5. Discussion and conclusions

We selected the London Olympics because it provided an opportunity to understand how an

organizational structure and process can be established to cope with a high degree of complexity. The

view that a project can be treated as a temporary system of complex and interacting components

arranged in hierarchical structure encouraged us to revisit early organizational studies inspired by

systems thinking (Simon, 1962; Hirschman, 1967; Perrow, 1984) and contingency theory (Lawrence

and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). These studies argue that organizations cope with complexity by

breaking a system down into smaller component parts and coordinating interdependencies between

and within components.

27

Building on these ideas, project management research suggests that a project can be

considered a temporary system of interacting hardware, software and knowledge-based intangible

components (Hobday, 1998; Davies and Hobday, 2005; Loch et al, 2006; Shenhar and Dvir, 2007).

Project complexity is defined in terms of the number of components, degree of interactions among

them and the number of hierarchical levels in the system. Complex projects are inherently uncertain

because of the inability to predict how components interact when joined together (Sapolsky, 1972;

Geraldi et al, 2011). Internal sources of uncertainty are associated with new technology, novelty for

users, and temporal urgency of the project. External sources refer to the social, political and ecological

conditions and variety stakeholders which together form the environment within which a complex

project is embedded.

Referring an early stream of literature, we argued that systems integration is the structure and

process required to address different degrees of project complexity (Sayles and Chandler, 1971;

Sapolsky, 1972; Morris, 1994; Hughes, 1998). A systems integrator has the engineering and project

management capabilities in-house to coordinate interdependent tasks performed by the multiple parties

involved in the design, production, integration and handover of a complex system. Subsequent

research has suggested that systems integration applies to complex projects across many different

industries including construction and the built environment (Prencipe et al, 2003). Our study of the

London Olympics showed that systems integration is one of the major challenges involved in delivery

of a complex project. But what generalized principles can we learn from the experience of a single

case study which will apply to each and every special-case of a complex project? We recognize that

there are “no magical management system cures” (Sapolsky, 1972: 253) and no “single predictable

managerial strategy” (Sayles and Chandler, 1971: 317) will serve the needs of every complex project.

Our findings show that organizations attempt to cope with complexity by decomposing a

project into different levels of systems integration with clearly-defined interfaces and buffers between

and within individual component systems. A system of systems project can be divided into levels of

systems integration to cope with such a high degree of complexity – in our case a large, time-critical

system of systems project in a densely populated urban area involving multiple stakeholders.

28

At the meta systems integration level, the client or sponsor responsible for the project faces a

number of choices about how to establish a systems integrator with the capabilities to understand the

total system and coordinate the integration of its component parts. Systems integration can be

performed in-house by a large client, an experienced prime contractor or joint-venture delivery partner

established on a temporary basis and disbanded on completion of the project. Few organizations have

the capabilities in-house to address all aspects of systems integration and the joint-venture delivery

partner approach is receiving increasing attention around the world as a possible model for managing

complex megaprojects. A version of this approach is being used to programme manage the UK’s

£14.8bn Crossrail high-capacity suburban railway project connecting the East and West of London.

The ODA considered all three options before deciding to appoint a dedicated delivery partner bringing

together organizations with the prior experience and the complementary capabilities required to

understand the total system and design, integrate and coordinate the many organizations involved in

this complex project.

The meta systems integration task was divided between the client and its delivery partner. The

client was responsible for achieving the overall programme goals and managing upwards and

outwards to external stakeholders. By dealing with all external interfaces between the system and the

external environment, the client created an “umbrella” or buffer insulating the delivery partner and

principal contractors from the frequent and potentially disruptive interventions of numerous

stakeholders. A delivery partner organization was established to represent the interests of the client

and create the common processes required to coordinate the overall programme and interdependencies

between each project as a tightly-coupled system.

At the system integration level, the overall array can be decomposed into smaller more

manageable subsystems. The design, construction and operational handover of each system is

managed as a loosely-coupled system with clearly-defined interfaces with other systems within the

overall array. In our research, principal contractors and their own network of subcontractors were

appointed to deliver individual systems. Whereas the client and delivery partner established

standardized processes and clearly-defined budgets and schedules to keep the programme on track,

flexible contractual arrangements encouraged principal contractors to find their own routes to

29

achieving specific project goals and devise processes tailored to the requirements and complexity of

each project. The delivery partner and client participated in co-located integrated project teams with

principal contractors to provide the penetration of collaborating organizations required to coordinate

interdependencies with adjacent or affected systems and to ensure that the progress of each system

project was aligned to overall system-wide goals of the programme.

But as Sayles and Chandler (1972) recognized, efforts to cope with complexity can never

eliminate uncertainty: “In complex projects managers learn to expect the unexpected, that what looks

good today may be in deep trouble tomorrow” (Sayles and Chandler, 1971: 311-312). Establishing

processes to maintain stability whilst responding dynamically to unforeseen and changing conditions

is one of the most challenging aspects of systems integration. Standardized, consistent and carefully

planned processes which serve to freeze components of a system into a given position may have to be

unlocked to introduce change and adapt to unexpected situations. To retain its options in the face

interdependency, uncertainty and change, a systems integrator must apply what Sapolsky (1972) calls

“disciplined flexibility”: the discipline to work within the predictable constraints of the system and

determination to meet schedules and the flexibility to avoid a premature commitment to a particular

goal and adapt to changing and emergent situations (Sapolsky (1971: 250).

In our research, the meta systems integrator established standardized programme management

processes, carefully-defined baseline plans, detailed schedules of activities and to freeze the

programme as far as possible, including the budget and contingency available for dealing with

uncertainty and change. Planning to achieve deadlines ahead of time created some contingency or

temporal buffer to prevent overall progress from being held back by poorly performing systems. A

highly structured change control process has to be established to “unlock the frozen positions” and

promote rapid, mutual adaptation when conditions change (Sayles and Chandler, 1971: 271). To gain

the collaboration needed to uncover problems and identify solutions, the meta systems integrator

established integration processes to identify and address system-wide problems and worked

collaboratively with principal contractors in integrated project teams to uncover and solve problems or

respond to opportunities to innovate and improve performance.

30

This paper is limited to a single case and more research is needed to understand how systems

integration is required to deal with project complexity. We recognize that complexity depends on the

capabilities of individuals and organizations involved, some of which will be engaged in projects

which exceed their prior experience (Morris and Hough, 1987: 14). The context surrounding each

project also has implications for its managerial style and organizational culture. In our study, for

example, participating in a highly prestigious project played an important role in creating a

collaborative, highly motivated multi-party organization focused on tackling such a complex and

difficult task. While difficult to undertake because of the long duration and resources needed to study

megaprojects, future research could benefit from comparative studies exploring the relevance of some

of our initial propositions about project complexity and systems integration including the type of

systems integrator organization, levels of systems integration and processes required to balance

between stability and change over time. Although is it is widely assumed that large, complex and

high-risk engineering megaprojects cannot easily be broken down in modular components (Miller and

Xavier, 2001: 97), we believe that understanding how they can be “nearly decomposed” and integrated

to cope with complexity is a promising and potentially rewarding area of research.

References

Altshuler, A. and Luberoff, D. 2003. Mega-projects: The changing politics of urban public investment,

Washington: The Brookings Institution.

Baccarini, D. 1996. The concept of project complexity – a review, International Journal of Project

Management, 14(4): 201-204.

Boulding, K.E. ‘General systems theory – the skeleton of science’, Management Science, 3(2): 197-

208.

Brady, T. and Davies, A. 2010. From hero to hubris: reconsidering the project management of

Heathrow’s Terminal 5. International Journal of Project Management, 28: 151-157.

Brusoni, S., Prencipe, A., and Pavitt, K. (2001), Knowledge specialization and the boundaries of the

firm: why do firms know more than they make?, Administrative Science Quarterly, 46: 597-621.

Burns, T., and Stalker, G.M. (1961). The management of innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davies, A. and Hobday, M. 2005. The business of projects: managing innovation in complex products

and systems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

31

Davies, A., Gann, D. and Douglas, T. 2009. Innovation in megaprojects: systems integration at

Heathrow Terminal 5. California Management Review, 51(2): 101-125.

Davies, A., Brady, T. and Hobday, M. 2007. Organizing for solutions: systems seller vs. systems

integrator’, Industrial Marketing Management, Special Issue: ‘Project marketing and marketing

solutions’, 36:183-193.

Dvir, D., Lipoveskey, S. Shenhar, A. and Tishler, A., 1998. In search of a project classification: a non-

universal approach to success factors, Research Policy, (27): 915-935.

Eisenhardt, K. M., and Tabrizi, B.N. (1995). Accelerating adaptive processes: product

innovation in the global computer industry, Administrative Science Quarterly, 40: 84–110.

Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N. and Rothengatter, W. 2003. Megaprojects and risk: an anatomy of

ambition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Flyvbjerg, B. 2006. Five misunderstandings about case-study research. Qualitative Inquiry, 12/2: 219-

245.

Galbraith, J.R. 1973. Designing complex organizations. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Geraldi, J., Maylor, H. and Williams, T. 2011. Now, let’s make it really complex (complicated).

International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 31/9: 966-990.

Gersick, C.J.G. 1994. Pacing strategic change: the case of a new venture. Academy of Management

Journal, 1: 9-45.

Gholz, E. 2003. Systems integration in the US Defence Industry, 279-332 in Prencipe, A., Davies, A.

and Hobday, M. 2003. The business of systems integration, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gil, N. 2009. Developing cooperative project-client relationships: how much to expect from relational

contracts?. California Management Review, 51(2): 144-169.

Grabher, G. 2002. Cool projects, boring institutions: Temporary collaboration in social context,

Regional Studies, 36: 245-262.

Hansford, M. 2010. Race to the finish, New Civil Engineer, 22-29 July 2010.

Hirschman, A.O. 1967, Development projects observed, Washington: The Brookings Institution.

Hobday, M. 1998. Product complexity, innovation and industrial organization, Research Policy, 26:

689-710.

Hobday, M., Davies, A. and Prencipe, A. 2005. ‘Systems Integration: A Core Capability of the

Modern Corporation’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 14:1109-1143.

Hone, D., Higgins, D., Galloway, I. and Kintrea, K. 2011. Delivering London 2012: organisation and

programme, Proceedings of the ICE – Civil Engineering, 164(5): 5-12.

Hughes, T.P. 1998. Rescuing Prometheus, New York: Pantheon Books.

Institution of Civil Engineers. 2011. Delivering London 2012: planning and people. Civil Engineering,

Special Issue, May 2011, 164/1: 1-66.

32

Jones, C. and Lichtenstein, B.B. 2008. Temporary inter-organizational projects: How temporal and

social embeddedness ehance coordination and manage uncertainty, pp231-255 in Cropper, S., Ebers,

M. Ring, P.S. and Huxman, C. (eds). Handbook of Interorganizational Relations, Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Johnson, S.B. 2003. Systems integration and the social solution of technical problems in complex

systems, 35-55 in Prencipe, A., Davies, A. and Hobday, M. 2003. The business of systems integration,

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kortekaas, V. 2012. Olympics contractors build on experience, Financial Times, 15 February 2012.

Lawrence, P.R. and Lorsch, J.W. 1967. Organization and environment: managing differentiation and

integration, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

Loch, C.H., De Meyer, A., and Pich, M.T. 2006. Managing the unknown: a new approach to managing

high uncertainty and risk in projects. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons.

Mackenzie, I. and Davies, A. 2011. Lessons learned from the London 2012 Games construction

project, London Olympics Learning Legacy, ODA 2011/269 www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

Maylor, H., Brady, T.B., Cooke-Davies, T. and Hodgson, D. 2006. From projectification to

programmification, International Journal of Project Management, 24: 663-672.

Miller, R., and Lessard, D.R. 2000. The strategic management of large engineering projects: shaping

institutions, risks, and governance. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.

Miller, R. and Olleros, X. Chapter 4 ‘Project shaping as a competitive advantage’, pp93-112 in Miller,

R., and Lessard, D.R. 2000. The strategic management of large engineering projects: shaping

institutions, risks, and governance. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.

Mintzberg, H. (1983). Structures in fives: Designing effective organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NY:

Prentice Hall.

Morris, P.W.G. and Hough, G.H. 1987. The anatomy of major projects: a study of the reality of

project management, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.

Morris, P.W.G. (1994). The management of projects, London: Thomas Telford.

Morris, P.W.G. (2013). Reconstructing Project Management, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell.

New Civil Engineer. 2011. Major project report: delivering the UK Games. February 2011: 1-20.

Pellegrinelli, S., Partington, D. and Geraldi, J.A. 2011. Program management: an emerging

opportunity for research and scholarship, chapter 10 in Morris, P.W.G., Pinto J.K. and Söderlund,

J.(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Project Management, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Perrow, C. 1984. Normal accidents: living with high risk technologies, Princeton University Press.

Pettigrew, A. 1990. Longitudinal field research on change: theory and practice. Organization Science,

1/3: 267-292.

Pich, M.T., Loch, C.H., and De Meyer, A. 2002. On uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity in project

management, Management Science, 48 (8): 1008-23.

33

Prencipe, A., Davies, A. and Hobday, M. 2003. The business of systems integration, Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Sanderson, J. 2012. Risk, uncertainty and governance in megaprojects: a critical discussion of

alternative explanations, International Journal of Project Management, 30: 432-443.

Sapolsky, H.M. 1972. The Polaris system development: bureaucratic and programmatic success in

government, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Sapolsky, H.M. 2003. Inventing systems integration, 15-34 in Prencipe, A., Davies, A. and Hobday,

M. 2003. The business of systems integration, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sayles, L.R. and Chandler, M.K. 1971. Managing Large Systems: Organizations for the Future’, New

Brunswick: Transaction Publications.

Scott, W.R., Levitt, R.E. and Orr, R.J. 2011. Global projects: Institutional and Political Challenges,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shenhar, A.J. 1993. From low- to high-tech project management, R&D Management, 23(3): 199-214.

Shenhar, A. J., and Dvir, D. 1996. ’Toward a typological theory of project management.’, Research

Policy, 25: 607-632.

Shenhar, 2001. One size does not fit all projects: exploring classical contingency domains,

Management Science, 47/3: 394-414.

Shenhar, A. J. and Dvir, D. 2007. Reinventing project management: the diamond approach to

successful growth and innovation. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press.

Simon, H.A. 1962. The architecture of complexity, Proceedings of the American Philosophical

Society, 106(6):467-482.

Sommer, S.C. and Loch, C.H. (2004), Selectionism and learning in projects with complexity and

unforeseeable uncertainty, Management Science, 50(10): 1334-1347.

Stimpson, J. 2011. Vital venues delivered to order, New Civil Engineer, Major Project Report:

Delivering the UK Games, February 2011.

Stinchcombe, A.L. and Heimer, C. 1985. Organizational theory and project management:

Administering uncertainty in Norwegian offshore oil, Oslo: Norwegian University Press.

Thompson, J. D. 1967. Organizations in action: social science bases of administrative theory,

McGraw-Hill.

Van de Ven, A. 2007. Engaged scholarship: a guide to organizational and social research. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Van Marrewijk, A. 2007. Managing project culture: the case of Environ megaproject, International

Journal of Project Management, 25: 290-299.

Van Marrewijk, A., Clegg, S.R., Pitsis, T. and Veenswijk, M. 2008. Managing public-private

megaprojects: paradoxes, complexity and project design, International Journal of Project Management,

26: 591-600.

34

Von Bertalanffy, L. 1968. General systems theory: foundations, development, applications, George

Braziller.

Weick, K. 1976. Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. Administrative Science

Quarterly, 21/1: 1-19.

Williams, T.M. 1999. The need for new paradigms of complex projects. International Journal of

Project Management, 17(5): 269-273.

Woodward, J. (1965). Industrial organization: theory and practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

35

Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Systems interdependence and integration

(Morris, 2013)

Figure 2: Levels of systems integration

Figure 3: London 2012 Olympics: programme, projects and systems

Pooled interdependence –
integration by standardization

Sequential interdependence –
integration by planning

Reciprocal interdependence –
integration by mutual adaptation

System integration

Components

System integration

Meta system of systems
integration

Principal Contractors

ODA

CLM

Sub-contractors

System of

Systems

(Array)

Systems

Programme

Projects

Components

& subsystems

36

Figure 4: Simplified view of systems integration on the London 2012 Olympics

System integration Meta systems integration

Definition Integrate various components and subsystems, jointly

performing multiple functions’ into an entire system or

platform to meet a specific operational requirement

Integrate a dispersed and large-scale

array of platforms and systems, each

with a specific purpose, to achieve a

common goal

Project complexity System, platform

System of systems, array

Examples Aircraft, weapon system, communications network or

single building construction

Airport, urban development, mass

transit system, the English Channel

Tunnel or a national missile defence

system

Table 1: Levels of systems integration and complex projects

Meta systems integration – interface with external environment (ODA)

System integration – vertical buildings & venues (PC)

System integration – horizontal infrastructure & utilities (contractors)

Meta systems integration (CLM)

37

Table 2: Major systems within the Olympics Park

Major systems Principal

contractor

Suite of contracts

Key characteristics

Permanent structures

Olympic Stadium McAlpine Target Cost (NEC3

Option C)

Construction of the 80,000 capacity stadium was

completed in March 2011 safely, on time and within

budget.

Aquatics Centre Balfour

Beatty

Target Cost (NEC3

Option C)

Completed in July 2011, this iconic building

housing two swimming pools was designed by

architect Zaha Hadid with two temporary “wings” to

provide 17,500 capacity during the games and 2,500

capacity in legacy.

Velodrome ISG Target Cost (NEC3

Option C)

Construction of the cycling track was completed in

February 2011.

Athletes Village Lend Lease Changed from

Construction

Management (CM) to

mix of CM and

Design & Build (fixed

price NEC3 Option

A)

Completed in December 2011 provided

accommodation for 17,000 athletes and officials and

2,818 new homes in legacy.

International

Broadcast Centre

& Main Press

Centre

(IBC/MPC)

Carillion Design & Build (fixed

price NEC Option A)

Completed in July 2011, this venue supported

20,000 broadcasters and journalists during the

games.

Largely temporary Structures

Eton Manor

Mansell

Construction

Services

Managed Packaged

Strategy

Aquatics training venue with three Olympic size

temporary swimming pools during the Games.

Dismantled and transformed to host wheelchair

tennis during Paralympics. After the Games turned

into multipurpose sports centre.

Basketball Arena CLM Managed Packaged

Strategy

Construction of the 12,000 capacity venue was

completed in June 2011. Dismantled after the

Games and reused at other UK and overseas events.

Water Polo CLM Managed Packaged

Strategy

5,000 capacity temporary venue completed in.

Components dismantled and reused elsewhere in the

UK.

38

Table 3: London Olympics 2012: Organizational structure

Organization, capabilities and contracts

ODA

Public sector client organization (250 staff) managers interface with sponsor, defines the scope and budget,

and coordinates with delivery partner

Responsible for managing “upwards” to diverse external stakeholders (international, national and local),

single government interface, and minimising “noise” to shield CLM from external interventions

ODA-CLM co-located during planning to build team and align objectives

CLM Private sector delivery partner (600 staff) manages programme, PCs and communication with ODA

Combines specialized capabilities and complementary assets of CH2MHill, LOR and Mace

NEC3 Professional Services contract with ODA to bring “highest skills

Principal

contractor

(PC)

Contractors with capabilities and prior experience in specific systems (e.g. stadia and roof structures)

Suite of NEC3 contractors with PCs tailored to complexity of each project

CLM co-located with PCs and ODA representative on site in integrated project teams during construction

39

Organization Capabilities

ODA “Building an organization and scratch and delivering

the kind of programme we had, there was no way we

were going to do it organically, and, so, quite early

on, we made a decision that we needed a private

sector partner, a really tough, experienced public

sector partner that could bring, if you like, existing

processes and tools and delivery capability to work

alongside us to deliver this”.

“You can’t tell who’s ODA and CLM, it’s fully

integrated”.

“We actually needed to have a much more open and

collaborative relationship and build that relationship

and the trust, so we spend a lot of time together, we

have a lot of joint meetings and I think we’ve

established a remarkable level of, sort of, openness,

honesty and trust”.

“We just knew over time that we needed different

skills and probably different bits of a delivery partner

and there was, maybe with Bechtel aside, there was

probably nothing out there on the shelf that it was,

you know, you could point to and say, you know,

that’s what we want, so we were in, sort of,

somewhat new charted territory really”.

“We obviously had three companies coming together

in terms of Laing O’Rourke, CH2M Hill and Mace,

all with track records…We could buy first of all into

three companies, dig in all their resources, we

weren’t just limited to individuals. Secondly, they

could hire quickly, they could tap people on the

shoulder, whether in Australia, America or the UK or

wherever, get the best people, best fit. We could de-

mobilise those people just as quickly, take them back

into their businesses or let them go; so they had

complete flexibility. So they were able to rapidly

mobilise, they were able to flex to meet changing

circumstances, expected or unexpected”.

CLM “Three different companies, three organizations,

existing organizations that had to come together in an

entity. We had a programme manager, a project

manager, and a builder. We had to make that group

into a fit for purpose programme and project

manager…The fact that we’ve been able to find a

way to operate in an integrated and highly open

structure has enabled us organizationally to get a

level of confidence and trust with each other. So even

though we operate in a very clear hierarchy, we

operate within my organization and ODA up, down,

and across each other’s organization with impunity: a

very open structure. So I will have some of my

project managers report directly in meetings to ODA

directors and ODA sponsors without my senior

management or myself present. So we’ve cultivated

that method of working”.

“The interface between the delivery partner and the

client is where a lot of the magic happened. They had

this, these really high level goals that they set us, and

it was in how it got turned into something that

happened”.

“The make-up of the delivery partner was also

something unique because you brought in a

contractor, Laing O’Rourke, you brought in a

construction manager/project manager MACE and

you brought in somebody with international

programme experience CH2mHill too. And they

blended those together to give, to assure you have the

right skills to manage this programme on behalf of

the ODA… It’s all about understanding the risk and

the delivery of the job”.

“A delivery partner, in the main, here, the client

doesn’t write the instructions; they’ll talk to us about

a problem, we’ll get round the table, and always, in

the final analysis, we’ll throw around different ideas,

and we’ll say, okay, let us give something back to

you with some ideas, maybe some solutions”.

“The concept of a delivery partner came into being,

and that was very much around programme

management with real project management and

construction delivery expertise. So the ability to have

a much broader band width of a partner”.

Table 4: Organizing meta systems integration: illustrated interview quotations

40

Meta systems integration System integration

ODA “Our job was all around the, sort of, assurance and

governance, getting all of those approvals, you know,

be they all our planning approvals, all our business case

and financial approvals, and, sort of, you know, all of

those days of going to Olympic board, getting all of the

sign-offs, you know, managing the politicians,

managing the stake… so managing all of that stuff that

happens around a big project and almost, sort of,

creating this cordon around the delivery machine that

they were looking down on the site and getting on with

it and they weren’t being distracted, and they were

saying to us, this is when we need all these permissions,

this is the critical path, you know” (ODA interview).

“The ODA has done a first-class job in protecting us

from external pressures, and they have contained a lot

of the opinions, if you like, that have been brought to

bear on the project. So they’ve acted as an umbrella to

us” (CLM interview).

“ODA are at the top, we sit in the middle, and

everything should be more or less coming down, but, of

course, relationships go across that” (CLM interview).

“So you get a programme view of life, and you’ve got a

project view of life. And the sponsors being given the

freedom to do their job, to have their job clearly

defined, but being given the freedom to do it and to

manage the stakeholders as they see appropriate. And

you’ve probably met a few of the sponsors and we are

individuals and I think we do our job in different ways

on many of the projects, But effectively we all operate

within the same framework and get the same outputs”

(ODA interview).

“It’s, kind of, generic across all of them really, so the

project sponsor sets the brief, gets stakeholder buy into

the brief, physically gets their sign-off to it. So you’ve

got a good strong baseline document involved in the

procurement of the design team. And then subsequently

the contractor acts as the point, as the client direction

for any change or for controlling change, for accepting

the designs against the requirements of the brief, getting

stakeholders sign-off at intermediate stages as the

design develops, and managing the stakeholder group

throughout the project process. And having a project

manager of each and individual project report to you

formally through a monthly progress meeting on-site,

but informally on a day to day basis” (ODA interview).

CLM “Internally have a group of people that are focused

downwards – absolutely focused on delivery, absolutely

making the milestones, absolutely ensuring that the

supply chain” (CLM interview).

“The fact that the contracts were all set up in the first

place to make it very clear that these interfaces exist.

So you can’t ever argue, well, I don’t need… I’m just

going to do my own thing, I’m not going to interface

with anyone else, I just want to delivery my work and

walk off. It’s… the fact that the contracts were always

set up to highlight all these interfaces” (CLM

interview).

“But he’s [the PC] just drawing himself on his little

island, and you know, on that island it was for him to

build it, but who is gluing that with the rest of the park?

And it’s only through time, I think, some of the

contractors thought, aah, you know, so it’s CLM who

are actually gluing us all together, as well as this role

very much of the assurance and overall direction of the

whole” (CLM interview).

“So you had to have a good programme from your, from

each of your contractors, and then we had to roll that

into something that was in, you know, integrated but not

so huge and complex that you couldn’t see the wood for

the trees” (CLM interview).

“Your role is a more, a higher level project manager,

because you’re given the interface between the design

and the construction to that contractor, they’ve defined

what they’re building, they’re managing their tier two

contractors. Obviously you’re monitoring cost and any

other peripheral changes that are coming in as different

processes rolled in, but basically, that can be ring-

fenced and you’ve only got people crossing the border,

you know, for peripheral things, generally speaking”

(CLM interview).

“There never has been any white space on this

project…every piece of ground, every square meter of

ground is owned by a principal contractor. The actual

map of the park looked like a piece of tartan, because it

was all split up” (CLM interview).

PC “So, we’ve got so many different interfaces, you know,

the red lines on each of the buildings obviously give,

you know, there’s clear responsibility within that full

delivery of whatever that might be… So, as we collapse

and wrap up the project that co-ordination internally

becomes even more important. But, then, there’s the

co-ordination outside. We are adjacent to Westfield.

We are adjacent to railway lines. We’re adjacent to

rivers and waterways. We’re adjacent to the Olympic

Park. There’s an awful lot going on there and that co-

ordination’s absolutely critical” (PC interview).

“There’s no day-to-day relationship between the

different contractors at all, except where we’re touching

next, where we might have an infrastructure to put in on

their doorstep. So the site has been set up within

discreet PC areas so we’re working within a boundary

within a boundary, as it were. And we’re being, as I say,

left to get on with our work. I think it’s worked very

well” (PC interview).

Table 5: Levels of systems integration: illustrated interview quotations

41

Baseline planning Controlled change

“We have right from the beginning of 2006 established

what we call our milestones, and they were for the

different phases of the project. So, you had the dig,

demolish, design phase that’s pretty much designing the

venues, demolishing the buildings, starting digging the

foundations. Very public milestones, ten milestones, and

publically announced so the public could track, and our

stakeholders and the media, could track our progress”

(ODA interview).

“[Blue book] not a document that does a warm up piece

on every project, but it puts down, in highlights, exactly

what you’re building on a project, what the timetable is,

what the deliverables are, what the cost’s going to be,

some sub-division of that cost and all of that” (ODA

interview).

“The Blue Book was like an umbrella for the project

under which CLM can get on with their work…It set out

the programme and time and people could see very

clearly from the outside, if we don’t let the procurement

at this date, and if we don’t finalise the design at that

date, we’re going to start running late on this project..

There was an integration between the project and how

things had to come together on the site; it was very

clearly structured within the document” (ODA

interview).

“We set up a change board, we set up a process with

CLM that meant if you wanted to change the schedule,

the milestones, if you wanted to change the scope and

that had financial consequence, you had to take a change

through a monthly change board… We kept a very tight

control check, change was the enemy of the project, we

said that from the outset; we wanted to be change

resistant” (ODA interview).

“We decided early on to use the NEC contract, NEC 3,

basically because needed to identify risks early on,

through the early warning structure, so that you could

map out cost and change and schedule implications, you

know, almost in a real time situation. Because if went to

traditional contracting, you needed lots of fixed price

stuff, you just wouldn’t get visibility” (CLM interview).

“The ODA as well, but especially for CLM, I think it’s

been the flexibility issue, has been the fact that, whether

it’s organizationally or procedurally or what-have-you,

it’s having the right amount of discipline but, yet, also

having the right amount of flexibility. By flexibility, I

mean moving the right people to the right spot at the

right time, changing your organization chart…It really

has been a good, cooperative team effort” (CLM

interview).

“Here’s two elements to change: there’s change in terms

of client change and understanding client change; we’ve

established a formal change board in governance with the

ODA; I think it worked brilliantly. People who were not

used to it, project managers, don’t like it because of the

rigour in the discipline…You know, nearly 2,000

changes to date, full visibility and traceability of

decisions. But what we’ve done is, we’ve rejected just

under 500 changes and decided not to do it; that’s saved

money, because of this collective visibility” (CLM

interview).

Table 6: Systems integration: balancing stability and change: illustrated interview quotations

42

Appendix A: List of Interviews

Date Interviewee Affiliation Job title / Function

Phase 1: Programme level

1 17-Nov-10 Carline Blackman CLM Head of Organizational Development

2 17-Nov-10 Louise Hardy CLM Infrastructure Director

3 24-Nov-10 Ken Owen CLM Commercial Director

4 25-Nov-10 Mark Reynolds CLM Deputy Programme Director

5 01-Dec-10 Ian Galloway CLM Programme Director

6 01-Dec-10 Simon Wright ODA Director of Utilities

7 08-Dec-10 Ken Durbin CLM Technical Services Director

8 08-Dec-10 Alison Nimmo ODA Director of design and regeneration

9 15-Dec-10 Richard Rook CLM Director of Construction Integration

10 15-Dec-10 Hugh Sumner ODA Director of Transport

11 15-Dec-10 Michele Owens ODA HR Manager

12 15-Dec-10 Howard Shiplee ODA Director of Construction

13 28-Jan- 11 Dennis Hone ODA Director of Finance; CEO

14 02-Feb-11 Jason Millett CLM Venues Director

15 09-Feb-11 John Armitt ODA Chairman

16 09-Feb-11 Alice Coates ODA Marketing Strategy

Phase 2: Project level

17 17-Mar-11 Tony Aikenhead McAlpine Stadium – Project Director

18 17-Mar-11 Chris Hall McAlpine Stadium – Project Manager

19 17-Mar-11 Richard Rook CLM Stadium – Project Manager

20 28-Mar-11 Simon Birchall CLM Athletes Village – Project Manager

21 28-Mar-11 Mark Dickenson Lend Lease Athletes Village – Project Director

22 28-Mar-11 Alan Bates ODA Athletes Village – Project Sponsor

23 31-Mar-11 Dean Goodliffe ISG Velodrome – Project Director

24 31-Mar-11 Davendra Dabasia CLM Velodrome – Project Manager

25 06-Apr-11 Colin Naish ODA IBC/MPC – Project Sponsor

26 06-Apr-11 Tony Coyle Carillion IBC/MPC – Project Director

27 10-May-11 Danny Richards CLM Basketball – Project Manager

28 10-May-11 Dave Coulson CLM Basketball – Project Manager

29 10-May-11 Richard Arnold ODA Basketball – Project Sponsor

30 22-July-11 Michael Lytrides CLM IBC/MPC – Project Manager

31 04-Aug-11 Ian Crockford ODA Aquatics – Project Sponsor

32 05-Sept-11 Stuart Fraser Balfour Beatty Aquatics – Project Director

43

Appendix B: The ODA’s Six Priority Themes

The ODA identified six ‘priority themes’ as follows:

1. Health, Safety and Security

2. Design and Accessibility

3. Equality and Inclusion

4. Legacy

5. Employment and Skills

6. Sustainability

The ODA published a strategy for each of these themes and detailed specific objectives and principles

which the ODA was committed to achieve in the course of delivering its programme of construction.

These objectives were cascaded down through CLM to Tier 1 contractors and beyond. While the

targets and principles were non-negotiable, it was up to each contractor to implement them in their

own way. What was crucial was that ODA senior management made it clear that these additional

targets were as important as the traditional construction targets. As a result, they were taken seriously

– and achieved – right across the programme.

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Stakeholder Engagement

What are stakeholders?

Individuals or groups who have an interest or role in the project, programme or portfolio or are impacted by it.

APMBoK, 7th Edition

The organisations or people who have an interest or role in the programme or are impacted by it.

APM Introduction to Programme Management

Individuals or organisations that are actively involved in the project, or whose interests may be affected as a result of project execution or project completion.

PMBoK – 3rd Edition

Individuals or organisations whose interests may be affected by the program outcomes, either positively or negatively.

PMI’s Standard for Program Management

Stakeholders: –

Attitudes can vary

Some may need extra care

Need to be communicated with

Overview of Process: –

– Identification

– Analysis

– Engagement

– Mapping (matrix)

– Communication

Identification

Internal

– Formal – organisation chart

– Informal – personality / experience

External

– Your customers and suppliers and your suppliers’ suppliers

– pressure groups

– how the media might react to what you are doing

– the institutions, especially if your work relates to government, security,

armed forces or regulators.

Analysis and Engagement

How much will this initiative impact on them?

How interested might they be?

How much power might they wield?

Key dimensions: –

Position: – how they think about the initiative – ranging from champion to opposition or rejection.

Interest: – how interested they are in the programme.

Power or influence: – how much power each stakeholder could wield over the programme.

Classification of stakeholders: –

An example of how you might classify your stakeholders:

Championing – Inertia

Support – Obstruction

Approval – Antagonism

Commitment – Opposition

Cooperation – Rejection

Compliance – Mutiny

Neutrality – Sabotage

Mapping Techniques

Communication

– Is the output of stakeholder engagement.

– Is how stakeholders are engaged and influenced

– Explaining benefits

– Listening to stakeholders

Hard to get a balance

Ask stakeholders what they would like to know

Relationship building

So able to communicate:

– In an appropriate form

– At appropriate intervals

– With the appropriate content

Example of part of a communication plan

Stakeholder management on programmes

Wider range than on a project

Agreement with project managers about accountabilities and responsibilities

Adequate resources and governance

Any Questions?

?

References:

APM Introduction to Programme Management, Second Edition

Buttrick, R., (2020) The Programme and Portfolio Workout, Routledge

Rayner, P. & Reiss, G., (2013) Portfolio and Programme Management Demystified – Managing Multiple Projects Succesfully, 2nd Edition, Routledge

image1.jpg

image2.png

image3.png

image4.png

image5.png

image6.png

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Projects in Context

Session Outcomes

An awareness and understanding of life cycles; linear, iterative and hybrid

An understanding of the benefits of life cycles

An understanding of reviews; decision gates, audits, post project reviews, benefits realisation reviews.

What are life cycles?

A framework comprising a set of distinct high-level stages required to transform an idea or concept into reality in an orderly and efficient manner. Life cycles offer a systematic and organised way to undertake project-based work and can be viewed as the structure underpinning deployment.

APMBoK 7th Edition

A project life cycle is the series of phases that a project passes through from its start to its completion. A project phase is a collection of logically related project activities that culminates in the completion of one or more deliverables.

PMBoK 6th Edition

Linear Life Cycle (APMBoK)

4

Concept phase

Understand the problem/opportunity

Gather high level requirements

Investigate feasibility

Identify the project environment

Identify/analyse stakeholders

Identify preferred solution

Prepare outline business case

Gain approval to proceed

5

Definition phase

Refine the work of concept

Develop the requirements

Define the scope

Schedule the work

Prepare the management plans

Develop the project cashflow and budget

Produce the deployment baseline

Produce the project management plan

Gain approval to proceed

6

Development / Deployment phase

Further requirements definition

Design stage

Build stage

Procurement

Manufacture

Component testing

Prepare for benefits realisation

Handover & Closure / Transition phase

User acceptance testing

Hand over to customer and obtain acceptance

Hand over to operational support and obtain acceptance

Dispose of facilities

Release resources

Finalise contracts and accounts

Archive project documentation

Undertake post project review – distribute lessons learned

Benefits realisation phase

Benefits are realised

Discover new benefits

Sponsor holds benefits realisation reviews

Benefits sustained throughout Operations

Operations phase

Use the products

Support and maintain the products

Upgrades (possibly new projects)

Runs in parallel with Benefits Realisation phase

Termination phase

Shutdown the operation

Make safe

Dispose of the product

Could include recycling product for re-use elsewhere.

Benefits of life cycles

Benefits of life cycles cont.

Iterative life cycle

Pre-project phase

Feasibility phase

Foundations phase

Evolutionary development phase

Deployment phase

Post-Project phase

Hybrid Life Cycle

Premature Close

Projects close early for a number of reasons:

A major issue occurs which costs too much to resolve

The external or internal environment changes

Funds are withdrawn

Staff are withdrawn

Benefits devalued

In all cases the business case will be come invalid

Decision often taken at decision gates

Move into the transition and adoption phases and make use of what has been completed where possible

Programme Life Cycle

Programme life cycle strategic approaches

There are four types of programme life cycle strategic approaches:

Linear

Incremental

Experimental

Evolutionary

Linear Lifecycles

Where the business transitions to the final new state through a single sequential series of activities each providing only partial capability (possibly even in a single tranche). This is suitable for stable, low-risk environments where the full benefit can be delivered through a single final roll-out.

Incremental Lifecycles

Where the transition to the new state is achieved through a staged series of smaller step changes in capability delivering increasing benefit. This is an approach that can deliver ‘quick wins’ to help engage stakeholders in an uncertain environment and build confidence towards the final end state, and is well represented within the ‘tranche’ framework.

Experimental Lifecycles

Where the programme runs parallel activities in order to explore high-risk options and fall-backs, where the way forward is unclear at first. The scope of this type of activity will depend on the risk appetite of the organisation – in some circumstances the approach may extend for the duration of the delivery phase.

Evolutionary Lifecycles

In this approach the programme takes a number of planned full transitions to business-as-usual, each of which are based on user/customer feedback from the preceding transition and implementation. This approach can be used for time-critical initial entry to market followed by follow-on solutions, but runs a possible risk of negative reputational impacts from continuous changes.

What are reviews?

Project reviews take place throughout the project life cycle to check the likely or actual achievement of the objectives specified in the project management plan.

APMBok 7th Edition

Decision gates

Undertaken at the end of phase or stage

Determines whether project should proceed or not

Major decision point for senior management

Informed by

Outputs from latest audits (if applicable)

Completion of current phase/stage

Plan for next phase/stage

External circumstances

Business case

Benefit:

Opportunity to confirm ongoing investment in the project (or not)

Audits

Undertaken by group outside the team

Project Office

Internal auditors

External auditors

Used to provide objective evaluation and assessment of the management of the project

Agenda includes, evaluation of project performance, likely success, use of project management processes, stakeholder engagement etc

There is a need to pass an audit

Benefit

Independent (external) assurance project is being managed properly (or not) / chance to take corrective action

Post project review

Takes place in the Transition Phase

Used to assess “did we do it right?”

Aims

Evaluate against success criteria

Determine what went well, what went badly, what could be done differently, separating cause from effect

Recognise individual and team performances

Evaluate the project processes and any tools or techniques used

Benefit

Opportunity to learn lessons and continually improve

Benefits realisation review

Undertaken some time after the products are in use

3 – 6 months perhaps?

Perhaps more than one?

Establish whether

The benefits have been realised (or not)

Any unexpected benefits have been realised

Any problems have been caused by the new products

Put in place corrective action if benefits not realised

Responsibility of the sponsor

Benefit

Opportunity to reinforce benefits realisation, realise new benefits, correct any problems

References

APM (2019) APM Body of Knowledge 7th Edition, Princes Risborough, Buckinghamshire

APM (2016) Project Management Qualification Study Guide, Princes Risborough, Buckinghamshire

PMI (2017) Project Management Body of Knowledge, 6th Edition

Further activity:

Please engage with Session 8 – Portfolio Delivery Cycle of ILX’s Management of Portfolios

image1.jpg

image2.png

image3.png

image4.png

image5.png

image6.png

image7.png

Themanagementofprojectmanagement:Aconceptual
frameworkforprojectgovernance

Eric G. Too a,⁎ , Patrick Weaver b

a University of Southern Queensland, Australia
b Mosaic Project Services Pty Ltd, Australia

Available online 31 August 2013

Abstract

For an organization to create optimal value from its investment in projects there must be a clear link between the outputs created by the projects and the
requirements of the organization’s business strategy. This means that organizations that have a structure in place for aligning the project deliverables with
their organizational goals will be better placed to realize their investment in projects, and achieve the value defined by their business strategies. This paper
examines existing research, ideas and concepts of project governance and enterprise project management, and offers a framework to build on current theory
development and practice. Synthesizing existing literature of project/program management, governance and portfolio management, this paper proposes
four key elements to improve the performance of projects and hence create value for organizations. These four elements are (1) portfolio management:
focused on selecting the right projects and programs to support the organization’s strategy, and terminating ones that no longer contribute to the business
success of the organization; (2) project sponsorship: providing the direct link between the executive and the project or program manager, focused on the
whole project lifecycle; (3) Project Management Office (PMO): providing oversight and strategic reporting capabilities; (4) projects and program support:
the effective support and management of projects and programs are the measures of an effective governance system. The purpose of the framework
described in this paper is to provide guidance to organizations in the development of effective project governance to optimize the management of projects.
© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Project governance; Multi project environment; Strategic alignment; Enterprise project management; Business value

1. Introduction

There is a significant growth in the adoption of project man-

projects – including program management and portfolio
management – is now the dominant model in many organizations
for strategy implementation, business transformation, continuous

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

ScienceDirect
International Journal of Project Management 32 (2014) 1382– 1394

Eric G. Too Patrick Weaver

1 / 13Outline Cited by Figures (4) Article info Hide

Recommended Articles

Exploring the value of project management: Linking
Project Management Performance and Project Success
Farzana Asad Mir and Ashly H. Pinnington
International Journal of Project Management • February 2014

Preview View PDF Save PDF

Project Governance – The Definition and Leadership
Dilemma
Michiel C Bekker
Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences • 2 July 2015

Preview View PDF Save PDF

Governance performance in complex environment:
The case of a major transformation in a university
hospital
Monique Aubry, Marie-Claire Richer and Mélanie Lavoie-Tremblay
International Journal of Project Management • November 2014

Preview View PDF Save PDF

Crossrail, the largest civil engineering project in
Europe, received Royal Assent on 22nd July 2008 and
is now being delivered after nearly two decades.
Enabling works for the scheme are due to start in the
New Year, with the main construction expected to
start in 2010 and operational in 2017.1 The scheme
is welcome news for the London economy. It will
provide at least a £20 billion boost to the UK
economy, significant employment during construction
and operations, regeneration and new capacity, and
much needed crowding relief. However, its journey
towards this significant milestone has taken 16 years
since the first attempt in the early 1990s; and it was
first considered nearly 150 years ago.The old adage,
‘what goes around comes around’, is no truer than
with the Crossrail. This article reviews Crossrail’s
ancestory and its epic journey to receiving Royal
Assent, and discusses future issues.

Crossrail’s ancestory
An east–west link across central London is not a
modern-day concept. In 1845, a proposal to link the
Great Western Railway (GWR) and Great Eastern
Railway (GER) was first put forward in 1845, but did
not progress.2 In more recent times, some authors
have traced Crossrail’s ancestors to the Abercrombie
Report, published in 1944, and The London
Transportation Study, published 1965.2,10 Although
these key reports provide the basis for the scheme,
the modern day version of Crossrail was derived
from the Central London Rail Study (CLRS)

commissioned by the then Conservative Secretary of
State Paul Channon in March 1988.The impetus for
CLRS was: overcrowding and congestion
experienced during peak times on the national rail
and underground networks and the roads, plans to
regenerate Docklands; and the need to identify a
transport strategy to meet future demand up to
2000.3 CLRS was a joint strategic study between the
Department of Transport (DoT), British Rail (BR),
London Regional Transport (LRT) and London
Underground Limited (LUL). The CLRS report,
published in January 1989, examined and provided
outline analysis of eight schemes categorised under
‘New underground lines and extensions’ and four
under ‘Surface lines run under the central area (or
crossrail concept)’. Three projects from the CLRS
study were conceived to combat the future
congestion problems4: The East–West Crossrail,
Cheslea–Hackney and extension of the Jubilee Line.

First time around
During autumn 1991, under the Conservatives, the
Crossrail promoters deposited a Private Bill to
Parliament to obtain powers for the scheme. From
January 1992, multiple Government cost-effective
and engineering reviews were ordered, which some
believe were in a bid to try and stall or even halt the
project. Early in May 1994, the bill was rejected by a
2:1 vote, by three conservatives who did not
represent London constituencies. It is understood
this decision was taken against a backdrop of an

Planning Crossrail

Crossrail has had a gestation period of 16 years’ but at

last it seems finally underway. Dr Mark Gannon CMILT,

lecturer in Operations and Project Management,

University of Surrey, investigates how Crossrail plans

have developed.

Author
Dr Mark J Gannon
CMILT

Tottenham Court Road Crossrail station plaza design

XVII FOCUSON PLANNING & POLICY

All images copyright Cross London Rail Links Limited.

transport_special:Layout 1 21/10/08 09:19 Page 18

economic recession and lower number of passengers
entering London, the schemes interference with rail
privatisation, and political preference for the Jubilee
Line Extension still in its legislative process, and
despite Crossrail having a stronger business case.3

Despite this disappointing news for sponsors and the
taxpayers’, sunk expenditure was estimated at £150
million3, the Government, according to Schabas5,
made a ‘good show of being disappointed’ and
requested that the route was ‘safeguarded’ to protect
the alignment of the route and prevent development.

Resurrection
In 1999, the City of London Corporation, under
Labour, resurrected Crossrail in a similar form to that
presented to Parliament in 1991. In December 1999,
the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, asked the
shadow Strategic Rail Authority (sSRA) to carry out
a review of issues relating to rail travel on an
east–west axis across London. Once again, the
impetus for the study was congestion, network
capacity, growth and regeneration. The aim of the
report was to create a programme comprising of
appropriate projects to deliver the capability ‘to
create a railway network for London’s status as a
world city’.6 The sSRA made nine recommendations,
five of which were focused on progressing the
Paddington to Liverpool Street Regional Metro
scheme from a concept to project definition and
support necessary; the remaining four were
infrastructure improvements around London’s
network.The final recommendation was to conduct
a feasibility study into theWimbledon–Hackney line.

What goes around comes around
In 2001, Central London Rail Links Limited (CLRL
Ltd), a 50:50 joint venture between Transport for

London (TfL) and the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA),
was formed to define and develop proposals for a
Crossrail link. Central Government provided CLRL
with a budget of £154 million to conduct a feasibility
study and acquire statutory powers for Crossrail line
1 and line 2, formerly the Chelsea–Hackney line.7

With the disbandment of the SRA in September
2005 and its subsequent engulfment into the
Department for Transport (DfT), the Crossrail
project was brought under the effective sponsorship
control of the Government. A long and short list of
options were examined by sponsors between 2001
and 2003, which led to a single option for Crossrail
line 1 being identified and taken forward to a Hybrid
Bill. Prior to the Government allowing Crossrail line
1 to proceed to submit a bill in Parliament, it called
for a review, led by Adrian Montague, of the schemes
preferred option and business case.

The Montague Review

The reviewers assessed the realism of the proposals
to deliver 24tph and the investment to support this
against a background of network interfaces with
Network Rail and the required investment on these
networks. Once the reviewers had discovered
uncertainties with the scope of the business case,
other components that are derived from the scope,
such as revenues and operating and maintenance
costs, were also in doubt.The reviewers questioned
the passenger revenue forecasts, especially model
calibration, lack of empirical evidence, annualising
methodology, risk and quality factors. A key finding
from the review was that the business case was not
‘fully deliverable as intended and further work is
needed to enable the scheme to be presented to
Parliament in a Hybrid Bill,’8

XVIII Planning Crossrail

Crossrail will tackle
congestion and the lack
of capacity on London’s
existing rail network

transport_special:Layout 1 21/10/08 09:19 Page 19

The Crossrail Act

After Montague’s uncommitted endorsement, the
Government cleverly steered the Crossrail project
through to introducing a Hybrid Bill, in the House of
Commons on 22nd February 2005, to construct,
operate and maintain the scheme.5 The bill left the
Commons towards the beginning of December
2007. During this period, it had 466 petitions against
the bill. The bill had its first reading on 14th
December 2007 and its second on 9th January 2008
in the House of Lords, and had 113 petitions against
it.The final reading was completed early July and the
bill received Royal Assent on 22nd July 2008.1, 9

Funding

On 5th October 2007, the Prime Minster announced
a £16 billion funding package to cover costs and
inflation increases for Crossrail.1 The details were
published in a Heads of Terms agreement between
the DfT and TfL that provides details of future
funding and governance arrangements for Crossrail.
In essence, the DfT and TfL are responsible for £5.6
billion and the Greater London Authority £7.7 billion;
and contributions are to come from British Airports
Authority (BAA), the City of London Corporation,
CanaryWharf Group and Berkley Homes.1

The scheme
Objectives

Crossrail has three objectives8: to support the
development of London as a world city, and its roles
as the financial centre of Europe and the UK; to
support the economic growth of London and its
regeneration areas by tackling congestion and the
lack of capacity on the existing network; and to
improve rail access into and within London.

Route

The Crossrail scheme is comprised of four sections10:
a western section, a central area and an upper and a
lower eastern section – see Figure 1. In the west, the
route runs on existing GreatWestern rail tracks from
Maidenhead and Heathrow to Paddington. A new
23km twin-bore tunnel will run under the central
London area from Royal Oak to Whitechapel and
then branch at a point near Stepney Green into an
upper and lower section. On the eastern section, the
upper branch will surface at Pudding Mill Lane and
then use existing Great Eastern tracks to Shenfield.
The lower eastern branch will surface at Victoria
Dock Road and then run through to a new tunnel
under the Thames resurfacing near Abbey Wood.
Tunnels with a diameter of approximately 6m–10m
at stations – will be constructed mostly 25–35m
below London’s street level and to depths of 35m,
40m and 50m at Hyde Park, Liverpool Street and the
Isle of Dogs respectively.10

Trains and trains service

Crossrail’s rolling stock will be 200m long, comprised
of 10 carriages each 20m in length, and will have
capacity for up to 1,500 seated and standing
passengers during peak periods. During these peak
periods, Crossrail plans to run 24tph in each
direction through the central area, with 12tph during
off-peak periods. It is forecast that during 2016,
160,000 passengers will travel on Crossrail during
the morning peak, with trains expected to travel up
to 100mph on the surface and 60mph in the tunnel.10

New stabling sidings are proposed at West Drayton
and West of Maidenhead and Old Oak Common
stablings are modified. Trains will be maintained at a
new depot that will be built west of Romford station
and existing stabling facilities extended at Gidea Park;
additionally sidings at Abbey Wood and Shenfield
may be utilised.10

Figure 1

XIX Planning Crossrail

The final Crossrail route

transport_special:Layout 1 22/10/08 16:27 Page 20

Stations

Crossrail will serve a total of 35 stations: 14 on the
western branch, 7 in the central area, 12 on the
upper eastern branch and 2 on the lower eastern
branch – again, see Figure 1.The central stations will
be new, with 210 m platforms long and two ticket
halls; at other stations, further enhancements will be
made to accommodate Crossrail trains.

Economic appraisal
A scheme appraisal and wider economic appraisal to
compare the net costs and benefits was conducted
by the CLRL Ltd and submitted as part of the
environment statement required for the Crossrail Bill.
Such benefits in the scheme appraisal included are:
journey time-savings; highway savings; reduction in
crowding and ambience and benefits to mobility
impaired users. With the July 2004 business case
evaluation, Crossrail had a benefit:cost ratio of 1.80:1,
1.63 with optimism bias.11 This was lower than
previous evaluations, primarily due to the lower
eastern branch terminating at Abbey Wood rather
than Ebbsfleet.A benefit:cost of 2.60:1, with optimism
bias 2.40:1, was derived for the wider economic
appraisal, which included such benefits as employment
opportunities and improved productivity and outputs.11

For instance,CLRL estimates that the central area will add
5,000–13,000 jobs in 2006, rising to 23,000–40,000
by 2026.

Discussion
Whilst Crossrail provides a much-needed rail scheme
for London, there are many issues that need fully
understanding.With any major transport investment,
concerns will be raised over cost overruns and
realisation of future forecasts. CLRL has provided
capital cost estimates that include optimism bias to
cover the likely eventuality of cost overruns. However,
time will tell whether these are sufficient.

With revenue forecast, rail transport schemes are
notorious for not being realised, due to their complex
nature with forecasting and political nature. In the
case of Crossrail, two-thirds of its forecast revenue is
from existing operations and a third from new
growth, which should provide some comfort.
However, the abstracted revenue should trigger
financial concerns with TfL on how revenue diverted
from London Underground’s Central line and other
lines will be replaced. Additionally, there are concerns
that Crossrail threatens to reduce funds available for
the upgrade of the tube12 and future LRT schemes in
London.Of equal concern is the funding for Crossrail.
Despite the Heads of Terms published in November
2007 and the political need to demonstrate ‘good
economic news’, the press has reported several
uncertainties with BAA and the concept of the
business levy.13

Cross-section of typical Crossrail
platform tunnel

The proposed Bond Street Crossrail entrance

XX Planning Crossrail

transport_special:Layout 1 21/10/08 09:19 Page 21

The Crossrail route has also been severely
challenged, especially from the promoters of
Superlink Ltd who believe the route does so little for
few, despite the £10 billion cost.5,14 Superlink,
proposed in December 2004, is a 550km network
that would provide regional service from
Northampton, Reading, Basingstoke, Guildford,
Cambridge, Ipswich, Southend Victoria and Tilbury
into London’s main traffic nodes of Euston,
Paddington,Waterloo and King’s Cross, connected by
a new east–west tunnel through central London.
CLRL Ltd conducted a feasibility assessment and
appraised the proposal, and concluded there were
major issue with its construction, operations and
obtaining powers through greenbelt land necessary
for construction. However, Superlink’s promoters
insist that although it will cost £3 billion more than
Crossrail, it will become more than self-financing by
generating more passenger revenue due to its far
reaching regional services.5

In conclusion
Crossrail is a major transport investment that will
deliver significant benefit to the UK and London
economy, and help maintain London as a world class
city and financial centre of Europe. It took nearly two
decades to achieve the Royal Assent milestone, and in
excess of 100 years to achieve the Crossrail dream’
As is apparent from other major transport schemes,
a contributory factor has been the transference of
the scheme to the effective control of the
Government and the DfT.This action can only assist
the scheme being steered through the significant
political mire at its height during project planning, the
critical project stage at which Crossrail faltered in the
early 1990s. Although the visionary Superlink is now
probably doomed to the transport history books, its
promoters will be looking over the Government’s
shoulders. As Dr Prideaux, Superlink Ltd, states: ‘Only
one major railway is built in London every 15 years
that costs over £10 billion – so it needs to be right!’14

References

1. GLA, ‘Crossrail given the go-ahead by Parliament’, press release, 23rd July 2008, www.london.gov.uk,
accessed 24th August 2008

2. FERGUSON, J C, ‘CrossRail: Scope, background and feasibility’, Journal of Transport, Proceedings of the
Institution of Civil Engineers, May 2001, Issue 2

3. HEATH, D L, ‘CrossRail: External influences and the way forward’, Journal of Transport, Proceedings of the
Institution of Civil Engineers, May 2001, Issue 2

4. Department of Transport, Central London Rail Study, January 1989

5. SCHABAS, M, Paying for Crossrail the Business Case, Institute of Economic Affairs, 2008

6. Shadow Strategic Rail Authority, London East–West Study, 2000

7. Crossrail, Crossrail Line 1 Shortlist Announcement, 7th March 2002

8. Department for Transport, Review of Crossrail Business Case, 2003, www.dft.gov.uk, accessed
20th August 2008

9.The Crossrail Act, www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/crossrail, accessed 24th August 2008

10. Crossrail, Crossrail Environmental Statement, 2005,Vol 1

11. Crossrail, Economic Appraisal of Crossrail, 2005

12. WEBSTER, B, ‘£16bn Crossrail go-ahead threatens to shunt tube upgrade into sidings’, The Times, 14th
September 2007

13. CECIL, N, ‘Crossrail backers raise doubts over financing’, Evening Standard, 7th August 2008

14. Prideaux, J, ‘Superlink: a viable alternative?’, The Utilities Journal, March 2005

Author: Dr Mark J Gannon CMILT is a lecturer in Operations and Project Management, within the School of Management,
University of Surrey, and Programme leader for an MSc in Operations and Logistics Management. He has gained a wide
range of project management, commercial and analytical expertise through working on some of the largest and most
innovative transport-based Private Finance Initiative/Public-Private-Partnership projects undertaken in the UK.

Note: The contents of this article represent the views of the author and do not represent the views of the University
of Surrey. The author does not accept any liability for its correctness.

For more information on rail planning, why not join our Strategic Rail or Transport Planning Forums? See our web
site www.ciltuk.org.uk for more deails.

Information

Some of the reports and
statements generated in the
planning of Crossrail

XXI Planning Crossrail

transport_special:Layout 1 21/10/08 09:19 Page 22

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

PROGRAMME CONTROLS

RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN

Document Number: CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014

(Supersedes: CR/QMS/COM/S/0811)

Document History:

Revision Prepared Date: Author: Reviewed by: Approved by: Reason for Issue
1.0 13-04-10 First Issue

2.0 23-06-11 Second Issue, to
reflect re-

organisation

3.0 15-06-2015 Update to reflect
org changes

Business Owner (if different to Author):

This document contains proprietary information. No part of this document may be reproduced
without prior written consent from the chief executive of Crossrail Ltd.

This document is shared for the purposes of learning legacy. It is a snapshot in time and hence many of
the links within the document will become obsolete over time. Some links/document references will refer
to a document storage location that isn’t accessible. Users should refer to the learning legacy website
where these documents may be published separately.

karen elson
Typewritten Text

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 2 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

Contents
1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4

2 Purpose: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4

2.1 Objectives: …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

3 Scope …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5

3.1 Scope of Risk Management: ………………………………………………………………………… 5

4 Key Definitions ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 7

5 Responsibilities and Accountabilities …………………………………………………………… 8

5.1 Role of the Accountable Manager ………………………………………………………………… 8

5.2 Risk Management Organisation …………………………………………………………………… 8

5.3 The Role of Crossrail ………………………………………………………………………………….. 9

5.4 The Roles of Individuals within Crossrail ……………………………………………………… 9

5.5 The Roles of Crossrail’s Industry Partners …………………………………………………. 10

5.6 The Roles of Contractor’s working for Crossrail …………………………………………. 11

6 Governance ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 11

6.1 Audit Committee ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 12

6.2 Risk Sub Committee ………………………………………………………………………………….. 12

6.3 Programme Risk Panel ……………………………………………………………………………… 12

6.4 Area/ Function Governance ……………………………………………………………………….. 13

7 Risk Management Process …………………………………………………………………………. 13

7.1 Generic Process Description ……………………………………………………………………… 13

8 Interface with Other Processes …………………………………………………………………… 15

8.1 Health and Safety ……………………………………………………………………………………… 15

8.2 Issue Management ……………………………………………………………………………………. 16

8.3 Trend Management and Change Control …………………………………………………….. 16

8.4 Investment Authority Process ……………………………………………………………………. 17

8.5 Procurement Process ……………………………………………………………………………….. 17

8.6 Cost Management …………………………………………………………………………………….. 17

8.7 Contingency Management …………………………………………………………………………. 17

9 Quantitative Risk Assessment ……………………………………………………………………. 18

10 Risk Appetite and Escalation ……………………………………………………………………… 19

10.1 Risk Appetite ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 19

10.2 Risk Escalation …………………………………………………………………………………………. 19

11 Risk Reporting …………………………………………………………………………………………… 20

11.1 QRA Report ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 21

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 3 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

12 Awareness and Training …………………………………………………………………………….. 21

13 Risk Management Systems ………………………………………………………………………… 21

14 Reference Documents ……………………………………………………………………………….. 22

15 Standard Forms / Templates ………………………………………………………………………. 22

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 4 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

1 Introduction

Managing risk and uncertainty is vital to the successful delivery of Crossrail. This Risk
Management Plan describes the activities, governance, roles, responsibilities and process
which are required to ensure that Crossrail manages its risks effectively. It forms part of a
consistent suite of documentation which describes Crossrail’s risk management approach.

2 Purpose:

The purpose of this document is to provide a high level overview and description of the
Crossrail’s approach to risk management. This Risk Management Plan includes:

 High level overview and description of the Crossrail risk management process;

 Description of the high level roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for managing risk;

 Description of Crossrail’s risk management governance arrangements;

 Description of risk management interfaces;

 Summary of Crossrail’s risk appetite and the escalation procedure; and

Description of the purpose, frequency and scope of risk reporting.

2.1 Objectives:

Managing risk and uncertainty is vital to the successful delivery of Crossrail. Crossrail is
accountable for delivering a new world class, affordable railway safely through effective
partnerships. Crossrail must do this with incomplete knowledge of future events, in a complex
environment and within known funding and timing constraints.

Crossrail’s risk management process provides a structured approach to the identification,
assessment and treatment of risks to ensure project success by minimising threats and
maximising opportunities.

The objectives of Risk Management are to:

 Support the delivery of Crossrail by reducing the likelihood and potential consequences
of events that could have a negative effect on the project and increasing the likelihood
and potential consequences of events that could have a positive effect on the project;

 Provide assurance to internal and external stakeholders that the project understands its
significant risks and is actively managing them;

 Improve decision making, planning and prioritisation by improving understanding of
uncertainty and risk.

This Risk Management Plan forms part of a consistent suite of documentation to describe
Crossrail’s risk management approach and has been developed with reference to
ISO31000:2009 Risk management – Principles and guidelines and the Joint Code of Practice
for Risk Management of Tunnel Works in the UK.

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan
CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 5 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

3 Scope

The scope of this plan includes the management of all categories of risk during design and
construction and during commissioning and handover to operation. Crossrail has established a
structured hierarchy of risk information defining Strategic, Programme, Area, Project and
Contract risk levels.

The plan describes the responsibilities and accountabilities for managing risk for individuals
within Crossrail and between Crossrail and its Delivery and Industry Partners.

The key elements of risk management governance within Crossrail are Audit Committee (a
committee of the Crossrail Board), the Risk Sub-Committee (a sub-committee of ExComm) and
the Programme Risk Panel (made up of members of the Programme Executive or their
delegates).

This plan describes the standard risk management process for Crossrail. This provides a
systematic approach to managing risks and represents a generic process to be applied
throughout the programme. The plan also describes some key areas of interface including
Health and Safety, Change Control and Contingency Management.

The plan describes the purpose and contents of the key reports which will be produced as part
of the process.

The plan also defines the principles by which Crossrail will establish its Risk Appetite and the
mechanisms by which risks will be escalated

3.1 Scope of Risk Management:
The Risk Management Plan forms part of a consistent suite of documentation to describe
Crossrail’s risk management policy and process, which is shown below.

Risk Management framework of documentation

This Risk Management Plan will apply to Crossrail and to all Crossrail’s Industry Partners. It will
be used as information for the wider Crossrail supply chain. This plan sets out the activities
which will deliver an appropriate programme of Risk Management to ensure that the Crossrail
project and programme risks are effectively managed and controlled.

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

Risk
Management

Plan

Le
ga

cy

Le
ga

cy

Risk
Management

Policy

Risk
Management

Procedure

Le
arn

ing

Le
arn

ing

Risk
Management

Agreement LU

LU Risk
Management

Pan

Contractor Risk
Management

Pan

Contractor Risk
Management

Pan

Contractor Risk
Management

Pan

QRA
Procedure

Opportunity
Management

Procedure

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 6 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

Crossrail will reflect Health and Safety risks which could affect project objectives in its overall
risk management process, however the identification, assessment and management of safety
risk is not covered within the scope of this plan. Guidance is given in the Health and Safety
Manual.

The scope of the plan includes the management of all categories of risk, both during design and
construction and during commissioning and operation. This includes:

 Business Risks (including Funding and Delivery risks);

 Engineering and Design risks;

 Interface and Logistics risks;

 Environmental risks;

 Quality risks;

 Business Continuity risks;

 Security risks;

 Fraud risks.

Crossrail has established a clear hierarchy to manage risk information at the correct level within
the programme. The hierarchy defines five levels:

 Strategic;

 Programme;

 Area;

 Project; and

 Contractor.

Establishing a hierarchy for risk information ensures that risks are managed at the most
appropriate level in the organisation. Although the principles of risk management at Crossrail
will be common, the mechanisms for managing risks in each level of the hierarchy may be
different. (Note that the level at which a risk is managed may differ to the contingency level from
which it is funded.)

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan
CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 7 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

Crossrail hierarchy of risks

Risks may be escalated or delegated between levels to ensure that they are managed by the
party best placed to manage the risk and at the most appropriate level in the organisation.

Risks will be managed through a tiered system of risk registers which closely reflects the
organisation and accountability breakdown structure.

4 Key Definitions

Risk: An uncertain event or set of circumstances that, should it occur, will affect the project’s
objectives. Note that risks could have negative effects (threats) or positive effects
(opportunities).

Risk Exposure: Potential exposure over and above the estimate (e.g. cost or time) which could
arise as a result of the impact of one or more risks.

Contingency: A budgetary allowance made specifically to cover the cost of change, risk or
unforeseen event. To be allocated and expended in accordance with the governance
procedure.

Issue: A currently occurring event that is already impacting achievement of the programme
objectives (sometimes referred to as ‘Critical Issue’).

Strategic Risks

 Externally-driven relating to funding, market
and economic factors, industry and
stakeholder relations;

 Summarise key areas of risk within the
programme for reporting to the Crossrail
Board and Sponsors.

Area Risks

 Risks associated with delivery of Area scope
and coordination, interfacing and integration
of projects

Contractor Risks

• Risks which the Contractor is best placed to
manage

Programme Risks

 Associated with coordination, interfacing and
integration of Areas;

 Significant risks which cannot be resolved
within Areas; or

 Risks to Crossrail’s functional requirements.

Project Risks

 Risks associated with delivery of Project
scope

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 8 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

5 Responsibilities and Accountabilities

5.1 Role of the Accountable Manager

The Risk Management Plan recognises the role of Accountable Manager. The Accountable
Manager is the person accountable for delivery of an element of work and who is accountable
for managing the risks associated with delivering that work. Typically this will include the Chief
Executive Officer, Programme Director, Delivery Director, Area Directors and Project &
Functional Managers. The risk management organisation provides support and guidance to the
Accountable Manager in managing their risks.

The Accountable Manager’s risk management responsibilities include:

 Maintaining a risk register in accordance with the Risk Management Procedure, for the
scope and project objectives for which they are accountable;

 Ensuring that the Risk Management Procedure operates fully within their teams, and
make adequate competent resource available to ensure that risk management
obligations are met; and

 Ensuring that all other relevant parties and perspectives (Area Managers (Delivery and
Functional), Project Managers, Contractors, stakeholders and specialists) are
appropriately engaged in the identification, assessment and management of risks in their
area.

5.2 Risk Management Organisation

The risk management organisation is made up of Risk Managers and Analysts who support
Accountable Managers by:

 Facilitating the identification of risks through facilitated workshops, data analysis etc.;

 Informing management priorities by assessing risks impacts;

 Supporting the development of effective response plans to mitigate risks;

 Helping, where possible, to expedite those response plans;

 Monitoring performance on identified response actions; and

 Informing decisions by providing qualitative and quantitative analysis of cost and
schedule risks

The risk management organisation comprises a core risk management team operating within
the Programme Controls directorate which acts as the owner of the risk management processes
and procedures. The risk management organisation is shown below.

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan
CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 9 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

5.3 The Role of Crossrail
Under the terms of the Project Development Agreement, Crossrail is the programme manager,
systems integrator and delivery agent for the Central Section and bears the majority of risk
associated with the delivery of Crossrail. As a result, Crossrail must:

 Develop and implement a risk management policy and plan for Crossrail;

 Develop and implement processes and procedures for managing risk;

 Actively manage the risks for which Crossrail is responsible;

 Provide assurance that risk management carried out by the Industry and Delivery
Partners is competent and effective;

 Maintain a useful, accurate and up-to-date Crossrail risk database, ARM;

 Carry out a programme-wide cost and schedule Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to
inform reporting of Anticipated Final Cost (AFC) and schedule confidence.

5.4 The Roles of Individuals within Crossrail
Risk management is an essential part of good project management and is a central
responsibility of all those working on the programme. Risks should be managed by the party
best placed to manage the risk and at the most appropriate level in the organisation.

The following individuals have specific accountabilities and responsibilities for managing risk.

Finance Director

Chief Executive

Area Director

Programme
Controls
Director

Area Director

Programme
Director

Area
Commercial and
Controls Director

Area
Commercial and
Controls Director

Delivery Director

Head of Risk
Management

Area Risk
Manager

Doc
um

en
t

Doc
um

en
t

Area Risk
Manager

Core Risk
Management

Function

Doc
um

en
t

Doc
um

en
t

Doc
um

en
t

Doc
um

en
t

Area Risk Team

Doc
um

en
t

Area Risk Team

Le
ga

cy
D

oc
um

en
t

Risk Management Organisation (Indicative)Doc
um

en
t

Doc
um

en
t

etc

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 10 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

5.4.1 Head of Risk Management

The Head of Risk Management’s responsibilities include:

 Providing functional leadership in Risk Management across the programme;

 Developing and implementing Crossrail’s Risk Management Plan;

 Determining competency standards for those involved in risk management and ensuring
that training is available;

 Ensuring that risk management activity on Crossrail is of an appropriate standard;

 Ensuring that risk management complies with the requirements of TfL;

 Leading assurance activities in the area of Risk Management;

 Reporting on risk to the Crossrail Executive and Board;

 Reporting on risk to the Sponsors and other external stakeholders; and

 Conducting the Crossrail programme-wide QRA.

5.4.2 Area Risk Manager

Area Risk Managers are embedded in delivery teams with line management reporting to Area
Commercial and Controls Directors (or Area Business Managers, depending on the Area) and
functional reporting to the Head of Risk Management.

Risk management responsibilities include:

 Ensuring that all teams within the Area (including their respective Contractors) follow the
risk management procedure, and alert non-compliances;

 Ensuring that all teams within the Area (including their respective Contractors) use the
designated tools to maintain up-to-date data which is of suitable quality in accordance
with the process, and alert significant errors;

 Ensuring that records are held to demonstrate risk management practices follow the risk
management procedure (e.g. records of meetings, approvals); and

 Liaising with the Crossrail Head of Risk Management to ensure continued alignment in
approach with requirements.

5.5 The Roles of Crossrail’s Industry Partners

Crossrail has a number of Industry Partners. The roles of the key industry Partners are
discussed in Crossrail’s Management Plan Volume 1 Ref 1

The roles and obligations in relation to risk management will be addressed in specific
arrangements with Crossrail and will address the following:

 Roles and Responsibilities in relation to Risk;

 Risk Management governance arrangements;

 Reporting requirements and information handling protocols; and

 Arrangements for Crossrail’s audit and assurance of Industry Partners’ risk management
functions.

Under these arrangements, all Industry Partners will be required to:

 Develop and implement a risk management plan and process, which aligns with the
principles laid out in this plan;

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 11 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

 Actively manage the risks for which they are responsible;

 Take measures to inform Crossrail immediately about any emerging risks that they are
not best placed to managed;

 Report to Crossrail their key risks and risk management performance on a regular basis;

 Support Crossrail in carrying out the Crossrail cost and schedule QRA;

 Manage the interface risks between Crossrail and Industry Partners and report their
status to Crossrail on a regular basis.

In addition, Industry Partners may be required to record risk information on the Crossrail Risk
database where appropriate.

5.6 The Roles of Contractor’s working for Crossrail

Crossrail will engage a large number of contractors in delivering the Works. The role and
obligations of the contractors in relation to risk management will be detailed within the works
information of the contract which will place emphasis on the contractor to manage its risks
consistent with Crossrail’s Risk Management Policy and Plan.

6 Governance

Risks and issues should be considered as agenda items at all of the main committees and
meetings throughout the programme. The Crossrail Board has overall responsibility for risk
management on Crossrail and is responsible for setting Crossrail’s risk appetite.

In order to develop and oversee the functioning of the risk management process, Crossrail’s
Risk Management Governance has a number of key elements (as highlighted in the diagram
below).

Risk Management Governance meetings

15

High Level Risk Meetings

Review Area and Project RisksPeriodicLine Management Review

Report Key Area and Project RisksPeriodicArea Performance Review

Report Strategic Risks in detailPeriodicExComm

Review Strategic, Programme Risks in detailQuarterlyAudit Committee

Review Strategic, Programme Risks

and Risk Management Performance

PeriodicRisk Sub-Committee

Periodic

Periodic

Quarterly

Frequency

Report Summary of Strategic RisksCrossrail Board

Forum Agenda

Programme Executive Report Programme Risks in PDR

Programme Risk Panel Review Specific Risks, Responses in detail

2. Risk Management Process

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 12 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

6.1 Audit Committee

The Crossrail Audit Committee is a sub-committee of the Board and meets four times a year or
at such other frequency as determined from time to time by the Chair. The duties and
responsibilities related to Risk Management are:

 To obtain assurance as to the adequacy of the systems of internal control in place
throughout the Company. Internal control is not restricted to financial control but
includes, amongst other things the arrangements that management has put in place for:

o the systematic identification of business risks and mitigating controls and
procedures for ensuring these are properly implemented and effective; and

o ensuring a systematic approach to minimise the risk of fraud.

 To consider and report to the Board matters relating to risk management.

The Audit Committee should on an annual basis review the suitability and effectiveness of
Crossrail’s arrangements for managing risk.

6.2 Risk Sub Committee

The Risk Sub-committee will advise on, assist, make recommendations and report, as the
context requires, to the Executive and Investment Committee in order to facilitate its and the
Board’s:

(i) Understanding of Crossrail’s key Strategic, Programme and Project risks and the
controls that are put in place to manage them;

(ii) Understanding the performance of Crossrail’s risk management, the risk profile of
the programme and its movement over time;

(iii) Understanding, reviewing and monitoring of the Quantitative Risk Assessment and
the level of Risk Exposure relative to the Contingency Provision; and

(iv) Understanding, reviewing and monitoring any other risk areas the Sub-committee
considers appropriate.

The Risk Sub-committee shall develop and establish appropriate policies and procedures to
ensure that there is proper assessment and management of risk throughout the Programme.

On an annual basis, the Risk Sub-committee will conduct a review of the suitability of the Risk
Management Plan and the capability and competence of the programme to deliver it and will
report their findings to the Audit Committee.

6.3 Programme Risk Panel

The Programme Risk Panel is chaired by the Programme Controls Director, is attended by the
Programme Leadership Team or their delegates and has the following Terms of Reference
relating to risk management:

 Review the high priority Programme Risks.

 Review the risk responses and evaluate their effectiveness.

 Endorse the high priority Programme Risks for inclusion in the periodic reporting.

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan
CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 13 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

6.4 Area/ Function Governance
Each delivery Area / Function will put in place appropriate mechanisms to review risk
management performance. Areas / Functions will be required to report risk for review within the
Area / Function performance review as required by the Programme Controls Director.

7 Risk Management Process

7.1 Generic Process Description
The standard risk management process for Crossrail is shown below. This provides a
systematic approach to managing risks and represents a generic process to be applied
throughout the programme. The risk management process is iterative and continuous, although
formal reporting of risk will be on a regular basis as defined later in this document.

Standard risk management process based on BS31100.

All risk information generated by Crossrail will be recorded on the Crossrail risk database. Risk
information will be integrated into the programme data model and subject to quality control and
performance measurement.

7.1.1 Plan

Risks should be identified with reference to the objectives of the work under consideration.
Objectives for the Area / Function, teams and individuals should be clearly defined and
communicated in the Delivery Strategy and Management Plan. A useful first stage in the risk
management process is to review those objectives to ensure that they remain comprehensive,
up to date and relevant to the wider objectives of the programme.

7.1.2 Identify

Risk identification should be approached methodically to ensure that all significant sources of
risk are identified and recorded. Risks will be recorded within the appropriate risk register within
the Risk Management database.

7.1.3 Assess

Risk Assessment involves the analysis of individual risks and their aggregate effect, and
evaluation against a defined level of Risk Appetite.

Assessment of the severity of a risk drives management attention and supports planning for risk
mitigation. A risk assessment scheme consisting of qualitative probability and impact scales and
a Probability Impact Diagram (PID) is used to assess the severity of a risk.

Identify Assess Respond

ReviewReportMonitorPlan

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 14 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

The Accountable Manager will be responsible for ensuring that all risks are analysed
qualitatively and the level of management and monitoring a risk should receive is based on its
Severity.

Risks should be assessed on the basis of probability and ‘average’ impact should the risk occur.
Impacts should not be ‘worst case’ but should be a reasonable.

The main Impact Categories considered in Crossrail are:

Impact Category Metric

Health and Safety Lost Time Injuries, RIDDOR Reportable events, Fatalities

Environment Environmental impact, Environmental harm

Capital Cost Annual cost impact, Anticipated Final cost impact

Time Critical path delays

Reputation Local/National Media reporting levels

Quality Non conformance

Crossrail Railway
Operations

Annual cost or revenue, loss or disruption to service, Impact on
customers

3rd Party Impacts Impacts on third party services

Table of Impact Categories

Risks exposure should be assessed at Current (pre-mitigation) and – once a response has
been identified – at Forecast (post-mitigation) levels. As part of establishing Current risk
exposure, Existing Controls should be reviewed.

Crossrail will employ Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to evaluate the aggregate impact of
the identified risks on the cost and schedule (see section 7).

7.1.4 Respond

For each risk, the risk owner must establish an appropriate level of mitigation. Control measures
in addition to the existing controls may be needed to achieve this level of mitigation. Risk
responses may include measures to Tolerate (Accept), Terminate (Avoid), Transfer or Treat
(Reduce) the level of risk exposure to the programme.

Responses should be allocated to a Response Owner, who is the person responsible for
implementing the response. The Response Owner should develop and implement an
appropriate response and report to the Risk Owner on its status. Note that the Response Owner
and Risk Owner may or may not be the same person.

7.1.5 Review

The Accountable Manager should regularly review the output from the risk management
process to ensure that risks are being appropriately managed, and that the risk data remains
accurate and reliable. Specifically this should cover the risk profile and the key risks identified
and how these are changing in time, the progress of actions to treat key risks, whether risks are
being managed within the target.

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 15 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

7.1.6 Report

Key outputs from the risk management process are reported on a regular basis in order to
inform management and support decision making.

All risk reports should be produced from a single set of risk information and will have a
consistent format and vocabulary.

The information reported should include:

 Significant risks;

 The aggregate effect of risks (risk profile);

 Progress on risk management actions.

 The trend in exposure over time; and

 Performance against target;

Risk information should form a key part of all standard reports but in addition, dedicated risk
reports will be produced. Section 9 includes further information on reporting.

7.1.7 Monitor

Continuous systematic and formal monitoring of implementation of the risk process and outputs
need to take place against appropriate performance indicators to ensure process compliance
and effectiveness. Monitoring may take a variety of forms and range from self-assessment and
internal audit to detailed reviews by independent external experts. Risk Managers will work with
Accountable Managers to develop and establish suitable performance indicators to provide an
efficient monitoring method.

8 Interface with Other Processes

8.1 Health and Safety

Crossrail’s Target Zero philosophy and improvement initiatives target the behaviours that are
precursors to risk.

The identification and management of health and safety risk is the responsibility of the relevant
duty holder as defined in UK law. There is no common process for the identification,
assessment, elimination and mitigation of health and safety risk, or collation of all risks, for all
parts of the Crossrail family (Crossrail, its partners, designers and contractors etc) and nor
would this be appropriate. Crossrail does however facilitate processes for the sharing of
information on health and safety risk with those that need it. These processes are numerous
and include:

 Designers risk registers;

 Interface Design Review Meetings;

 Discipline Design Review Meetings;

 Pre-construction information packs ;

 SHE notes on drawings;

 Project Manager Contractor Meetings;

 Project Wide Hazard Record (dealing with future operations risk).

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 16 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

Crossrail monitors these processes to provide assurance that they are effective. Significant risk
can be elevated from designers and constructors and industry partners into the Project,
Programme and Strategic risk registers in ARM, particularly where it is identified that Crossrail
needs to take a lead.

8.2 Issue Management

An Issue is defined as a currently occurring event that is already impacting achievement of the
programme objectives. The relationship between Risks, Issues and Trends is illustrated below.

Key Issues are reported as part of regular performance reporting at the Contract, Project, Area
and Programme levels. Where issues are reported, the subsequent report should contain an
explanation of how the issue has been resolved.

Relationship with Trends/ Issues etc

8.3 Trend Management and Change Control

The Trend Management and Change Control process provides early identification and
authorisation of all potential changes to the agreed programme and project baselines. The
Change Control is a formal process used to change the Programme Baseline and to ensure that
changes to the programme are introduced in a controlled and coordinated manner.

Change proposals should be reviewed against the programme’s overall risk exposure to check:

 Reduction in the programme’s overall risk exposure as a result of risks crystallising into
changes;

 Changes in risk exposure as a result of changed approach – increase or decrease in risk;

 Uncertainty and risk associated with the revised estimates as part of the Impact
Assessment.

Changes to the programme risk exposure should only be made once the change has been
formally approved and it has been accepted into cost.

12

Relationship with Trends/ Issues etc

Management
Information

(QUALITATIVE)

Cost Forecasting
(QUANTITATIVE)

Issues

‘are happening’‘may happen’

Unresolved Resolved

‘knowns’

time

‘unknowns’

Trends

Risks

Risks (QRA)

2. Risk Management Process

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 17 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

For all assessments of risk exposure, an understanding of relevant approved and unapproved
trends and/or changes is required.

8.4 Investment Authority Process

The Investment Authority Process requires an assessment of risk exposure for contracts at
PTBA and IA stages. Risk Managers will work with the Project Manager to identify and quantify
the risks associated with the contract concerned. Risk Managers will facilitate quantitative risk
assessment of the identified risks.

8.5 Procurement Process

The procurement process requires that the allocation of risks between Crossrail and the
Contractor is understood. Risk Managers will work with the Procurement lead to identify and
correctly allocate the risks within the Risk Allocation Summary template included in the full
procurement plan template. Risk allocation will be monitored and updated during the
procurement process.

8.6 Cost Management

Cost management will use the forecast risk exposure calculated from Project QRAs as part of
the forecasting of Anticipated Final Cost (AFC). Project QRAs will be run on a quarterly basis
with the results provided to the cost management team to be included in the Periodic Cost
Report.

8.7 Contingency Management

Contingency will be managed at two levels:

Delivery Contingency – a fund allocated to the Project Manager to allow them to manage risks
relating to their work scope in an effective and efficient way within delegated authority limits.

Programme Contingency – a fund held by the Crossrail organisation, outside of the control of
the individual Project Managers, to cover programme-wide or unforeseen risks.

The Programme Wide Contingency has been established with reference to an assessment of
the Programme-wide risk exposure derived through the Crossrail Risk Model. From this,
Delivery Contingency will be allocated to the relevant Project as each contract within the project
is granted Investment Authority. Contingency will not be allocated to individual risks.

Risk exposure will be reassessed by re-running the Crossrail Risk Model on a regular basis and
a comparison made with the remaining contingency to ensure funding sufficiency. This
comparison will be carried out at the Investment and Change Sub Committee and through other
reporting mechanisms.

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan
CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 18 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

9 Quantitative Risk Assessment

Crossrail will conduct Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to evaluate the aggregate exposure
of the identified risks on the cost and schedule and to prioritise risks and inform the risk
management process.

QRA should:

 Make a robust and accurate assessment of Crossrail’s risk exposure using
representative models that accurately reflects the nature of the risk.

 Identify the key risks which affect the cost and schedule;

 Create a transparent record of the assessment which supports the published outputs
and facilitates subsequent phases of the risk management process.

QRA will be carried out for Projects, Areas and Programme-wide elements and combined into a
comprehensive assessment – the Crossrail Risk Model (CRM).

The programme-wide QRA will be conducted on a quarterly basis or more frequently as
required. This will consider risks to both cost and schedule. Risks at all levels (i.e. Strategic,
Programme, Area and Project) will be reviewed with a view to establishing the quantified impact
on cost estimate and baseline schedule. The QRA will assess risk exposure at the Forecast i.e.
post mitigation level.

Both cost and schedule QRA will be undertaken on a project basis to support investment
decisions, project change and options appraisals where risk may be a factor and to understand
changes in risk exposure during the project lifecycle.

As part of the procurement process, cost and schedule QRA should also be conducted on
significant contracts prior to contract award in order to ensure that risk transfer through
contracts is well understood and cost effective.

For more details refer to Quantitative Risk Assessment Procedure Ref 2.

Le
ga

cy
D

oc
um

en
t

Le
ga

cy
D

oc
um

en
t

Programme-wide elements QRA

Le
ga

cy

Le
ga

cy

Project QRAs

Le
ga

cy

Le
ga

cy

Area QRAs

Doc
um

en
t

Doc
um

en
t

Crossrail Risk Model (CRM)

– Sum of programme-wide, sub-programme
elements and project QRAs

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 19 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

10 Risk Appetite and Escalation

10.1 Risk Appetite

In its capacity as programme manager, systems integrator and delivery agent (for the Central
Core Area) Crossrail bears the majority of risk associated with delivery of Crossrail with limited
opportunity to transfer risk to third parties. Crossrail has no right of relief offered by the Project
Development Agreement.

Defining a risk appetite determines the way that the organisation chooses to prioritise risks. The
figure below shows the risk assessment criteria that are used at Strategic and Programme level
within Crossrail.

Each Severity Status carries a Risk Appetite Statement which gives guidance as to the level of
response that is required.

Probability Impact Diagram

Severity
Status

Risk Appetite Statement

High

This level of risk is generally unacceptable and priority should be given
to develop action plans to reduce risk to a lower level wherever possible
and practicable. Risks at this level can only be tolerated where all
reasonable measures have been taken to mitigate the risk.

Medium This level of risk is undesirable and action plans should be developed to
reduce risk to a lower level wherever prudent.

Low

As a general principle, risks should be mitigated to as low a level as
possible (towards the bottom left of the map) – but only as far as the
benefits gained from risk reduction outweigh the costs of mitigating the
risk.

Risk Appetite Table

10.2 Risk Escalation

Risks should be managed by the party best placed to manage the risk and at the most
appropriate level in the organisation. Risks may need to be escalated up the management chain
– either within or between the levels of hierarchy (i.e. Strategic, Programme, Project or
Contractor).

Accountable Managers, with the assistance of Risk Managers, should identify any risks which
are to be considered for escalation in their regular reporting cycle. These will then be reviewed
with line management at risk review meetings, as specified within the Programme Controls

Impact

1 3 20 100 1000 Threats
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Severe

16
Very High 16 48 320 1600 16000

12
High 12 36 240 1200 12000

8
Medium 8 24 160 800 8000

4
Low 4 12 80 400 4000 Pr

ob
ab

ili
ty

2
Very Low 2 6 40 200 2000

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 20 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

Governance structure, in order to review and approve the escalation of the risk. This cycle of
review is repeated up the organisation structure.

When selecting risks to escalate, these factors should be considered:

 Is any single risk so significant that it should be escalated to the next level?

 Are there any common causes of risk that should be escalated?

 Do any of the identified risks have consequential effects to the wider programme which
are significant enough for that risk to be escalated to the next level?

 Do any risks require responses which can only be implemented by the next level of
management?

Note that escalating risk does not transfer the ownership of risk, but allows the Accountable
Manager at the higher level to understand the risks within their responsibility.

11 Risk Reporting

Reporting on key risks and risk management performance should be a standard part of
performance reporting.

A standard format for risk reporting within the Crossrail organisation is shown below.

The Accountable Manager has discretion to select Top 5. Their selection should not be limited
to the most severe risks and should consider:

 Severity;

 Proximity; and

 Decision Required.

Schematic of Risk Reporting

Information on key Risks and Risk Management performance should be included in Area Directors
Report, Programme Directors Report, Board Report and Sponsors Dashboard.

Significant Risks

What are the significant risks?

Selected by:

– Severity
– Proximity
– Decision Required

Risk Profile

How risky is this project?

Progress with Actions

Are Risk Management actions
completed and effective?

Performance

Is the risk exposure reducing?

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 21 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

11.1 QRA Report

The purpose of the programme-wide QRA report is to summarise the latest programme wide
cost and schedule risk assessment. The report includes a description of the inputs and results
and identifies the key drivers to change in risk exposure. The report is submitted to Risk Sub
Committee on a six monthly basis in line with the Semi Annual Construction Report.

12 Awareness and Training

Risk Management has been recognised as a key component of Crossrail’s culture. The
intention is that the pro-active management of risk is accepted and adopted as a behaviour
across the programme to support the Vision and Values. To this end, risk management is one of
five key skill areas identified by the Organisational Development Plan.

The key elements of the Organisational Development Plan which relate to risk management
are:

1. Developing Crossrail culture:

 Develop a coordinated plan to communicate the benefits of risk management and clear
accountability for managing risk;

 Engaging Industry and Delivery partners in developing risk management approach;

2. Developing organisational capability:

 Develop a competence framework for risk management and provide training to support
this;

 Risk Management included job descriptions where appropriate;

 Establish an appropriate risk management organisation;

3. Establish performance indicators for risk management.

13 Risk Management Systems

Crossrail will use the Active Risk Manager software (ARM) to record and update all risk
information within Crossrail. Access to ARM will be given to all Crossrail Staff who require and
will have write access to individual registers within the database as agreed by the Accountable
Manager responsible for that register.

Contractor’s staff will be expected to input the high-level risks into ARM for their contract in
accordance with the Works Information.

Le
arn

ing
Le

ga
cy

D
oc

um
en

t

Risk Management Plan

CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014 Rev3.0

Page 22 of 22

Valid only if viewed through the CRL Management System Portal on Crossrail Connect

© Crossrail Limited
Procedure Template: CR-XRL-O4-ZTM-CR001-00001 Rev 6.0

CRL RESTRICTED

14 Reference Documents

Ref: Document Title Document Number:

1. Crossrail’s Management Plan Volume 1 CR-XRL-O4-GPG-CR001-00001

2. Quantitative Risk Assessment Procedure CR-XRL-Z9-GPD-CR001-50004

15 Standard Forms / Templates

Ref: Document Title Document Number:

A. None

B.

1

Learning legacy
Lessons learned from the London
2012 Games construction project

Lessons learned from the
London 2012 Olympic
and Paralympic Games
construction programme

Abstract
This research project has sought
to identify the key factors which
have underpinned the success of
the London 2012 construction
programme. The research has focused
on the approach taken to the overall
management of the programme and
the way this shaped the approaches
taken to managing individual projects.

It was found that favourable
programme outcomes were directly
attributable to three ‘headline drivers’:
– the rigorous use of five key project

and programme management
processes;

– the explicit specification of a series
of targets and principles around
other key programme objectives
(such as health and safety); and

– a pervasive, high-level
management philosophy adopted
across the entire programme.

These headline drivers were
effective because of three critical
‘enabling factors’:
– the use of a well-resourced

Delivery Partner (DP);
– supportive contractual

arrangements; and
– a supportive programme-wide

culture.

Finally, the research identified six
‘supporting factors’ which, in turn,

underpinned and facilitated these
enabling factors:
– the so-called ‘Olympics effect’;
– the ‘health and safety’ effect;
– the strong emphasis placed on

personal and organisational
development;

– the practice of allowing contractors
to work with familiar partners;

– full funding; and
– the market downturn of 2008–09.

While some of these factors were
clearly circumstantial, many reflected
conscious senior management
decisions to put in place rigorous,
professional, yet flexible, programme
and project management.

While each component of the
management approach may appear
unsurprising, the combination – and
the level of execution – proved to
be immensely powerful. In addition,
it appears that the programme has
had a significant impact in raising
standards of practice across the UK
construction industry.

We found evidence of learning
carried forward at the level of
individual managers and, at the level
of entire construction firms through
the adoption of new, firm-wide
policies. This aspect of legacy is
immensely valuable and should
not be underestimated.

Authors
Ian Mackenzie
Senior Research Fellow, Innovation
and Entrepreneurship Group,
Imperial College Business School

Andrew Davies
Reader in Innovation Management,
Innovation and Entrepreneurship
Group, Imperial College Business
School

2

Research objectives, methodology
and scope
With less than one year to go to the
Games, the construction programme,
which will not only provide most of
the venues for London 2012 but
transform a huge swathe of east
London, has been successful. The £7.2
billion programme is on track to be
completed under the detailed budget
set in the 2010 spending review a.
The safety record is outstanding
and other targets (for example,
sustainability) have been met. Most
important of all, it is being completed
on (and in several cases before) time.

This picture is in sharp contrast
to the experience of many other
‘mega-projects’ (for example,
Denver international airport,
Wembley Stadium and the Athens
2004 Games) which have been
characterised by cost and time
over-runs 3. Whereas many of these
other projects have been mired in
confrontation between client and
contractor, the London 2012
programme has been a testament
to collaboration with a remarkably
low level of disputes.

Our research aimed to identify
what aspects of the programme
and project management approach
underpinned this success to yield
useful lessons for future mega-
projects. We conducted 30 in-depth
interviews – each typically an hour in
length b. The research was undertaken
in phases to address the two levels of
organisation created to manage such
a complex project c:
– Programme level: In a first phase

we focused on the management
of the overall programme with
interviews conducted within the
ODA which acted as ‘the client’
for the programme and the ODA’s
Delivery Partner (DP), CLM – the
joint venture between CH2MHILL,
Laing O’Rourke and Mace – which
was formed specifically to act as
the ODA’s DP. The interviews
focused on how the ODA and DP
formed an umbrella organisation

and created a consistent process
to coordinate and integrate each
project within the overall
programme.

– Project level: In a second phase
our focus shifted to specific
projects, including the Olympic
Stadium, the Velodrome, the
temporary structures, the
International Broadcast Centre
(IBC)/Media Press Centre (MPC),
the Aquatics Centre and the
Athletes’ Village. Here, interviews
with the ODA project sponsor and
the DP Project Manager were
complemented with interviews with
the relevant Tier One contractor
(project director). The interviews
addressed the ways in which each
individual project fitted within the
overall programme, whilst being
tailored to meet specific
circumstances.

While our main focus was on
understanding what led to success,
we had a particular interest in the
use of innovative approaches to
programme and project management
– as exemplified by the use of a DP
Although the output from each
mega-project is clearly unique, prior
research has suggested that there is a
growing stock of knowledge around
how best to manage such complex
programmes which is generally
applicable 1,4.

This stock of knowledge grows
through the use of innovative
programme or project management
practices which are either developed
‘in programme’ or imported from
prior, similar projects or from other
industries 2. Also of interest is how
learning within a programme is
captured for future use – the key
objective of the ODA’s learning
legacy programme. The section on
innovation and learning explores the
source of the various management
practices used on the London 2012
construction programme and looks at
how this is carried forward, while the
section on overall lessons provides a
summary of key lessons.

a The original Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) budget, set in 2007, was £8.1bn.
This included considerable contingency elements.

b A list of interviews is provided in Appendix 1.
c The Games project is an example of the most complex ‘system of systems’ project,

comprised of a variety of systems which must be integrated to achieve an overall goal.
These projects are often called ‘programmes’ and structured under a formal ‘umbrella
organisation’ (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007: 105).

This research aimed to
identify what aspects
of programme and
project management
underpinned the
success of the ODA’s
construction programme.

3

An overall framework
Detailed analysis of the interviews
helped us to develop a framework
which identified three ‘headline
drivers’ which we believe are directly
responsible for favourable programme
outcomes. These were the:
– rigorous use of five key project

and programme management
processes;

– explicit specification of a series
of targets and principles around
other key programme objectives;

– high-level management philosophy
adopted across the programme.

Next, we identified a series of
‘enabling factors’ which allowed
these headline drivers to function
effectively. These were:
– the use of a well-resourced DP;
– supportive contractual

arrangements;
– a supportive programme-wide

culture.

Finally, we identified a number of
‘supporting factors’ which, while less
critical to the primary drivers,

Figure 1: Overall ‘drivers of success’ framework

nevertheless, have made a valuable
contribution to outcomes. These were:
– the so-called ‘Olympics effect’;
– the ‘health and safety’ effect;
– the emphasis placed on personal

and organisational development;
– working with familiar partners;
– full funding;
– the market downturn.

Figure 1 illustrates this framework
in diagrammatic form.

Headline drivers of success
Rigorous management processes
The Games construction programme
posed three main challenges. The
first was the crucial importance of
completing construction in a tight,
well-defined timescale. The second
was the scale of the construction
programme, which encompassed
over 70 separate projects with very
significant interdependencies
(common services, site logistics, etc).
The third was the wide range of
stakeholders that had legitimate
influence over parts of the
programme.

On time On budget Exemplary
safety

Other targets met
(eg: Sustainability)

Use of well-resourced
DP

Five key management
processes

Supportive contractual
arrangements

Explicit objectives and
principles

Supportive culture

Programme management
philosophy

Olympics effect Health and
safety effect

Personal and
organisational
development

Working with
familiar partners Full funding Market

turndown

Supporting factors

Enabling factors

Headline drivers of success

Programme outcomes

¦

¦

¦

4

Against this backdrop, the familiar
‘large construction programme’
challenges – maximising the
efficiency of construction while
minimising inevitable problems
caused by:
– designers or contractors failing to

do what they say they would do;
– misalignment between client/

stakeholders and design, between
design and construction and
between the different pieces of
the construction jigsaw; and

– changes caused by inevitable
revisions to requirements,
construction problems and external
factors – took on even greater
significance.

It was, thus, essential that there was:
– a high level of detailed planning

(both to optimise at the project
and programme level and to
reduce likelihood of problems);

– a high level of visibility of
performance throughout
construction (to expose problems
and issues at the earliest point);

– a high level of inter-dependency
management d (to minimise
misalignments); and

– a robust way of identifying and
dealing with problems and
changes across the entire
programme.

Five key management processes
Our first headline driver is, thus,
the series of five key management
processes that the ODA and DP e set
up and operated. These were:
– Up-front planning process:

A comprehensive ‘baseline’
was developed in 2007 which
defined scope, specifications and
initial budgets across the entire
programme. The resulting ‘yellow
book’ provided a valuable tool
for tracking progress and changes
and was updated (‘the blue book’)
in 2009.

– Project and programme
monitoring process: Each
project was required to provide
very detailed information on
progress, budget position, future
programme, etc. on a monthly

basis. This formed the basis for the
DP to review the project (through
their ‘assurance’ function) and
for the DP to roll up projects to
provide an overall programme
view f . Monthly trend reviews
(involving the ODA and the DP)
allowed senior managers to
spot trends which might not
be so apparent at lower levels.
Contractors and the DP were also
subject to a very rigorous audit
regime. The DP had their own
audit function (which would even
be auditing the DP Project
Management team). The ODA
operated an audit, backed up
by Ernst and Young. Finally there
were periodic government level
audits. As one DP Project
Manager put it ‘It was like
working in a fish bowl’.

– Problem resolution process:
The above monitoring process
highlighted problems and
kickstarted the associated
process of seeking solutions –
where typically, the DP would
seek to work with the relevant Tier
One contractor. Whether at the
planning stage – or as a result
of an unforeseen problem – time
was taken to identify, explore and
evaluate options so as to work
towards a ‘best solution’. An
example of this ‘optioneering’
would be the change to the
Velodrome roof structure.

– Change management process:
This involved identifying any
proposed changes at an early
stage, a rigorous change
approval process (with escalation
depending on size of change)
and fully documenting changes,
together with their impact and
their supporting rationale. Any
significant change had to be
reviewed by a ‘change board’
chaired by the ODA. This process
was instrumental in resolving
contentious issues before they
got to a point where things
became confrontational. Also,
the tight documentation meant
that ex-post payment disputes
were all but eradicated.

d We also use the words ‘integration management’ or ‘interface management’
interchangeably.

e At this point we simply acknowledge that CLM was the ODA’s DP. We discuss the use
of a DP, and the use of the DP in enabling factors section.

f A reporting matrix called ‘the wall’ was used with one axis corresponding to projects
and the other functions. This enabled senior DP managers to identify ‘problem bricks’.

A high level of detailed
planning, visibility
of performance,
inter-dependency
management, and robust
problem resolution and
change control processes
were essential.

5

– Integration management process:
This sought to identify how
slippages or changes in one
project impacted on others.
Integration committees were
operated in both design and
construction phases. Integration
between each project interface
and the overall London 2012
Olympic Park infrastructure (which
was split into two major areas)
was particularly important.
Indeed, integration of the various
elements of the infrastructure (such
as utilities) which represented
successive overlays required
careful integration.

Taken individually, these approaches
were not particularly innovative.
What was striking, however, was the
level of effort and rigour with which
they were pursued and executed.

This was unusual for an industry
that is not renowned for embracing
formal management processes.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that
these processes were instrumental
in keeping individual projects –
and the overall programme – firmly
on the rails.

These processes were not without their
critics. Several Tier One contractors
voiced frustration with what were
perceived as being overly bureaucratic
procedures which ‘took resource away
from project management’. For
example, the need to recast the
forward programme each month was
criticised in more than one interview.
Nevertheless, there was a broad
recognition that detailed information
was needed to facilitate sound
programme management, especially
in the context of a highly visible,
public-sector-funded programme.

Figure 2: Details of the London 2012 policy values and priority themes

Objectives

Venues

Site platform

Village vertical build

Transport

Operations

Stratford projects

Other projects

H
ea

lth
, s

af
et

y
an

d
se

cu
rit

y

Su
sta

in
ab

ili
ty

Eq
ua

lit
y

an
d

in
cl

us
io

n

Em
pl

oy
m

en
t a

nd
s

ki
lls

Le
ga

cy

D
es

ig
n

an
d

ac
ce

ss
ib

ili
ty

Priority themes

Mission
To deliver venues, facilities, infrastructure and transport on time for the
London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games that are fit-for-purpose

and in a way that maximises the delivery of a sustainable legacy
within the available budget.

Overarching themes

Time, cost and fit for purpose

Taken individually, these
approaches were not
particularly innovative.
What was striking,
however, was the level
of effort and rigour
applied.

Whilst the priority theme
targets were non-
negotiable, it was up
to each contractor to
implement them in their
own way.

6

Objectives and principles relating
to other aspects of performance
While ‘cost, time and quality of
construction’ were clearly its prime
objectives, the ODA had a number
of additional objectives that had to
be met to achieve broader social
and economic impact. Accordingly,
at an early stage, the ODA identified
six ‘priority themes’ as follows:
– Health, Safety and Security
– Design and Accessibility
– Equality and Inclusion
– Legacy
– Employment and Skills
– Sustainability

The ODA published a ‘strategy’ for
each of these themes and detailed
specific objectives and principles
which the ODA was committed to
achieve in the course of delivering
its programme of construction. These
objectives were cascaded down
through the DP to Tier One
contractors and beyond. While the
targets and principles were non-
negotiable, it was up to each
contractor to implement them in
their own way.

What was crucial was that ODA
senior management made it clear that
these additional targets were not just
window dressing. They were deemed
just as important as the traditional
construction targets. As a result, they
were taken seriously – and achieved
– right across the programme.

Particular mention should be made
of the Health and Safety theme
which was championed right from
the top of the ODA. A ‘Park health’
facility was set up whereby everyone
on the Park could get health care
‘on-site’. Major emphasis was put
on safety through the setting up of
‘safety and leadership’ committees.
As a result, the safety record on the
Games site has been exemplary, with
no fatalities or major injuries to date.

Broad programme management
philosophy
The ODA (and by extension the DP)
exercised the thoughtful use of
‘loose-tight’ management, where
some aspects were tightly controlled
so as to achieve a highly consistent
approach across the programme,
whereas other aspects were loosely
managed – which provided for

flexibility. Tightly controlled aspects
included the five key management
processes (discussed previously), the
principles and targets relating to
health and safety and the other
priority themes (discussed previously)
and the kind of behaviours required
to underpin the programme culture
(in the next section).

This ‘tightness’ made sense partly
because of the need for programme-
wide consistency (for example, if
individual project reporting was to
be rolled up to the programme level)
and partly so as to reinforce the
importance of process, principle
or target.

Loosely controlled aspects included
how contractors would implement the
principles (for example, health and
safety) or achieve the targets (priority
themes) and the procurement and
contract approach to be used for
each project. The rationale for the
former was that each contractor
already had their own way of doing
things. Attempting to impose uniform
safety routines would probably be
counterproductive. Better to provide
an objective and challenge the
contractor to find their own route
to achieving it. Providing flexibility
around procurement and contract
approaches also made sense, given
that projects within the overall
programme differed greatly.

While a recognised Tier One
contractor under design and build
NEC3 C (target price with pain/gain)
was probably appropriate for
the Olympic Stadium, design-led
procurement seemed appropriate
for the Velodrome (give the
aspiration for a signature building)
while the ‘managed package
strategy’ was appropriate for the
temporary venues given that their
somewhat unusual requirements
were less attractive to conventional
Tier One contractors.

The ODA also exhibited appropriate
flexibility when project circumstances
changed. The most striking example
was where the economic downturn
in late 2008 meant that the Athletes’
Village needed to revert to public
funding. The ODA renegotiated the
contract with Bovis Lend Lease to
‘development management’.

Major emphasis was put
on safety through the
setting up of ‘safety and
leadership’ committees.
As a result, the safety
record on the Games site
has been exemplary.

7

Enabling factors
There is no guarantee that specifying rigorous processes, setting overall
targets and principles and adopting what appears to be a well thought
out overall management philosophy will achieve the programme’s goals.
Certain ‘enablers’ are needed to ensure that desired outcomes are
delivered through proper execution and appropriate behaviour. Our
analysis suggests that there were three key enablers:
– a well-resourced DP
– supportive contractual arrangements
– a supportive programme-wide culture

In addition, the procurement
approach was changed from
‘all construction management’ to
a hybrid approach where over half
of the building was procured with
a Tier One contractor under a lump
sum, Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT)
design and build contract. A further
example of ODA flexibility was
when ISG, the Tier One contractor
on the Velodrome, challenged the
incumbent steel roof design in favour
of tensioned cable.

The ODA provided time for a
proper evaluation and ultimately
accepted the switch even though
it exacerbated short-term time
pressures. Also on the Velodrome,
ISG’s contract was changed from
target price with pain/gain to fixed
price as part of a restructuring where
the budget was creating a major
problem and the ODA took on
the risks associated with resilience
and security.

A well-resourced DP
– The DP concept
Given that the ODA was a transitory
organisation and that the lead time
for getting ‘up and running’ was
short, it was always clear that they
needed to appoint an organisation to
act as overall programme manager.
The initial thinking was to contract
with a conventional programme
manager. However, the ODA’s Chief
Executive, David Higgins, felt that
the role should be broader and set
out to appoint a DP.

Interviewees often found it difficult
to draw a clear distinction between
‘programme manager’ and ‘DP’ but
most would agree that the latter implies
a more dynamic, more pro-active
leadership of the overall programme.

The DP evolved over time (see
discussion below) but ended up
undertaking seven key roles:
1. developing/specifying detailed

project and programme
management processes;

2. administering the contracts with
Tier One contractors or equivalent
(for example, involving sign-off
and payment authorisation);

3. providing project assurance,
for example, checking that things
are done – and done properly –
on each project; challenging the
future programme;

4. providing optioneering and
problem solving expertise at the
project level;

5. managing the ‘change’ process;
6. providing visibility of project

performance to the programme
level and collating performance
programme-wide;

7. managing the interfaces between
the various projects, such as
integration management.

Of these seven roles, items
1, 6 and 7 related primarily to
programme management, whereas
items 2 to 5 related primarily to
individual projects. There was,
therefore, tight linkage between the
project and programme levels.

In addition, the DP provided specific
capability when needed. The DP
was asked to undertake certain
programme-wide functions such as
site-wide logistics. At the project
level, the DP was able to step in
to provide a form of construction
management for the temporary
structures when it became clear
that the conventional Tier One
procurement route was not working.

Broadly speaking, the
DP faced ‘downwards’
to the various individual
projects while the ODA
faced ‘upwards’ to the
plethora of stakeholders.

8

Broadly speaking, the DP faced
‘downwards’ to the various individual
projects while the ODA faced
‘upwards’ to the plethora of
stakeholders g. This division of roles
was generally felt to have been
very valuable. Together, the ODA
and DP played a vital role in
brokering between stakeholders and
the contractors when it came to
changes in requirements or changes
necessitated by a project’s situation.
Despite this role separation, it is clear
that the ODA and DP worked very
closely together (as discussed further
below). Overall, the ODA and DP
represented a ‘very intelligent client’.

– The choice of the DP
The choice of the DP appears to
have worked out very well despite
the need to weld together staff from
three distinct organisations. Initially, it
seemed that Bechtel was the heir
apparent to the role. However, the
joint venture emerged to offer a novel
breadth of programme management,
project management and direct
construction expertise. The ODA ran
a selection process which
emphasised (amongst other things)
‘compatibility of working style’ and
‘capability to deal with problems’ and
as a result, the DP was appointed.

The DP clearly provided access to
a wide range of skills. Less obvious
was the notion that the use of a new,
purpose-built joint venture created a
‘clean sheet of paper’. This probably
fostered a fresher and more objective
approach to going about things,
whereas a single firm appointment
could have imposed an established
set of beliefs about how things
should best be done.

The appointment of a DP would not
have paid off without the funding to
fully resource the task. At its peak, DP
staffing reached around 600. If the
200 or so staff from the ODA are
included, the overall ‘programme
management’ cost will come out
around 10 per cent of the overall
programme spend h. If we assume that
the minimum level of programme
management would be five per cent,
then the issue is whether the extra five

per cent is worth it. Across the
programme, the clear consensus is
that the extra five per cent has indeed
been worth it given the favourable
outturn performance.

Supportive contractual arrangements
The ODA had a clear preference for
NEC contracts between themselves
and Tier One contractors. NEC3 C
was ‘target price plus pain/gain’
while NEC3 A was ‘fixed price’.
The most important aspect of these
contracts was the requirement to
provide transparency of progress,
to bring problems or issues to light
as soon as possible and to work in
collaboration with DP and others
to find solutions to problems.
While an ‘open and collaborative’
approach can be affected under
a JCT contract, there is little doubt
that working under a contract that
enshrines these behaviours makes
life easier.

The contract between the ODA
and DP was carefully structured
in two regards: Firstly, the DP bid on
periodic ‘work packages’ i. The ODA
would specify the overall, ‘top-down’
requirements for the period leaving
the DP to work through the detail
and come back with a ‘bottom-up’
proposal which was then subject
to examination and negotiation.
This approach ensured that the DP
had high ownership of the resulting
work packages which reflected
bottom-up knowledge.

Secondly, the contract also involved
important incentives. The DP opted to
put 90 per cent of its margin ‘at risk’,
linked to meeting multiple key
performance indicators (KPIs). This
provided the DP with a huge incentive
to meet various milestones and targets
and served to align objectives
between the DP and the ODA. The
KPI approach also provided flexibility
so that incentives could be aligned
between the DP and Tier One
contractors. An example of this was
on the Athletes’ Village where
relationships between the DP and
Lend lease improved once it was clear
that success would benefit both.

g Stakeholders span from LOCOG through to various sports associations through to many
statutory bodies to Local and central Government.

h Source: ODA Annual Financial Reports.
i These work packages were typically let for a 12–18 month period.

Overall, the ODA and
DP represented a ‘very
intelligent client’.

10%
Percentage of the overall programme
spend on programme management.

90%
Percentage of DP’s margin ‘at risk’,
linked to meeting multiple KPIs.

9

A supportive organisational culture
It is well known that formal
organisational arrangements
(processes, resources, objectives,
etc.) can only go so far in driving
outcomes. The informal aspect of an
organisation, notably a supportive
culture, is crucial for driving the ‘open
and collaborative’ behaviours that
underpin success. The organisational
culture that we observed across the
programme was indeed supportive
in three important aspects j:
– a fundamental belief that

‘failure was not an option’ and
that everything must be done to
make the programme a success;

– a commitment to bringing
problems to light at an early
stage and striving collaboratively
to find solutions;

– a particularly strong discipline
around health and safety aspects.

Organisational culture cannot simply
be imposed by managements – they
develop in response to a number of
factors. Importantly, organisational
culture is greatly influenced by the
pronouncements and actions of
senior managers. This culture on the
London 2012 construction programme
can be traced back to the leadership
of the ODA – and other senior
managers at the DP or at Tier One

level who, mainly through past
experience, held these aspects to
be important. Several important
influences on the development of
this culture are highlighted in the
following section.

Supporting factors
We now describe a series of
factors which helped to underpin
the enabling factors and thereby,
the headline drivers of success k.

The Olympics effect
The fact that the programme was
for ‘the London Olympics’ – a very
prestigious and high profile event –
underpinned a widespread attitude
that ‘this programme has to be a
success’ and ‘we’ll do what it takes to
get it done’. This undoubtedly helped
to foster a culture of collaboration
across the programme and indeed, is
attributed by many for inspiring high
on-site productivity. As one executive
put it: ‘People were working at least
10 per cent harder than they would
normally work’. Some contractors
explicitly sought to produce ‘superior
performance’, a good illustration
being Carillion’s ‘going for gold’
campaign on the IBC-MPC where
their supply chain were challenged
to‘do the best they could every day’.

The IBC-MPC contractor sought to produce ‘superior performance’ through their
‘Going for Gold’ campaign, challenging the supply chain to ‘do the best they could
every day’

j Appendix 2 provides further detail on the culture observed across the London 2012
construction programme.

k The role of technology, though important, is not viewed by the authors as distinctive
as these other aspects. A brief summary of the technology deployed is contained in
Appendix 3.

The culture on the
programme can be
traced back to the
leadership of the ODA
and other senior
managers at the DP
or Tier One level.

10

The Olympic effect also undoubtedly
enabled highly experienced
managers to be recruited or
seconded into the ODA and
DP and encouraged contractors
to field their ‘A’ teams. The impact
of having experienced construction
professionals working on the
programme – many of whom had
prior experience of working together
– cannot be overstated.

The health and safety effect
Many interviewees cited that the
great emphasis put on health and
safety by the ODA did more than
just achieve a highly successful health
and safety record. It made individual
workers on site feel that management
did, in fact, care about them. This
generated commitment which, in
turn, inspired greater effort and
productivity. If this effect can be
substantiated, it has important
consequences for future construction
management practice.

The emphasis on human resource
management and organisational
development
A striking feature of the London 2012
construction programme was the
extent of attention and resourcing
devoted to providing what might be
described as a modern human
resource management and
organisational development
capability. These efforts contributed
greatly to the effective working of the
ODA and DP – and probably also
between the DP and Tier One
contractors. It is striking because the
UK construction industry is not
renowned for being a major advocate
of devoting resource to these areas.

This emphasis does, of course,
make sense given that the ODA
was a new organisation and the DP
was assembled at speed by its three
parent companies. It is not surprising
that there were significant problems in
the early days, particularly as the DP
sought to define its role, establish a
modus operandi and build personal
relationships. Several organisational
development activities appear to
have been particularly valuable in
overcoming these problems:

– the co-location of the ODA and
the DP over the planning phases
of the programme. This was then
translated into co-location of the
ODA and the DP with the relevant
Tier One contractor in integrated
project teams during construction
phases;

– the pairing of an ODA executive
(project sponsor) and DP executive
(project manager) across the
major projects (and many smaller
projects). Again, this was extended
to include pairing of the DP Project
Manager with the Tier One Project
Director in the construction phase;

– the proactive management of skills
requirements. This involved
determining what skills were
required, identifying skills gaps
and finding ways to bridge the
gaps. It included the running of
training workshops, including
team building exercises and
rigorous performance appraisal;

– the provision of coaches for
senior executives and specialist
facilitators for workshops;

– a strong emphasis on internal
communication to aid awareness
of how the programme was going,
to reinforce key messages and to
foster pride l.

Two further aspects are worthy
of special note:
– If it became clear that an individual

was not well suited to a particular
role – perhaps simply because
of personal style issues – then
changes would be made.
Proactively getting ‘the right person
in the right position’ was cited
on many occasions as critical
to fostering the right working
relationships and embedding the
open, collaborative culture. A
specific example of this principle
was the appointment of a Chief
Executive for the DP who was not
from any of the three parent
companies. This, in retrospect, was
a very helpful move as inevitably
there were tensions within the DP,
where parent company practices or
cultures clashed. The appointment
of someone who was seen as more
independent and ‘above the fray’
helped to defuse these tensions and
set common directions.

l Much effort was also put into external communications with stakeholders and the
general public.

A striking feature of the
construction programme
was the emphasis placed
on human resource
management and
organisational
development capability.

11

– The running of workshops to
discuss how the organisations
and the culture were developing
and to seek consensus around
issues and solutions. Many
interviewees credit these for
achieving and maintaining a close
alignment of the ODA and DP over
time. Informal weekly ODA-DP
management meetings were set up
to foster openness and
collaboration. As a result, trust
and confidence built up between
key individuals from each
organisation. In the early days,
each organisation would have its
own formal monthly management
review meetings. However, over
time, representatives from the other
organisation were invited along
so that the level of openness
(and hence, collaboration)
increased still further.

This emphasis on proactive
human resource management and
organisational development would
not have succeeded without the
support of top ODA and DP
management. This support was
made explicit through the
endorsement of a ‘People Strategy’
in 2007 which was prepared (and
implemented) by the ODA and DP
human resources teams.

Working with familiar partners
Several of the Tier One contractors
interviewed stressed the role that
‘working with familiar (supply chain)
partners’ had had in achieving good
project outcomes, the rationale being
that the value of established personal
relationships in resolving problems
and issues outweighed any loss of
competitiveness in bidding. In some
sense this is controversial in that EU
procurement regulations require open
bidding. However, it is clear that
the ODA and DP were sympathetic
to the ‘relationship’ argument and
generally tried to support the
preferences of the Tier One
contractors.

Full funding
Although it is difficult to come to a
truly objective view, the consensus
from our interviews suggests that

the London 2012 construction
programme was indeed funded to a
‘good level’. This is not to say that
there was money for whatever the
stadia designers came up with. There
were, in fact, clear limits on the
funding available for the stadia,
which in some cases led to serious
redesign to meet the available
budget. The important point, in our
view, is that there was sufficient
funding to allow for the:
– deployment of a well-resourced DP

(as discussed already);
– rigorous implementation of the

range of ‘best practice’ programme
and project management processes
and tools as described already;

– adoption of a proactive approach
to human resource management
and organisational development
(for the ODA and DP).

The full funding may also have
assisted the recruitment of top calibre
construction executives though, as
mentioned, working on the London
2012 construction programme was a
great attraction in itself.

The market downturn
Any discussion of ‘key success
factors’ would be incomplete without
acknowledging that the market
downturn from the second half
of 2008, induced by the global
financial crisis, helped financial
performance because contractor
and raw material prices declined.
This was in sharp contrast to the
‘heated’ construction industry that
was prevalent in the early years of
the programme.

Of course, the downturn created
problems in terms of the loss of
private funding for the Athletes’
Village and the IBC-MPC. However,
in both these cases, the switch to
public funding triggered a
reappraisal of design which, in turn,
led to reduced cost schemes. A
specific example of the impact of the
market downturn comes from the
IBC-MPC where ‘the overall cost of
the scheme was reduced from
£350m to £300m on account of
procurement savings’.

12

Figure 3: Learning and transferring knowledge

‘Learning from outside’
events and experiences
(such as other projects,

consultants and industries)

‘Learning within’
experiences and innovation

generated within a
mega-project

‘Capturing and transferring
learning’

learning, capturing and
transferring knowledge gained
to subsequent mega-projects

Innovation and learning on the
London 2012 construction
programme
Our research employed a simple
model (see Figure 3) which
recognises that learning and
transferring knowledge has three
components:
– the introduction (to a mega-

project) of novel approaches
from outside the project, whether
from previous mega-projects or
from other industrial sources;

– learning and innovation that
takes place within a particular
mega-project;

– activities aimed at capturing
the learning from a mega-project
so that the innovations can be
reused on future projects.

Examples of ‘learning from outside’
Throughout our interviews, we came
across examples where the use of a
particular management approach or
the advocacy of a desired aspect of
the culture was attributed to a key
individual. These individuals brought
into the programme both their past
experience of ‘what drives success
in major projects’ and an ability to
assess what was needed or was
appropriate in the particular
circumstances of the Park
programme. Examples would
include:
– Culture of collaboration from

David Higgins
– Proactive ‘optioneering’ from Mark

Reynolds (MACE)
– MIS dashboard from Ian Galloway

(Bechtel, CTRL experience)
– High health and safety standards

from Ian Galloway (Bechtel/oil
and gas experience)

– Rigorous programme assurance
processes from Richard Rook (LOR)

Previous UK mega-projects such
as Heathrow Terminal 5 and the
Channel Tunnel Rail Link were
repeatedly mentioned as important
sources for the learning brought in
by these individuals. In parallel, the
Director of Construction proactively
sought to engage advisors with
hands on experience of preparing
for previous Games to ensure that the
pitfalls were avoided and that the
ODA and DP could take on board
previous experience.

Examples of ‘learning from within’
While the programme and project
management processes described
earlier in this research paper were
not new per se, there was no doubt
considerable learning and refinement
that took place as they were
developed and operated. There
were many examples of process
learning, such as moving from a 40
strong/four hour ODA-DP monthly
review meeting to an eight person,
1.5 hour meeting as familiarity and
trust developed.

The value of using a DP drawn from
multiple companies produced
considerable within-programme
learning including:
– the value of having a broad range

of skills and capabilities available
(to provide flexibility in role); and

– the need to provide time for the
new organisation to ‘shake down’
for ‘the right people’ (those
who could operate in an open,
collaborative culture) to be
identified.

13

Finally, some of the Tier One
contractors gained their first exposure
to NEC3 contracts – with their
requirements for open, collaborative
behaviour – and had to learn to
work under what was an unfamiliar
regime. These contractors no doubt
gained a variety of knowledge and
experience from their participation
and resolution of challenges
encountered in the different projects.

Examples of ‘capturing and
transferring learning’
– ODA’s Learning Legacy Initiative

The ODA has clearly made a major
effort to codify learning, at various
levels, and make the knowledge
available for subsequent mega-
projects:
– Lessons learned: Lessons captured

at 70 per cent and 90 per cent
completion as part of the normal
project process. Some already
documented.

– Micro-reports: One to two page
reports documenting innovations
completed by contractors,
designers, engineers, DP, the
ODA.

– Case studies: 3,000-word studies
on various learning topics.
Completed by industry, for
example, the Institute for
Sustainability doing something on
waste, or produced internally and
peer reviewed by industry experts.

– Champion products: Templates,
tools and documents that could
usefully be applied to other
projects.

– Research projects: More detailed
studies by external parties. This
paper is a summary of a research
paper and fits within this category.

It is also worth mentioning that the
programme and project management
processes and procedures developed
specifically for the Games have been
comprehensively captured in the
Project Document Management
System (PDMS).

– Individual and corporate carry
forward

This kind of ‘codification’ approach
can make a significant contribution.
However, at the end of the day,
the most powerful mechanism for
carrying forward learning is almost
certainly when it is carried in the
heads of key individuals – or where
it becomes part of the DNA of an
organisation, such as the efforts
by senior managers involved in
the Olympic Stadium project to
encourage McAlpine to adopt
health and safety processes on
all the firm’s future projects.

Overall lessons
In seeking to identify the most important overall lessons from the London
2012 construction programme, we must recognise that no two mega-
projects are the same and that programme-specific characteristics will
inevitably shape the appropriate organisational structure and
management style. For example, the London 2012 construction
programme contained a wide variety of individual projects (requiring a
flexible approach to project procurement and contracting), whereas
Heathrow Terminal 5 represented a much more integrated and
standardised set of processes. Nevertheless, we believe four key lessons
can be identified:
1. invest in comprehensive project and programme management

processes;
2. find a way to create an intelligent and broad-capability client. In

the case of Heathrow Terminal 5, BAA were already strong – and
seconded in certain staff to boost their capability. Here the appointment
of a DP with multiple capabilities appears inspired;

3. secure ‘full funding’ (having a realistic programme to work from helps
to create the right culture from the off);

4. invest in human resources and organisational development – to build
skills, relationships and a supportive culture.

The learning legacy aims
to make the knowledge
available for subsequent
mega-projects.

14

References
1 Davies, A., Gann, D., & Douglas, T. (2009). Innovation in megaprojects:

systems integration at Heathrow Terminal 5. California Management
Review, 51(2): 101–125.

2 Dvir, D., & Shenhar, A.J. (2011). What great projects have in common.
MIT Sloan Management Review, 52/3: 19–21.

3 Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N., & Rothengatter, W. (2003). Megaprojects and
risk: an anatomy of ambition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

4 Shenhar, A.J., & Dvir, D. (2007). Reinventing project management:
the diamond approach to successful growth and innovation. Boston,
Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press.

List of interviews
– Carline Blackman, Head of Organisational Development, CLM

(17 November 2010)
– Louise Hardy, Infrastructure Director, CLM (17 November 2010)
– Ken Owen, Commercial Director, CLM (24 November 2010)
– Mark Reynolds, Deputy Programme Director, CLM (25 November 2010)
– Ian Galloway, Programme Director, CLM (1 December 2010)
– Simon Wright, Director of Utilities, ODA (1 December 2010)
– Ken Durbin, Technical Services Director, CLM (8 December 2010)
– Alison Nimmo, Director of Design and Regeneration, ODA

(8 December 2010)
– Richard Rook, Director of Construction Integration, CLM

(15 December 2010)
– Hugh Sumner, Director of Transport, ODA (15 December 2010)
– Michele Owens, HR Manager, ODA (1 December 2010)
– Howard Shiplee, Director of Construction, ODA (15 December 2010)
– Jason Millet, Venues Director, CLM (2 February 2011)
– John Armitt, Chairman, ODA (9 February 2011)
– Alice Coates, Marketing Strategy, ODA (9 February 2011)
– Tony Aikenhead & Chris Hall, Stadium – Project Director, McAlpine

(17 March 2011)
– Richard Rook, Stadium – Project Manager, CLM (17 March 2011)
– Simon Birchall, Athletes’ Village – Project Manager, CLM (28 March 2011)
– Mark Dickenson, Athletes’ Village – Project Director, Lend Lease

(28 March 2011)
– Alan Bates, Athletes’ Village – Project Sponsor, ODA (28 March 2011)
– Dean Goodliffe, Velodrome – Project Director, ISG (31 March 2011)
– Davendra Dabasia, Velodrome – Project Manager, CLM (31 March 2011)
– Colin Naish, IBC/MPC – Project Sponsor, ODA (6 April 2011)
– Tony Coyle, IBC/MPC – Project Sponsor, T1 (6 April 2011)
– Danny Richards, Basketball – Project Manager, CLM (10 May 2011)
– Dave Coulson, Basketball – Project Director, T1 (10 May 2011)
– Richard Arnold, Basketball – Project Sponsor, ODA (10 May 2011)
– Michael Lytrides, IBC/MPC – Project Manager, CLM (22 July 2011)
– Ian Crockford, Aquatics – Project Sponsor, ODA (4 August 2011)
– Stuart Fraser, Aquatics – Project Director, Balfour Beatty

(5 September 2011)

15

Appendices Appendix 1: Organisational culture
Culture encompasses widely held assumptions which drive people’s
behaviours – which can be norms (accepted ways of behaving), values (what
is deemed to be important) or beliefs (what people believe about how things
work). The table below shows some of the main aspects of the culture on the
London 2012 construction programme that we discerned from our interviews:

Beliefs – Failure is not an option
– We can/will solve problems

Values – Making a success of the programme is very important
– All the major objectives (cost, time, quality plus the priority

themes) are important

Norms – Bringing problems or issues to light is normal/good
– Collaboration is normal/good
– Working non-hierarchically (such as horizontally) where

appropriate

Perhaps the main feature to highlight is the highly collaborative culture which
extended across the entire programme. Within this culture, the cardinal sin
was not running into difficulties but not disclosing that the difficulties were
there and not working to find a solution.

Appendix 2: The role of technology
The key management processes were facilitated through a series of ICT
systems, for example:
– Prima Vera contract management system
– GIS (single model system)
– PDMS (processes, policies) system

The use of these systems was generally viewed as being necessary but quite
commonplace. None were viewed as being particularly innovative. Overall,
technology was viewed as an enabler but not a key reason for success.

© 2011 Olympic Delivery Authority. The official Emblems of the London 2012 Games are © London Organising Committee of the Olympic
Games and Paralympic Games Limited (LOCOG) 2007. All rights reserved.

The construction of the venues and infrastructure of the London 2012 Games is funded by the National Lottery through the Olympic Lottery
Distributor, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Mayor of London and the London Development Agency.

For more information visit: london2012.com/learninglegacy

Produced in association with:

Published October 2011
ODA 2011/269

Managing Programmes and
Portfolios (MPP) M32494

Case Study: Crossrail

Contents

• Background
• Route Map
• Funding and Construction Cost
• Programme Management
• Programme Governance
• The Business Case and Benefits
• Crossrail Learning Legacy Framework
• References

Background

• Crossrail project was the largest infrastructure project in Europe and the
largest project in the UK for a generation.

• An east-west link across central London was first proposed in 1845 (Gannon,
2008)

• In recent times long history of development for Crossrail dating back to 1974.

• Private Bill deposited in 1991 to obtain powers to build the scheme despite
multiple Government led cost-effectiveness reviews bill rejected early May
1994 and scheme safeguarded (Gannon, 2008)

• Hybrid Bill submitted in House of Commons February 2005 and received
Royal Assent (permission to build the railway) on 22 July 2008 (Gannon,
2008)

• Constructing a 118km railway from Reading and Heathrow through London
(Paddington, Bond St, Tottenham Court Rd, Liverpool St) and out to Shenfield
in Essex and Abbey Wood in Greenwich (Tucker, 2017).

Route Map

The Appraisal and Business Case for Crossrail (2019)

Funding and Construction Cost

• Original construction cost estimate £14.8
billion (2004).

• Public and Private Sector
– Public Sector: Central and Local

Government, Tax Payer
– Private Sector: Heathrow Airport and

Developers

• 5 October 2007 £15.9 billion funding
package announced by the Prime minister
Gordon Brown (Buck, p8, 2017).

• Most recent construction cost now
estimated £19 billion with an opening in
2022 -mid way through year (Building
News, 2020).

• 28% increase in construction costs!

Civil Engineering

5

Crossrail project: finance, funding and value
capture for London’s new Elizabeth line
Buck

9.1 Learning point
In both of the above cases the risk to both the project and

the developers was significant. The! developer was investing
substantial sums of money and e”ort into constructing a railway
station that was not going be operational for several years, while
failure by the developer to meet deadlines set by the project
could result in delays to the critical tunnelling and railway works.
Deals of this complexity could not have been done at every
station: reaching agreement on acceptable terms required both
developer and project to deploy very sophisticated engineering
and commercial skills, and each location should be considered on
a case by case basis.

More generally, Crossrail was expected to generate development
across London. Traditionally, developers seeking planning
permission for significant commercial developments would enter
into a section 106 agreement with the local authority, serving as

(Figure!4), both of which would experience substantial uplift in the
development potential as a result of the railway.

The Canary Wharf Group were early movers lobbying strongly
for Crossrail to be built and agreeing first to build the proposed
station at Canary Wharf, and also to make a contribution of
£150!million towards the cost. In!return, government granted rights
for Canary Wharf Group to develop retail and leisure above the
station (Figure!5).

Siting a station at Woolwich had originally been rejected on
the grounds of cost, inability to provide for freight trains to use
the tunnel under the Thames to North Woolwich, and its potential
to cannibalise the tra#c generated by the recently completed
extension of the Docklands Light Railway to Woolwich.

When the House of Commons hybrid Bill select committee
instructed the promoter to provide a station at Woolwich, the
Berkeley Group – in the partially developed estate where a
station would be sited – and the London Borough of Greenwich
collaborated with CLRL to make a proposal to government to
construct the station. Initially, the agreement provided for the
construction of a station box which would support a residential
development above. A!subsequent agreement provided for the cost
of fitting out the station to be met between the developer and the
sponsors.

Figure 3. Business rate supplement prospectus

Local government
Transport for London

direct funding £1.9 billion

Central government
Department for Transport
direct funding £4.8 billion

Overall funding envelope

£14·8 billion

Business rate supplement, borrowing
and direct contributions £4.1 billion

Community infrastructure levy
£300 million

Sale of surplus land and property
£500 million

Developer contribution £300 million

Fundraising for which
Transport for London

is responsible £5.25 billion

City of London committed funding
£250 million

Heathrow Airport Limited £70 million

Voluntary funding from London
businesses £100 million

Fundraising for which
Department for Transport
is responsible £480 million

Network Rail financing for work
on the existing network £2·3 billion

Figure 4. Final sources of funding

Figure 5. Aerial view of Woolwich Station with Berkeley Homes
oversite developments

Figure 1: Final Source of Funding (Buck, 2017)

Programme Management Construction

Civil Engineering
Volume 170 Issue CE5

Crossrail project: the execution strategy for
delivering London’s Elizabeth line
Tucker

6

Crossrail secured the services of a programme partner to
provide the client team with a professional programme, project and
engineering management services and to support the oversight and
management of the project at the programme level. This contract
was awarded in 2009 to Transcend, a joint venture of CH2M Hill,
Aecom and the Nichols Group.

Crossrail secured the services of a project delivery partner to
take on the day-to-day responsibility for delivery of the central
section and its constituent contracts to time, to the desired quality
and within the forecast outturn cost, while fulfilling its obligations
under the enabling legislation. This contract was awarded, also in
2009, to Bechtel Ltd and its nominated sub-suppliers Halcrow and
Systra. The project delivery organisation is shown in Figure 6.

Agreements were put in place with industry partners for the on-
network works (Network Rail) and upgrades to the existing London
Underground assets (London Underground), Canary Wharf station
(Canary Wharf Group) and Woolwich station (Berkeley Homes).
Agreements were also put in place with the statutory utilities
(Thames Water, British Telecommunications, National Grid, British
Gas, etc.) to administer all asset protection and modification works
required for existing infrastructure to make way for the new railway.

Crossrail also recognised the need to be able to begin advanced
or ‘enabling’ works before the start of the major central section
construction.!In 2008, an enabling works management agent contract
was awarded to manage the design and implementation for all enabling
works, including utility diversions, tra”c management, surveys and
other protection works. These works were concluded in 2011.

The architecture of this delivery model has remained intact since
2009 and, while the specific organisational delivery structure for
the central section has evolved over time during di#erent phases of
the project, the basic tenets of Crossrail’s vision have stood the test

The programme for design, procurement, construction and
commissioning of the various stages was set in 2009.! As of
the date of this paper, progress has passed 75% complete with
a high confidence of maintaining and achieving the staged-
opening milestones. Figure!4 provides an overview of the project
programme.

5. Overall project management structure

Crossrail’s execution strategy was outlined in the internal
document Crossrail Project Delivery Strategy in 2009 and was
based on a model in which the overall programme of work would
be engineered, procured, constructed and commissioned in a
series of projects by Crossrail and its industry partners, third party
stakeholders and the supply chain. This was to be accomplished by
an integrated delivery team in which Crossrail

! remained responsible for delivery and assurance of the
sponsor’s requirements

! entered into agreements with Network Rail, London
Underground and other third parties as necessary to deliver the
programme

! defined the health and safety, environmental and quality regime
under which the programme would be delivered

! managed finance and funding
! defined and implemented the strategies for procurement

of design, construction and other services to deliver the
programme

! integrated the overall programme
! established and managed programme-wide public relations
! coordinated optimal insurance for the programme.

Figure!5 shows the programme management structure.
A programme director was appointed by Crossrail to lead an

integrated delivery team made up of Crossrail, programme and
project sta# and supply chain partners for design, construction and
implementation.

2009
Design

Tunnelling

Railway systems

Rolling stock and
depot

Civil engineering and station construction

Public space and oversite development around stations

Network rail works

Phased
introduction
of services

Surveys and enabling
works

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Figure 4.!The project’s construction programme extends over
10!years – from work starting in May 2009 to full service operation in
December 2019

London
Underground

Design
consultants

Project
partners

Crossrail

Transport
for London

Department
for Transport

Operator
Rail for London
(Elizabeth line)

Executive
team

Framework
contracts

Delivery
contracts

Operating
contracts

Contractors
Train

operating
concession

Docklands
Light Railway

Canary Wharf
Group

Berkeley
Homes

Network Rail
(on-network works)

In
d
u
st

ry
p

ar
tn

er
a

g
re

em
en

ts

Integrated
team

Sponsor’s agreement

Shareholder
agreement

Project development
agreement

‘Crossrail project’

Project
representative

Joint sponsor
team

Rolling
stock/depot

Figure 5. Programme management structure

The Crossrail programme is structured to
deliver a series of opening stages as follows
(Tucker, 2017):

■ Stage 1: progressive introduction of new
class 345 rolling stock on existing suburban
services between Liverpool Street and
Shenfield (May 2017).

■ Stage 2: on-network works between
Heathrow and Westbourne Park, including
services running at a frequency of four trains
per hour from Paddington station to Heathrow
(May 2018).

■ Stage 3: Elizabeth line services running
between Paddington low-level and Abbey
Wood stations (December 2018).

■ Stage 4: through-running of Elizabeth line
services between Paddington low-level and
both Shenfield and Abbey Wood (May 2019).

■ Stage 5: full Elizabeth line service from
Reading and Heathrow through the central
operating section to Shenfield and Abbey
Wood (December 2019).

Figure 2: Provides an overview of the project programme ( Tucker, 2017)

Programme Management

Civil Engineering
Volume 170 Issue CE5

Crossrail project: the execution strategy for
delivering London’s Elizabeth line
Tucker

6

Crossrail secured the services of a programme partner to
provide the client team with a professional programme, project and
engineering management services and to support the oversight and
management of the project at the programme level. This contract
was awarded in 2009 to Transcend, a joint venture of CH2M Hill,
Aecom and the Nichols Group.

Crossrail secured the services of a project delivery partner to
take on the day-to-day responsibility for delivery of the central
section and its constituent contracts to time, to the desired quality
and within the forecast outturn cost, while fulfilling its obligations
under the enabling legislation. This contract was awarded, also in
2009, to Bechtel Ltd and its nominated sub-suppliers Halcrow and
Systra. The project delivery organisation is shown in Figure 6.

Agreements were put in place with industry partners for the on-
network works (Network Rail) and upgrades to the existing London
Underground assets (London Underground), Canary Wharf station
(Canary Wharf Group) and Woolwich station (Berkeley Homes).
Agreements were also put in place with the statutory utilities
(Thames Water, British Telecommunications, National Grid, British
Gas, etc.) to administer all asset protection and modification works
required for existing infrastructure to make way for the new railway.

Crossrail also recognised the need to be able to begin advanced
or ‘enabling’ works before the start of the major central section
construction.!In 2008, an enabling works management agent contract
was awarded to manage the design and implementation for all enabling
works, including utility diversions, tra”c management, surveys and
other protection works. These works were concluded in 2011.

The architecture of this delivery model has remained intact since
2009 and, while the specific organisational delivery structure for
the central section has evolved over time during di#erent phases of
the project, the basic tenets of Crossrail’s vision have stood the test

The programme for design, procurement, construction and
commissioning of the various stages was set in 2009.! As of
the date of this paper, progress has passed 75% complete with
a high confidence of maintaining and achieving the staged-
opening milestones. Figure!4 provides an overview of the project
programme.

5. Overall project management structure

Crossrail’s execution strategy was outlined in the internal
document Crossrail Project Delivery Strategy in 2009 and was
based on a model in which the overall programme of work would
be engineered, procured, constructed and commissioned in a
series of projects by Crossrail and its industry partners, third party
stakeholders and the supply chain. This was to be accomplished by
an integrated delivery team in which Crossrail

! remained responsible for delivery and assurance of the
sponsor’s requirements

! entered into agreements with Network Rail, London
Underground and other third parties as necessary to deliver the
programme

! defined the health and safety, environmental and quality regime
under which the programme would be delivered

! managed finance and funding
! defined and implemented the strategies for procurement

of design, construction and other services to deliver the
programme

! integrated the overall programme
! established and managed programme-wide public relations
! coordinated optimal insurance for the programme.

Figure!5 shows the programme management structure.
A programme director was appointed by Crossrail to lead an

integrated delivery team made up of Crossrail, programme and
project sta# and supply chain partners for design, construction and
implementation.

2009
Design

Tunnelling

Railway systems

Rolling stock and
depot

Civil engineering and station construction

Public space and oversite development around stations

Network rail works

Phased
introduction
of services

Surveys and enabling
works

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Figure 4.!The project’s construction programme extends over
10!years – from work starting in May 2009 to full service operation in
December 2019

London
Underground

Design
consultants

Project
partners

Crossrail

Transport
for London

Department
for Transport

Operator
Rail for London
(Elizabeth line)

Executive
team

Framework
contracts

Delivery
contracts

Operating
contracts

Contractors
Train

operating
concession

Docklands
Light Railway

Canary Wharf
Group

Berkeley
Homes

Network Rail
(on-network works)

Ind
us

try
p

ar
tn

er
ag

re
em

en
ts

Integrated
team

Sponsor’s agreement

Shareholder
agreement

Project development
agreement

‘Crossrail project’

Project
representative

Joint sponsor
team

Rolling
stock/depot

Figure 5. Programme management structure

• Crossrail’s vision from the outset was to safely
build a world class railway for London

• Programme director was appointed by
Crossrail to lead an integrated delivery team
made up of Crossrail, programme and project
staff and supply chain partners for design,
construction and implementation.

• Key to managing a programme of this scale
and complexity is the programme controls
process.

• Crossrail sought a collaborative relationship
with its principal contractors and the extended
supply chain

Figure 3: Programme Management Structure (Tucker, 2017)

Programme Governance

• Governance at 2 levels (Morris, 2017):
– Corporate Governance – established by Crossrail board establishes delegated

levels of authority for executive directors
– Programme Governance – sits below Corporate Governance and control the

Crosrail Project in accordance with the Delivery Strategy

• Programme Director responsible for maintaining programme governance and
ensuring successful delivery of new capabilities through projects (Morris, 2017)

HOME ABOUT CROSSRAILCROSSRAIL LEARNING LEGACY Search

EVENTS AUTHORS PARTNERSABOUT LEARNING LEGACY LEARNING LEGACY THEMES

HOME LEARNING LEGACY THEMES PROJECT AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT DELIVERY/EXECUTION STRATEGY

CROSSRAIL PROGRAMME GOVERNANCE

TwitterFacebookLinkedIn

+

Jonathan Morris MEng – Crossrail Ltd

Jonathan Morris is the Programme Integration Manager at
Crossrail. He is responsible for ensuring the integration of the
end-to-end railway operates within a clear programme
governance structure, and assuring that critical integration
issues that support testing and commissioning and handover are
identified and resolved in a consistent strategy across the
Crossrail organisation. Jonathan started his career in project
management in airports and subsequently moved into
programme advisory. He now specialises in programme
governance, strategic planning, and performance management
on major complex programmes where he brings over 13 years
experience to bear. He has been with Crossrail since February
2014.

ABSTRACT

The Crossrail Project is a very large and complex programme with tight timescales. This
document provides an overview of the programme governance framework used at Crossrail to
control the leadership, decision-making, reporting and management of the Crossrail Project to
achieve its objective to deliver a world-class integrated end-to-end railway, and some of the
lessons learned.

READ THE FULL DOCUMENT

Introduction
Programme management is the coordinated implementation of a set of related projects and
transformation activities in order to achieve an outcome that realises its intended benefits.

During the lifecycle of a programme a series of projects will be initiated, delivered and closed.
Programme management complements project management by providing an umbrella under
which projects can be coordinated, and their outputs and capability transitioned into operations,
whilst maintaining the performance and effectiveness of delivery. It integrates and reconciles
multiple interdependencies to manage competing demands by the projects through providing a
context and control framework for the overall programme.

Programme governance is about controlling the work: the control framework of individuals,
authorities and forums through which a programme can deliver its objectives whilst remaining
within corporate visibility and control.

Any programme needs clear and transparent governance if it is to be successful.

Programme Governance Approach
Crossrail is a very large and complex programme that must deliver a safe operable integrated
end-to-end railway, on time and on budget, to the requirements set by the Sponsors. CRL
(Crossrail Limited) is the nominated undertaker appointed and funded by the Sponsors to
manage and implement the Crossrail Project as defined in the Project Development Agreement
(PDA) in accordance with an agreed Delivery Strategy. Its governance must be clear where
responsibility and accountability rests, and how decisions are made in a controlled way. Crossrail
has defined its governance at two levels:

Corporate Governance – established by the Crossrail Board which sets out delegated
authority levels for the Board, its committees and subcommittees as well as the scheme of
delegated authorities for the executive directors of CRL.

Programme governance – which sits beneath this and constitutes all the forums which, in
aggregate, control the Crossrail Project in accordance with the Delivery Strategy.

The diagram below illustrates the CRL Programme Management Framework, and the relationship
between the CRL Delivery Strategy and its Stage Delivery programme and opening baselines:

Figure 1 – CRL Programme Management Framework

The Programme Director is responsible for both establishing and maintaining programme
governance, and ensuring successful delivery of the new capabilities through the projects in
accordance with the CRL Delivery Strategy. He is supported in discharging his responsibilities
through support offered by both the Programme Controls and Integration teams to assure that:

1. Overall integrity and coherence of the programme is maintained

2. Strategic drivers are extended into the governance of projects

3. Projects are not detached or misaligned from the CRL Delivery Strategy

4. Risk profiles and thresholds for both the programme and projects are acceptable

5. Decision making on resolving directional issues between interdependent projects is informed
by both the latest intelligence, and the CRL Delivery Strategy

6. Focus is maintained on the achievement of the ultimate programme mission

Both the Programme Controls and Integration teams provide programme intelligence at the
Programme Leadership level, including the highlighting and drawing together of common themes
from across the CRL Project, and proactively making suggestions for improvements in the timely
direction of the delivery of the new capabilities required, in accordance with the CRL Delivery
Strategy. The principal place this is done is the Programme Delivery Board (PDB).

The diagram below illustrates Crossrail’s Programme Governance Map, showing relationships
between its key directorates, programme controls team, executive directors and the
Infrastructure Managers.

Figure 2 – Crossrail Governance Map

Programme governance is discharged through forums comprised of the individuals who have the
expertise and delegated authority to facilitate the delivery of CRL’s obligations. Ultimately delivery
is by CRL’s Industry Partners, and its supply chain, so effective governance must extend to
management of those in a manner, and to an extent, appropriate to each relationship. This is
consistent with the needs of a programme of the scale and complexity of Crossrail. The diagram
below illustrates the key forums that are delivered by each directorate across Crossrail:

Figure 3 – Crossrail Programme – Meetings Map

Lessons Learned
Crossrail has always had comprehensive programme governance in place since CRL was set-up.
The principal lesson that has been learned is the benefit of maintaining a clear overarching
programme governance structure, articulated in a single document that is regularly reviewed by
the programme leadership team. Further:

Decisions must be informed by the right breadth of scope at the right subsidiary level

Decisions can only be made by individuals with the appropriate delegated authority

Forums must form a clear and simple hierarchy:
Each must have a clear purpose and objectives

Membership will be established against these – it should be clear to all why they are there

Escalations of issues for decisions, where necessary, must be through a clearly defined
route

Gaps or overlaps of scope must be avoided

Business must be structured, efficient, recordable and traceable

Reporting must be simple, accurate and timely (even with complex inputs from many
sources)

Terms of reference must be clear, concise, transparent, in a standard Crossrail format, and
widely accessible, as well as approved by the more senior forum

Any changes to the programme governance structure, including the establishment or disbanding
of forums, must be notified to the Programme Director, and the whole governance structure
should be reviewed for efficiency and fitness-for-purpose whenever there is an impending step-
change in the programme lifecycle, or otherwise at a minimum of every 6 months.

Recommendations for Future Projects
CRL would recommend that future major projects:

Produce and maintain an overarching programme governance framework throughout the
lifecycle of the programme

Standardise and formalise governance in a single document

Ensure consistency of Terms of References in a standard format for all meetings and forums
throughout the organisation, and maintain all of these in a central repository

Ensure that the principal Programme Delivery Board (PDB) is focussed on reviewing progress
towards achieving a successful transition of the programme into operations (in CRL’s case,
staged opening) and not just reviewing the delivery progress of the whole portfolio of projects

Review the whole governance structure for efficiency and fitness-for-purpose whenever there
is an impending step-change in the programme lifecycle, or otherwise at a minimum of every
6 months

Ensure Technical Authority is coordinated across all works, including railway systems, rolling
stock and depots, in a single forum that assures the integration against the programme
requirements.

Regularly assure all of the most complex interfaces at a programme level, using a risk based
approach, and reviews its Delivery Strategy annually

Take a “Programme Intelligence” view to programme governance and assurance – this
consists both of delivery intelligence (provided by the PMO on cost/risk/schedule) and
technical intelligence (collective performance of the railway in assuring that all functional and
physical interfaces are on course to perform as the Requirements) at opening.

Remember that programme management is most effective when issues are debated freely
and risks evaluated openly.

DOCUMENT LINKS

AUTHORS

Tags: prog

Board

Excom

CSSC ElizabethLine
StrategicSteerine

ProgrammeDemeryBoard

Univeryboard

NiStely

(GAGE

MASONATOUR

VOT

sunace

Print this Micro-
report

CROSSRAIL PROGRAMME
GOVERNANCE
Document type: Micro-report
Author: Jonathan Morris MEng
Publication Date: 02/08/2018

Commercial&
ChangeSub-
Committee

Maintains

CHANGE

CRLDeliveryStrategy

ElizabethLineStrategicSteeringGroup

MasterOperationalHandover
Schedule(MOHS)

<> StagedOpeningPlans(2-5)

StageDeliveryPerformance

ProgrammeDeliveryBoard

Delivery/Surface/Technical/Operations/IMs

Maintains

K-Baseline>
OtherMember
Organisations
(e.g.LU/RA/MTR)

Board

Excom

ElizabethLine
ReadinessBoard

Operations&Systems
ExpertPanel

Commercial&Change
Sub-Committee

Programme
Controls(central)

ElizabethLine
StrategicSteering

Group

ProgrammeDeliveryBoard

Directorate

Controls
CentralSection
DeliveryDirectorate

Surface
Directorate

Technical
Directorate

AreaContingency Stations Systemwide NRONW

HAUHEX

ProjectControls PMs PMs

T&
C

Tier1Principal
Contractors

H
a
n
d
o
v
e
r

Contractors Contractors

CEG
Safety
Assurance
TechInfo
Integration
Quality

S&C
T&C

KEY

Programme

DeliveryBoard
DeliveryofStagedopeningontrack?Safe,Performs,Operable,Maintainable,
OnTime,OnBudget,World-ClassandmeetsRequirements

Operations
Directorate

RSD
MTR
Ops

Readiness
Business
Ready
NRONSIP
InfoSystems

In
fra
s
tru
c
tu
re
M
a
n
a
g
e
rs

(L
U
,D
L
R
,R
fL
,L
O
,N
R
a
n
d
H
A
L
)

Programme
Directorate

Learning Legacy Themes

Document List

Project and Programme Management

Procurement

Authorisation and Consents

Land and Property

Health and Safety

Environment

Engineering

Operations

Talent and Resources

External Affairs

Innovation

Information Management and Technology

MOVING LONDON FORWARD

Privacy and Cookies Accessibility Statement Terms and Conditions

© Crossrail Ltd 2022

Figure 4: Programme Management Framework and Relationship between Delivery Strategy and Its Stage Delivery (Morris, 2017)

The Business Case and Benefits

• Benefits included within the Business Case included (Bennett, 2017):
– time savings, international connections, regeneration, social exclusion, town centre

regeneration, regional access, strategic interchange, capacity, congestion relief

• The first version for which costs were identified was that in the London Rail Study of
1974 with a predicted cost of £300m. The Central London Rail Study (CLRS) of 1989 put
Crossrail at the top of its “To Do” list of 3 schemes with costs of £1.4bn and a Benefit-
Cost Ratio (BCR) of 1.6:1

• The Business Case presented in July 2003 had a BCR of 1.99:1 for the 2003 ‘Preferred
Route’.

• The scheme, as revised following the Montague Review in 2004 and submitted in the
Crossrail Bill, had a slightly lower BCR of 1.8:1 largely due to the decision to terminate
the south eastern route at Abbey Wood, rather than Ebbsfleet.

• In 2004, The Crossrail business case considered the wider Economic Benefits that
increased the BCR 2.60:1 include within the business case were derived from improved
employment benefits and productivity improvements (Gannon, 2008).

– For instance estimates in the central area are for 5,000-13,000 2006 rising to 23,000-40,000 jobs by 2026.

• According to Buck(2017) the case was made on:
– Mayor’s analysis of London’s developed that predicted high growth
– High potential to develop London’s service sector

Crossrail Learning Legacy Framework

• Project and Programme Management (PPM) learning legacy seeks to share
the policies, processes and procedures used successfully on the Programme
for possible use or modification by future projects and programmes.

• For more information on Crossrail and its Learning Legacy documents click on
the link below

https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/about-learning-legacy/learning-
legacy-framework/

References

• Bennett S (2017) Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth line: from options to
parliamentary bill. https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/documents/crossrail-project-
deliver-londons-elizabeth-line-options-parliamentary-bill/ Date accessed 10 January
2022.

• Buck M (2017) Crossrail Project: Finance, Funding and Value Capture for London’s
Elizabeth Line. https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/1C-
002-Finance-Funding-and-Value-Capture.pdf Date accessed 10 January 2022.

• Building News (2020) Crossrail cost to top £19bn as bosses confirm 2022 opening.
https://www.building.co.uk/news/crossrail-costs-to-top-19bn-as-bosses-confirm-2022-
opening/5107598.article. Date accessed 10 January 2022.

• Crossrail Learning Legacy Programme (2019)
https://www.crossrail.co.uk/benefits/crossrail-learning-legacy/. Date accessed 10 January
2022

• Crossrail Learning Legacy (2019), https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk. Date accessed
10 January 2022

• Gannon M.J. (2008). Crossrail. Focus. The Journal of the Chartered Institute of Logistics
and Transport, Transport Planning and Policy Special Supplement, Volume 10, Number
11, pp. XVII-XX11 November 2008. ISSN 1466-836X.

References

• The Appraisal and Business Case for Crossrail (2019).
https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/documents/appraisal-business-case-crossrail/.
Date accessed 10 January 2022.

• Morris J (2018) Crossrail Programme Governance.
https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/documents/crossrail-programme-governance/ .
Date accessed 10 January 2022.

• Project and Programme Management (2019).
https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/learning-legacy-themes/project-and-programme-
management/. Date accessed 10 January 2022

• Tucker W (2017) Crossrail project: the execution strategy for delivering London’s
Elizabeth line. https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/documents/execution-strategy-
delivering-londons-elizabeth-line/. Date accessed 10 January 2022.

• Wright S and Palczynski R (2017). Crossrail programme organization and management
for delivering London’s Elizabeth line. https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/1R-001-Programme-organisation-and-management.pdf. Date
accessed 10 January 2022.

1

in the early 1990s – a 22% fall. The  population then recovered
rapidly through the following decade, subsequently surpassing the
previous high, reaching 8·7 million in 2015. The combined effect
of the growing population and strong economic performance of
the professional and financial services industries elevated Crossrail
from a long-standing aspiration to a necessity.

Following a failed attempt to promote Crossrail in the 1990s, Cross
London Rail Links Ltd (CLRL) was formed in 2002 to develop new
proposals (Figure 1). CLRL was a legally separate vehicle initially
owned on a 50:50 basis by the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA)
(succeeded by DfT directly) and TfL. While CLRL’s main function at
that point was to support the preparation of the parliamentary hybrid
bill to provide the powers for the project, CLRL was also tasked with
developing options for delivery of the project.

CLRL engaged financial adviser Bank of America and legal
adviser Ashurst and undertook a wide-ranging review of the
funding and finance options and delivery models available.
The  resulting Crossrail Business Case (Cross London Rail Links
Limited, 2003) was presented to the then Secretary of State for
Transport, Alistair Darling, in July 2003.

He announced that the government supported the principle
of a new east–west Crossrail link, but wanted to be assured that
CLRL’s proposal was deliverable and financeable. He appointed a
review team, led by Adrian Montague (formerly deputy chairman

1. Introduction

At the outset of the establishment of the Crossrail project to
deliver the new Elizabeth line east–west railway across London,
the UK government’s preferred delivery model was a privately
financed concession. When this proved to be unachievable the
Treasury capped the contribution from the central exchequer at
around a third of the overall cost, requiring the remaining funding
to be generated from the ‘beneficiaries’ of the project.

The Department for Transport (DfT) and Transport for London
(TfL) – together the ‘sponsors’ – collaborated with the business and
property development communities in London to assemble a finance
and funding package. The quality of the cost estimate together with
the confidence generated by the risk analysis enabled the sponsors
to make the political and financial commitments necessary.

In turn, the certainty of funding provided the project company
with a high level of financial stability and covenant to proceed and
sustain the project.

2. Background

Following the Second World War, London’s population shrank
from a peak of around 8·6  million to a low point of 6·7  million

Crossrail project: finance, funding and
value capture for London’s Elizabeth line
Martin Buck FICE FRICS
Director, Crossrail Limited (2003–2016), London, UK

The £14·8 billion Crossrail project to deliver the new Elizabeth line east–west railway across London is the UK’s largest
transport project. Getting it into reality was only possible through an innovative programme of finance, funding and
value capture, which saw London business and future passenger revenues contribute approximately two thirds of
the cost. This paper sets out the experience and lessons learned from the funding structure established to enable the
Crossrail project to proceed.

Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers
http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/jcien.17.00005
Paper 1700005
Received 06/02/2017 Accepted 19/06/2017
Keywords: government/local government/public policy

Civil Engineering

Crossrail project: finance, funding and value
capture for London’s new Elizabeth line
Buck

ICE Publishing: All rights reserved

Figure 1. 2003 Preferred route

Civil Engineering

2

Crossrail project: finance, funding and value
capture for London’s new Elizabeth line
Buck

project was the then mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, with the
senior management team at TfL.

The office of Mayor of London was created with the GLA in
2000. Following the abolition of the Greater London Council in
1986 London had been administered by a range of joint boards
and other government agencies, and it is arguable that without the
single point focus provided by the office of mayor the arrangements
put in place to enable the Crossrail project would not have been
possible.

The mayor’s office together with TfL coordinated the case for
the Crossrail project. While the project had a positive 2:1 ratio on
the public sector’s traditional cost–benefit analysis calculation, the
mayor’s chief economic adviser Bridget Rosewell was instrumental
in developing that case into a commercial vision for business in
London. That in turn, coupled with the close involvement of
London First, an influential business-based lobby group, resulted in
an unprecedented level of involvement of the business community
in the promotion of the project.

According to Rosewell (personal communication), ‘The case
for Crossrail had to be made by a wide variety of stakeholders,
from business interests to local communities. It  also needed to
be accepted by the Treasury and the DfT, and the acceptance
of non-transport benefits to the London economy was crucial.
The  realisation that Crossrail created real additional outputs –
“agglomeration benefits” – and that gridlock on the system would
happen without it was central to this’.

While the DfT was an interested party through its agency the
SRA, which co-owned the project company CLRL with TfL,
Crossrail lacked a clear champion at central government level until
Darling moved from the Treasury to the DfT. In his previous role
he was reported to have been firmly against the project on cost
grounds but then seemingly warmed to the proposal when the
potential for alternative funding became apparent.

Also key to moving the project forward in the early years was
London First. At  that time London was already enjoying the
benefit of several years of growth on the back of financial and
commercial services. The chronic under-investment in the London
Underground rail network was being addressed through a public–
private partnership (PPP) programme but London First was a very
active and vocal voice in advocating that continued growth would
only be sustained with a major step change investment along the
lines of Crossrail. Crucially, London First also formed a very
influential voice back into the business community by making the
case that business would need to step up and make a contribution if
the project were to go ahead.

‘The effort made to engage with stakeholders before 2007
was very important. The alliance of a Labour mayor and London
business community proposing a supplement to the existing
business rate, effectively a hypothecated tax, was compelling’, said
Julian Ware, senior principal of commercial finance, TfL.

4. Business case and investment model

Making the case for Crossrail progressed on two fronts:
GLA/TfL’s analysis of London’s development, which projected
significant growth in both population and jobs, and the high
potential to develop London’s service sector – already the most
productive in the UK. GLA/TfL argued that London was more

of Network Rail and chief executive of the Treasury Taskforce), to
assess this.

The Crossrail Review published in July 2004 (Montague, 2004)
set out a number of findings, noting that the scheme was expected
to cost in the region of £10 billion at the first quarter of 2003 prices
– approximately £17 billion nominal outturn – which it considered
to be ‘acceptable value for money’. Significantly on funding, the
report also noted ‘doubt as to the available market capacity in the
construction and financial sectors to support a project of this size’
(Montague, 2004: p. 2).

The report though went on to note, ‘London business interests
appear ready to contribute significant amounts, in the range
of £2,000  million to perhaps £3,000  million NPV [net present
value], to the project by way of Alternative Funding Mechanisms’
(Montague, 2004: p. 2). This indication of substantial contribution
from business sources proved to be a pivotal moment in the funding
case for Crossrail. It had crossed the threshold from why should the
project be undertaken to how and when.

The significant question of how such a contribution could be
realised and whether it would be sufficient to bridge the substantial
funding gap still remained, with Darling noting in his written
statement to parliament that, ‘a major funding challenge remains’
(Hansard, 2004: col. 23WS) and that, ‘those who benefit from
Crossrail should contribute substantially to its delivery’ (Hansard,
2004: col. 24WS).

It was clear from the Crossrail Business Case and the Crossrail
Review that the scale of the project was too great (and potentially
too complex) for a conventional privately financed solution. CLRL
therefore commissioned a second report, this time from legal advisors
Ashurst, Royal Bank of Scotland, and insurance brokers and risk
assessors Marsh, to establish a more detailed business model through
which CLRL (as delivery vehicle on behalf of DfT and TfL) would
propose to act as the delivery vehicle for the project on a principally
public procured (as opposed to private-finance initiative) solution.

The business model published in 2004 effectively established
the blueprint for an empowered, publicly owned quasi-independent
delivery vehicle for the project. This was a relatively novel approach
at the time. In due course, CLRL became the nominated undertaker
vested with the statutory powers to undertake the scheme, and with
the transfer of 100% ownership to TfL in December 2008, a formal
governance structure and legal arrangements for a successor
company, Crossrail Ltd (CRL), were put in place reinforcing its
powers and quasi-independent status as a subsidiary of TfL.

It remained for the sponsors to crystallise the case for such a
large investment, and in July 2006 the Greater London Authority
(GLA) and TfL set out the case for investment based on growth,
productivity gains assessed around the context of the agglomeration
effects of additional transport provision.

CRL and the sponsors worked with the government and respective
stakeholders to reduce the cost of the project by around £2 billion
and assemble a funding structure endorsed in the government’s
comprehensive spending review of 2007. Further background is
available on the Crossrail Learning Legacy website (Crossrail, 2017).

3. Political and stakeholder support

As with any public investment of such a large-scale, political
support was imperative. The  main political champion for the

Civil Engineering

3

Crossrail project: finance, funding and value
capture for London’s new Elizabeth line
Buck

5. Cost estimate and risk analysis

As with any project, the cost estimate for Crossrail evolved with
the development of the scheme. A significant challenge for CLRL
was to maintain alignment between the engineering development
and the cost estimate as aspects of the project progressed at
different rates. The  approach to estimation of costs also had to
evolve over time, with global and elemental provisions being
developed into more refined estimates as the design developed into
more measureable detail.

However, it is important to note that at an early stage, any cost
estimate can only be an approximation based on the information
that is known at the time. Given the complexity of Crossrail
there were aspects in which the areas of uncertainty exceeded the
elements that could be determined and measured. The  areas of
uncertainty were evaluated in a risk model to produce a probability
based forecast of overall cost.

5.1 Learning point
An approach which worked well at this stage was to avoid

too much complexity too soon. Suggestions to adopt tools from
elsewhere were resisted in favour of simple models tailored to
address only the specific issues needed at that time. So, for example,
the investment model comprised simple Excel spreadsheets while
the risk model worked on approximately 200 items. Accordingly,
the results produced by the respective models could be easily
validated and errors recognised and corrected.

6. Funding and finance mechanisms

To distinguish between the terms ‘funding’ and ‘finance’,
‘funding’ is used in the sense of money that is available to use at
the time of the expenditure, that is during the course of the project
– typically this is a government grant that does not have to be paid
back or serviced thereafter. ‘Finance’ is used when money has to be
raised or borrowed and ultimately paid back through some form of
debt mechanism.

productive for a variety of reasons. Distinctive, high value
industries enable London’s employers to attract people with high
levels of skills and education, but other factors were important in
making London successful.

For example, the services industries in London were productive
due to close clustering, access to wide labour markets was an
important determinant to employers’ willingness to locate in
central London, and access to housing was essential to widen and
deepen labour markets. GLA/TfL’s case demonstrated the ability
and fit of Crossrail both to serve that growth and relieve other
bottlenecks.

Although by 2003 a ‘benchmark scheme’ had established the
basis of the east–west railway under the centre of London, the scale
and extent of Crossrail to the east and west of the central area was
the subject of intense debate. Concerns over affordability and the
demand of funds over time meant that all opportunities to reduce
the cost and improve the value for money had to be explored.

The review of options was informed by the development of an
investment model constructed to illustrate the effect of phasing or
staging respective parts of the project relative to one another and
over time. While the model was high level and based only on the
relatively early stage cost data available at the time, the resultant
scenario testing enabled the scale and pace of the project to be
judged against a range of affordability profiles.

As a result of the options appraisal, the Crossrail scheme
took on a very different shape, with the south-west branch being
abandoned and the south-east branch ending at Abbey Wood
to reduce costs while the western branch was extended to serve
Maidenhead, providing significant additional benefits at relatively
low cost (Figure  2). Options to phase or stage the separate
elements of the project did not prove of value and were not
adopted. More detail on the appraisal process and results can be
found in a separate paper (Bennett, 2017).

4.1 Learning point
Understanding and modelling the impact of different options on

cost and the timing of funding enabled CLRL to test the ‘benchmark
scheme’ and inform the selection of a more affordable solution.

Figure 2. Bill route

Civil Engineering

4

Crossrail project: finance, funding and value
capture for London’s new Elizabeth line
Buck

transformative value of Crossrail to the business community
through both improved access for existing staff and access to an
additional 1·5 million people brought within a 45 minute commute
of central London.

Improved access was expected to produce a step-change through
the clustering agglomeration effects, now recognised as key drivers
in productivity and development, by driving traffic towards cluster
sites. For  retail businesses, there would be the added value of
improved access for customers travelling into central London and
the West End.

Early estimates indicated that the potential for business
contributions could be £2–3 billion but collecting sums of that scale
would not be achieved through voluntary contributions. To engage
the business community GLA and TfL worked with London First
to host a series of meetings and workshops to test sentiment and
rally support. Key at that stage was the strong government message
that, without a significant contribution from London business, the
project would not happen. Early dialogue established the need for
contributions to be equitable and fair.

The GLA’s preferred mechanism was to levy an incremental
supplement through the national non-domestic rate (i.e. business
rates) – to be known as business rate supplement (BRS). A number
of hurdles were overcome, the levy needed primary legislation,
the Treasury had to agree to its hypothecation for the Crossrail
project, and BRS itself would be levied by the mayor and the
GLA. Following the legislation being passed and a consultation
process in the latter part of 2009, the GLA published the proposed
arrangements in a final prospectus issued in January 2010 (GLA,
2010) (Figure 3).

In April 2010, the mayor of London levied a £0·02 supplement
on business rates for properties of a rateable value over £55 000
per annum, with this threshold ensuring that smaller premises
were exempt and the burden would fall on the larger businesses
which were more able to absorb the cost, and most of which were
along the line of the proposed route in any case. The BRS generates
around £225 million per annum, which for the GLA could support
borrowing of around £3·5 billion. The levy is expected to fall away
once the bonds are fully repaid, which is forecast to be in the 2030s.

8.1 Learning point
The mayor’s adoption of BRS was not an insubstantial risk.

Besides the attendant political risk of imposing a levy across the
city region, the mayor had to determine the rate to be applied,
ensure the collection and underwrite the subsequent bond letting
process to meet the funding commitments to the project.

The attractiveness of the BRS was that, as a supplement to an
existing taxation base, it was easily levied and collected, and the
proceeds were very predictable – the income realised has slightly
exceeded TfL’s forecasts. This predictability also made it relatively
easy to raise capital to be repaid through its proceeds.

9. Beneficiaries: property developers

Property developers, both existing and prospective, stood to gain
substantially from the proximity of their land and buildings to the
new railway. Particular among these were Canary Wharf Group,
the owners of the Canary Wharf estate in Docklands, and Berkeley
Group, owners of the Woolwich Arsenal estate in Woolwich

The Crossrail Review had expressed doubt that a privately
financed proposition could be supported in the market but pointed
to business interests being ready to contribute through ‘alternative
funding mechanisms’.

DfT had identified grant funds of approximately £5  billion
for Crossrail, and GLA and TfL had identified approximately
£2 billion that could be made available through borrowing against
future revenue income (that is fares) and by reprioritising other
aspects of its capital investment programme – this left a very
substantial funding gap. The government had said that the scheme
would only proceed with a substantial contribution from those who
would benefit most from it.

How and in what form would that contribution be secured and
made available to the project? While funding infrastructure through
a combination of costs on direct users (i.e. fares) and through
general taxation (i.e. grants) was common place, tapping the
indirect beneficiaries on anything like the scale proposed had not
been done before.

7. Managing cost

In 2004 the gap between the cost of the project – around
£17 billion – and the funds available from the sponsors was between
£8 billion and £10 billion. The first target for CLRL was to seek to
reduce that gap through cost savings or value engineering and to
assure all stakeholders that the cost estimates were confident and
robust. Through a critical review of the operational requirements
and further development of the design, savings of £2 billion in cost
and risk reductions were identified.

7.1 Learning points
At this early stage, the involvement of operationally experienced

staff enabled aspects of the engineering to be challenged and in
some cases eliminated. For example, the base scheme incorporated
two crossovers in each direction within the underground tunnelled
section of the railway. Crossovers enable trains to move from one
track to the opposite track but these are hugely complex structures to
construct, with significant risk in engineering, cost and time terms.

The operating team determined that, in practice, there were few
if any scenarios in which the train service would be re-routed by
means of the opposite track and the number of crossovers was
reduced to one in each direction. Similarly, the operator challenged
the complexity of the tunnel ventilation system and led the process
to secure agreement of the respective authorities to a reduced
number of shafts along the tunnelled route.

Also, it should be expected that the cost estimate will start high
when budgetary and provisional estimates reflect the immature level
of knowledge of both the work required and the risk associated. Over
time the costs – along with uncertainty – should reduce as the early
estimates are replaced by more empirical ‘bottom up’ cost estimates
with improved judgement around the probability and impact of risk.
If early contingency provisions are not rigorous, costs may rise.

8. Beneficiaries: business community

Identifying the beneficiaries was informed by the work previously
discussed in Section 6. The  business case analysis illustrated the

Civil Engineering

5

Crossrail project: finance, funding and value
capture for London’s new Elizabeth line
Buck

9.1 Learning point
In both of the above cases the risk to both the project and

the developers was significant. The  developer was investing
substantial sums of money and effort into constructing a railway
station that was not going be operational for several years, while
failure by the developer to meet deadlines set by the project
could result in delays to the critical tunnelling and railway works.
Deals of this complexity could not have been done at every
station: reaching agreement on acceptable terms required both
developer and project to deploy very sophisticated engineering
and commercial skills, and each location should be considered on
a case by case basis.

More generally, Crossrail was expected to generate development
across London. Traditionally, developers seeking planning
permission for significant commercial developments would enter
into a section 106 agreement with the local authority, serving as

(Figure 4), both of which would experience substantial uplift in the
development potential as a result of the railway.

The Canary Wharf Group were early movers lobbying strongly
for Crossrail to be built and agreeing first to build the proposed
station at Canary Wharf, and also to make a contribution of
£150 million towards the cost. In return, government granted rights
for Canary Wharf Group to develop retail and leisure above the
station (Figure 5).

Siting a station at Woolwich had originally been rejected on
the grounds of cost, inability to provide for freight trains to use
the tunnel under the Thames to North Woolwich, and its potential
to cannibalise the traffic generated by the recently completed
extension of the Docklands Light Railway to Woolwich.

When the House of Commons hybrid Bill select committee
instructed the promoter to provide a station at Woolwich, the
Berkeley Group – in the partially developed estate where a
station would be sited – and the London Borough of Greenwich
collaborated with CLRL to make a proposal to government to
construct the station. Initially, the agreement provided for the
construction of a station box which would support a residential
development above. A subsequent agreement provided for the cost
of fitting out the station to be met between the developer and the
sponsors.

Figure 3. Business rate supplement prospectus

Local government
Transport for London

direct funding £1.9 billion

Central government
Department for Transport
direct funding £4.8 billion

Overall funding envelope

£14·8 billion

Business rate supplement, borrowing
and direct contributions £4.1 billion

Community infrastructure levy
£300 million

Sale of surplus land and property
£500 million

Developer contribution £300 million

Fundraising for which
Transport for London

is responsible £5.25 billion

City of London committed funding
£250 million

Heathrow Airport Limited £70 million

Voluntary funding from London
businesses £100 million

Fundraising for which
Department for Transport
is responsible £480 million

Network Rail financing for work
on the existing network £2·3 billion

Figure 4. Final sources of funding

Figure 5. Aerial view of Woolwich Station with Berkeley Homes
oversite developments

Civil Engineering

6

Crossrail project: finance, funding and value
capture for London’s new Elizabeth line
Buck

to Crossrail. GLA  raised funding against the projected income
generated through the BRS and the CIL. The GLA and TfL credit
rating of AA+ enabled funds to be secured at very attractive rates
of interest compared to TIF or other project finance instruments
because the income was much more secure.

Irrespective of the Crossrail programme, TfL had itself been
granted wider powers to raise debt independently of the central
exchequer and an AA+ credit rating gave it access to very attractive
funding (TfL had already established lines of bond credit with the
European Investment Bank). TfL evaluated the options and rejected
the TIF option electing itself to absorb the risk of the BRS receipts
and retain the margin over the cheaper bond finance. Through a
series of bond issues TfL has raised £3·5 billion of debt with an
initial tenure of 15 years repayment.

Bringing all of the different sources together illustrates
that London, in the form of business and property receipts, is
contributing approximately a third of the cost of the project.

12.1 Learning point
While the different methods of value capture have produced a

large contribution to the cost of the project, the requirement to
turn future receipts into usable funds for the project required TfL’s
substantial corporate standing to underwrite the income and secure
the debt on acceptable terms.

13. Other funding: redevelopment over stations

The railway incorporates the construction of nine new stations,
a number of which required the acquisition of substantial property
to enable the construction works to take place. The parliamentary
powers for Crossrail had to incorporate provisions for compulsory
purchase of the required property so that they could be demolished
for the construction of the stations and respective entrance
facilities.

CLRL worked with the respective stakeholders to ameliorate
some of the concern around the compulsory purchase arrangements
through offering to collaborate over the subsequent redevelopment
of the sites (Figure 6).

13.1 Learning point
By adopting a collaborative approach with the existing property

owners CLRL removed much of the potential resistance to the
compulsory purchase process and gained the benefit of the
specialist redevelopment skills of the existing owners. A separate
paper in Crossrail Learning Legacy will describe the collaborative
arrangement Crossrail put in place with the developers.

The redevelopment value was estimated at £550 million, which
the mayor underwrote as part of TfL’s contribution to Crossrail’s
funding package. A  study commissioned by delivery company
Crossrail Limited (CRL) – which replaced CLRL in 2007 –
estimated the uplift in land values within 1 km of Crossrail
stations between 2010 and 2020 (the railway opens in 2018) to
be £5·5  billion (Crossrail, 2012). While this is a very positive
reinforcement of the case for constructing Crossrail, the estimate
illustrates the very low level of value captured (approximately
10% in this case) by the public sector – the remaining 90%
accruing as windfall gains to the owners of the properties
impacted.

a voluntary contribution to related social infrastructure. These
are private agreements made between local authorities and
developers, attached to planning permissions, that make acceptable
developments that would otherwise be unacceptable in planning
terms, based on that section of the Town and Country Planning Act
1990. For Crossrail, the government extended those powers in the
form of a community infrastructure levy (CIL), which is a lump
sum on each completed development.

The CIL provided for the mayor of London to impose an
additional levy on both commercial and private residential
development, which as with the BRS would be hypothecated to
Crossrail. The rate applied is between £20/m2 and £50/m2 dependent
on the area of the city, and is set at the mayor’s discretion. The levy
for each location is set at the time of planning consent but is only
payable on completion of the development. After a slow start, the
CIL was generating £100 million a year by 2015–2016.

10. Beneficiaries: Heathrow Airport

Public transport access is a significant factor in the continuing
growth of Heathrow Airport (owned and operated by Heathrow
Airport Holdings Limited (HAHL), formerly British Airports
Authority (BAA)). Routing a branch from the western leg of the
railway into Heathrow Airport central terminals increased the
efficient use of the tunnel infrastructure constructed a decade
previously by BAA and substantially improved the capacity
provided by the existing Heathrow Express service.

Discussions with the Civil Aviation Authority established that
a contribution by HAHL on account of the improved surface
access would be admissible for inclusion in the regulated asset
base (RAB). This would then enable HAHL to recover the cost
through the airport landing charge. As a result, HAHL pledged a
contribution of £70 million to the project.

11. Beneficiaries: Corporation of London

The Corporation of London pledged to contribute £250 million
from organisations within the City of London.

12. Converting benefits to cash

An immediate problem in securing funds from beneficiaries is
that the money to invest in constructing the railway is required
before (in the case of Crossrail several years before) the benefits
begin to be realised – and even then, perhaps only with the
exception of a property disposal, the benefit is accrued over a long
period of time.

Not only would appropriate ways of collecting funds be needed
but a method would need to be found to convert the likely long-
term revenue stream into usable project funding. TfL analysis drew
on international experience of raising debt for public infrastructure,
with a US-style tax incremental financing (TIF), typically bonds
which carry the risk of actual incremental tax receipts, emerging as
a strong option.

The GLA’s and TfL’s balance sheet capacity and relatively low
level of borrowing enabled the mayor to provide substantial support

Civil Engineering

7

Crossrail project: finance, funding and value
capture for London’s new Elizabeth line
Buck

15. Other funding: rolling stock and
maintenance depot

There was a well established market in the UK for train
manufacturers and other finance organisations to provide trains
and maintenance facilities on a service basis. While Crossrail
had a number of unique characteristics on account of the tunnel
alignments and length and capacity of trains, market consultation
suggested that there would be a good appetite for a private finance
initiative or PPP procurement.

As above, the £1·5 billion capital cost would be defrayed with
the cost of the train fleet and its upkeep in service remunerated
through availability payments by the operator after the start of the
service (Figure 7).

16. Passenger fares: operating surplus

As discussed, the ability of capital elements of the cost to be met
by the operator is dependent on the commercial performance of
the railway after the start of services. Crossrail’s funding case was
assisted by the high level of expected usage and revenue.

Based on forecasts at the time, Crossrail’s operating revenue
would cover the cost of operating the service, the track access
charges to Network Rail including repayment of the £2·3  billion
capital cost, repaying the £1·3  billion cost of the train fleet and
associated maintenance and providing a further surplus in the order
of £1·9 billion being applied to pay down TfL’s debt. Taking this
into account, it can be argued that Crossrail’s future passengers will
pay approximately a third of the cost of the project.

17. Formalising funding commitments

The various strands of the funding structure were developed in
principle over the course of 2005–2006 and subsequently developed
into a proposal submitted to government as part of the Treasury’s

14. Other funding: Network Rail

When the Elizabeth line is fully operational in 2019, nearly
100 km of the total 118 km route length will run over tracks on the
existing national railway, controlled by Network Rail. In the early
2000s Network Rail was rebuilding itself after the failure of its
predecessor Railtrack, and its stated priorities were elsewhere in
completing the West Coast main line upgrade and Thameslink – a
similar railway to Crossrail but substantially upgrading an existing
route running north–south across London. In  view of its other
strategic priorities, Network Rail declined to take a lead role in
the project but committed to collaborate with CRL to ensure the
necessary measures were put in place.

As part of the arrangements for constructing the railway the
sponsors applied for a track access option, a process under the
national railway regulatory process providing for Network Rail to
put in place the necessary infrastructure to support a future service
– this was an essential requirement to secure the commitment to
the investment in the central section.

The other limb of the arrangement with Network Rail was a
regulatory protocol approved by the Office of Rail Regulation in
November 2009. The protocol provided for the £2·3 billion cost of
the works to be financed by Network Rail for later incorporation
into the Network Rail RAB – in effect meaning that Crossrail would
not have to finance or fund the works but Network Rail would be
remunerated through a track access charge paid by the operator.

14.1 Learning point
The RAB-funded option was an effective way of defraying the

capital cost of the required works. The operating revenues of the
resultant service are forecast to be sufficient to cover the subsequent
access charges, which also accrue a return for Network Rail at the
regulatory rate.

Network Rail is also entitled to charge the ‘carry cost’ or interest
on the debt arising during the construction period and before access
charges start to flow – in Crossrail’s case the carry cost could not be
included in the amount financed by Network Rail and the interest
costs fell to the project.

Figure 6. Canary Wharf Station oversite development by Canary
Wharf Group

Figure 7. Tottenham Court Road Station eastern ticket hall –
theatre oversite development

Civil Engineering

8

Crossrail project: finance, funding and value
capture for London’s new Elizabeth line
Buck

Property development above and around station sites contributed
both directly to the cost of the project and indirectly through a
special ring-fenced levy applied across the city.

The forecast passenger numbers together with London’s
relatively high fare structure means that the future revenue income
will pay for operating the railway and allow certain capital costs
to be defrayed into the operating phase of the railway’s life cycle.
Future passenger revenues will meet the cost of upgrading the
existing national rail lines, meet the cost of the new trains and
the associated maintenance and provide a further surplus to repay
TfL’s debt.

In 2003, with access to central taxpayer funding closed off, the
funding gap looked daunting – tapping indirect beneficiaries on
such a scale had never been attempted before. Through a series of
separate but coherent measures, London was able to engage and
persuade the business community of both the necessity and the
value of the investment in the transport infrastructure.

The project proceeded and London will soon start to reap its
return on investment.

Acknowledgements

The author is very grateful for the assistance of Mark Fell,
legal director and company secretary, and Simon Adams, head of
commercial, Crossrail Limited; Shashi Verma, CIO and director
of customer experience, and Julian Ware, senior principal of
commercial finance, Transport for London; Bridget Rosewell of
Volterra Partners; and Mark Elsey of Ashurst.

comprehensive spending review 2007 process. During the review,
CLRL’s cost and risk analyses were subjected to rigorous review
by both the Treasury and external consultants and were found to
be robust.

On 5 October 2007 Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced a
£15·9 billion package and the signing of heads of terms detailing
the arrangements and sources of funding and providing for the
formation of CRL as the delivery vehicle for the project. The heads
of terms were developed into a suite of agreements between
the sponsors, CRL and respective stakeholders. The  funding
arrangements between the sponsors and CRL were embedded
within a project development agreement.

18. National Audit Office review

In January 2014 the National Audit Office published its report
(NAO, 2014) on Crossrail, noting that the project had been
established with an appropriate level of funding based on robust
estimates, and provided certainty of funding (Figure 8).

19. Conclusion

At time of writing, the Elizabeth line is forecast to open on time
and within its funding envelope, and London will soon start to
enjoy the full benefit of a huge investment.

This success has only been possible through an innovative
approach to funding, finance and value capture.

In 2003 the Crossrail Review endorsed the cost estimates, which
it considered to be value for money, but expressed ‘doubts about the
available market capacity in the construction and finance sectors to
support a project of this size’ (Montague, 2004: p. 2). In its response,
the government in turn expressed support for the project but noted
the funding challenge saying that ‘those who benefit … should
contribute substantially to its delivery’ (Hansard, 2004: col. 24WS).

London’s municipal and transport authorities, bolstered by the
creation of the GLA and the new mayor, developed a persuasive
and commercial case for investment by the business community in
the transport infrastructure in the city. Working with London First,
the mayor introduced a supplementary business rate with proceeds
ring-fenced to fund Crossrail.

References

Bennett S (2017) Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth line: from
options to parliamentary bill. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil
Engineers – Civil Engineering, http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/jcien.17.00006.

Cross London Rail Links Limited (2003) Crossrail Business Case. Crossrail Ltd,
London, UK.

Crossrail (2012) Property Impact Links. Crossrail Learning Legacy, London,
UK. See http://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/documents/property-impact-
study/ (accessed 06/02/2017).

Crossrail (2017) Project Initiation and Development. Crossrail Learning
Legacy, London, UK. See http://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/learning-
legacy-themes/project-and-programme-management/business-case/
(accessed 06/02/2017).

GLA (Greater London Authority) (2010) Paying for Crossrail: Business Rate
Supplement. GLA, London, UK. See https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-
do/business-and-economy/promoting-london/paying-crossrail-business-
rate-supplement (accessed 06/02/2017).

Hansard (2004) HC (series 6) vol. 424, part no. 23, cols 24WS–26WS (20 Jul.).

Montague A (2004) Crossrail Review. TSO, London, UK.

NAO (National Audit Office) (2014) https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2014/01/Crossrail-summary..pdf (accessed 06/02/17).

Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Chapter 8. Her Majesty’s Stationery
Office, London, UK.

How can you contribute?
If you would like to comment on this paper, please email up to 200 words
to the editor at [email protected]

If you would like to write a paper of 2000 to 3500 words about your own
experience in this or any related area of civil engineering, the editor will be
happy to provide any help or advice you need.Figure 8. Class 345 train at Bombardier factory

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Background
    • Figure 1
  • 3. Political and stakeholder support
  • 4. Business case and investment model
    • Figure 2
    • 4.1 Learning point
  • 5. Cost estimate and risk analysis
    • 5.1 Learning point
  • 6. Funding and finance mechanisms
  • 7. Managing cost
    • 7.1 Learning points
  • 8. Beneficiaries: business community
    • Figure 3
    • 8.1 Learning point
  • 9. Beneficiaries: property developers
    • Figure 4
    • Figure 5
    • 9.1 Learning point
  • 10. Beneficiaries: Heathrow Airport
  • 11. Beneficiaries: Corporation of London
  • 12. Converting benefits to cash
    • 12.1 Learning point
  • 13. Other funding: redevelopment over stations
    • Figure 6
    • 13.1 Learning point
  • 14. Other funding: Network Rail
    • 14.1 Learning point
  • 15. Other funding: rolling stock and maintenance depot
    • Figure 7
  • 16. Passenger fares: operating surplus
  • 17. Formalising funding commitments
  • 18. National Audit Office review
    • Figure 8
  • 19. Conclusion
  • Acknowledgements
  • References
    • Bennett S (2017)
    • Cross London Rail Links Limited (2003)
    • Crossrail (2012)
    • Crossrail (2017)
    • GLA (Greater London Authority) (2010)
    • Hansard (2004)
    • Montague A (2004)
    • NAO (National Audit Office) (2014)
    • Town and Country Planning Act 1990

1

<TPa]X]V�[TVPRh
Lessons learned from the London
2012 Games construction project

Programme
Management

Abstract
London’s successful bid for the 2012
Olympic and Paralympic Games
created the need for a major
regeneration and construction
programme to provide the venues
and infrastructure needed to stage
the Games.

The programme of construction was
extensive, technically and politically
challenging. It was also up against
a!fixed deadline of the Opening
Ceremony of the Games in July 2012.
Turning the vision of the Olympic Bid
into the reality of roads, bridges and
stadia was the job of the Olympic
Delivery Authority (ODA), a!new
publicly funded body established by
an Act of Parliament in April 2006.

From its creation until the planned
completion of the majority of the
capital works a year ahead of the
Games, the ODA had just over five
years to staff up, procure and deliver
around £6 billion of major
construction works. The majority of
the construction works were to be
built on a largely derelict and
polluted site in Stratford, east London.
At the same time the ODA needed to
satisfy government, the media, local
residents and the public at large that
it was:
– providing value for money; and
– on track to provide both the

infrastructure required to stage the
Games, and a lasting legacy for a
relatively deprived part of London.

Authors
Kenna Kintrea
Head of Venues and Infrastructure
Programme, ODA

Association for Project Management
(APM)
Peer reviewer

Olympic Park looking south through the parklands

2

The ODA had five years
to staff up, procure and
deliver £6 billion of
major construction works.

Introduction
London’s successful bid for the 2012
Olympic and Paralympic Games
created the need for a major
regeneration and construction
programme to provide the venues
and infrastructure needed to stage
the Games.

The programme of construction was
extensive, technically and politically
challenging and up against a fixed
deadline of the Opening Ceremony
of the Games in July 2012. Turning
the vision of the Olympic Bid into the
reality of roads, bridges and stadia
was the job of the ODA.

From its creation until the planned
completion of the majority of the
capital works a year ahead of the
Games, the ODA had just over five
years to staff up, procure and deliver
around £6 billion (bn) of major
construction works. The majority of
the construction works were to be
built on a largely derelict and
polluted site in Stratford, east London.

At the same time the ODA needed to
satisfy government, the media, local
residents and the public at large that
it was:
– providing value for money; and
– on track to provide both the

infrastructure required to stage the
Games, and a lasting legacy for a
relatively deprived part of London.

Organisation Period Activity

London Development Agency a
(LDA)/ODA

Year 1 (2006–2007) Planning and land assembly

Olympic Delivery Authority Year 2 (to Beijing 2008) Demolish, dig, design

Year 3 (to 27 July 2009) ‘The big build’ (foundations)

Year 4 (to 27 July 2010) ‘The big build’ (structures)

Year 5 (to 27 July 2011) ‘The big build’ (completion)

London Organising Committee of the
Olympic and Paralympic Games

Year 6 (to 2012) Testing and commissioning, the
Olympic and Paralympic Games

Olympic Park Legacy Company 2012 onwards Conversion of the Olympic Park
and!venues to permanent legacy
configuration, re-opening the Park
to!the public

ODA scope and programme
The ODA’s programme of works
included:
– the deconstruction and land

remediation of approximately
a!400 hectare (ha) site;

– the master planning and
submission of approximately 950
individual planning applications;

– the construction of infrastructure –
around 20 kilometre (km) roads,
13km tunnels, 26 bridges, new
utilities infrastructure (water, gas,
electricity and telecommunications);

– the construction of 14 permanent
and temporary sporting venues
and a 12,000 square metre (m2)
broadcast centre and 29,000m2
media centres (for commercial use
after the Games);

– construction of the Athletes’ Village
(to be converted to 2,800 homes
for sale after the Games);

– the creation of approximately
100ha of parklands, gardens and
public open space; and

– transport improvements, including
station and infrastructure works.

The ODA budget (part of the overall
public sector funding package
agreed for the Games in March
2007) was set at £8bn, including
approximately £2bn of contingency.

Table 1: London 2012 construction and infrastructure: project phases (milestones published annually)

a The London Development Agency. Responsibility for the legacy development of the
Olympic Park was transferred to the Olympic Park Legacy Company in 2010.

3

The ODA Mission: to
deliver venues, facilities,
infrastructure and
transport for the London
2012 Olympic and
Paralympic Games on
time, to budget and to
leave a lasting legacy.

Strategic framework
With extensive public funding being
injected into the ODA it was to be
expected that its objectives would
go!beyond simply delivering a
programme of construction projects.
In particular, the UK government had
committed that the Games would
leave a lasting legacy for London
and the UK. The ODA translated
this!into the following Mission and
Objectives, agreed with members
of!the Olympic Board:

ODA Mission
‘To deliver venues, facilities,
infrastructure and transport for the
London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic
Games on time, to budget and to
leave a lasting legacy’.

ODA Objectives
– To create infrastructure and

facilities associated with Games’
venues to time and agreed budget
in accordance with the principles
of sustainable development.

– To deliver Olympic and Paralympic
venues to time, to design and
building specification, and to
agreed budget, providing for
agreed legacy use.

– To deliver the necessary transport
infrastructure for the Games, and
devise and implement effective
transport plans which provide for
legacy use.

– To assist the LDA in the finalisation
of sustainable legacy plans for the
Park and all venues.

ODA priority themes
In the execution of its objectives, the
ODA also committed to contribute to
the overall London 2012 vision of a
broad legacy of economic, social
and environmental benefits for
London and the UK. To realise this,
the ODA defined six ’priority themes’
to underpin its activity as set out
below.

Published policy documents and
strategies b, outlined strategic benefits
as well as specific objectives.

Priority themes were embedded as
a!fundamental part of the overall
programme governance.

Figure 1: ODA Strategic Framework

b The ODA’s priority theme strategies. Available from: www.london2012.com/about-us/
publications (accessed 10 February 2012).

4

The ODA delivery
strategy was based on
a smaller number of
important tenets.

Delivery strategy
The overarching strategy
The ODA delivery strategy was
based on a smaller number of
important tenets:
– Getting the right people with

delivery capability on board –
fast.

– Setting a realistic budget.
– Nailing down the scope,

programme, budget and funding
early and sticking to it.

– Early and prompt decision making
– saving time will save money.

– Strong programme management.
– Allowing industry partners to

deliver.
– Active risk management from start

to finish.
– Transparency and proactivity

in!internal and external
communications.

– Maintaining a collaborative
approach with government and
industry partners.

People and delivery capability
The ODA needed to move rapidly
through the planning phase to all-out
delivery. After initial staffing of ODA
key positions, it was decided to
employ a Delivery Partner (DP) with
experience of large-scale construction
projects and proven delivery
capability. The DP selected was a
private sector consortium, CLM,
comprising a partnership from the
three parent companies of CH2M
Hill, Laing O’Rourke and Mace.

The DP was appointed both as
the!ODA’s overall programme
management partner, but also having
responsibility as Project Manager for
the major construction projects. This
was preferred over the alternative
approach of separating project and
programme management as it was
judged that there were clear
synergistic benefits of a common
programme and project manager,
and that the potential for conflicts of
interest could be managed by virtue
of having the ODA in an overall
assurance role.

Figure 2: Delivery strategy

Sub-
programme
project
delivery

CLM

Supply chain

DP project
manager

Project
delivery team

DP project
manager

Project
delivery team

DP project
manager

Project
delivery team

DP project
manager

Project
delivery team

Programme
sponsorship

Programme
delivery

ODA

CLM

Priority theme
heads

Programme
assurance

heads
Commercial

director
DP sub-

programme
managers

DP
programme

director

DP
programme

controls

Project
sponsors

ODA
accountable

directors
LDA

ODA
programme
assurance

office

Executive
management

board

Senior
responsible

owner
(ODA CEO)

5

The Programme Baseline
Report was crucial in
bottoming out areas of
scope uncertainty at an
early stage.

The rapidly changing nature of the
programme, together with the DP
concept required a dynamic approach
to organisational design and resource
management. Joint reviews (ODA
and CLM) of organisational design
took place during the programme
life!with the objective of ensuring
constant alignment of client and DP
organisational models, skills and
resources.

Despite the finite lifecycle of the
ODA!the organisation recognised the
importance of investing in people to
build leadership capability, embed
team working and resilience, and
retain and motivate staff. A tailored
learning and development
programme was deployed that
included team building (especially
between the ODA and CLM), focused
skills development, mentoring and
health and wellbeing activities.

This programme was one of the
bedrocks of the ODA’s People
Strategy and positively impacted
retention, motivation and capability.

Nailing down scope, programme,
budget and funding
The ODA documented the
programme scope and submitted
it!with detailed budget assessments
to the Ministerial Funders Group
(Funders) and the Olympic Board for
approval. The resulting Programme
Baseline Report (PBR) (a detailed
500 page description of aligned
scope, programme, budget and risk)
was published in November 2007.

It identified the items that the ODA
planned to deliver, the allocation of
risk between the ODA and Funders
(to govern any subsequent
contingency allocations) and
importantly, those items which were
out of its scope. The development
of!this document was crucial in
bottoming out areas of scope
uncertainty at an early stage in the
programme and gave the ODA a
firm footing for delivery of the
programme.

Communications and stakeholder
engagement supporting delivery
The ODA understood at the outset
that there would be huge levels of
public interest in London 2012. It
also!recognised that the project could
only be delivered in partnership and
with the support of a large coalition
of organisations, many of whom had
differing interests. As a result, the
ODA adopted a highly proactive
and!systematic communications and
stakeholder management approach
from community and political
engagement, through to daily public
site visits and media opportunities.

The strategy was to:
– embrace transparency and ensure

complete alignment between
internal and external objectives;

– maintain a drumbeat of progress
with intense focus at big moments;
and

– recognise that ’seeing is believing’,
let success speak for itself and
allow as many people as possible
to see the Park for themselves.

Programme management
Work Breakdown Structure
A Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)
was defined to organise the scope
of!work and manage delivery and
monitoring of the programme, with
individual ’projects’ defined, typically
corresponding to a single venue (for
example, the Olympic Stadium) or
element of infrastructure (for
example, Utilities). Some ’projects’
such as Logistics and Security
provided programme-wide services
as this was determined to be the
most efficient delivery and
procurement model.

Planning and approvals
Objectives for the programme as a
whole were approved by government
via the PBR described earlier. This
also outlined the definition of
individual projects, which together
made up the totality of the ODA’s
scope. Following approval of the
PBR, individual project business cases
were developed and approved by
government. These established the
project objectives, overall design
parameters (including for legacy)
and cost targets.

6

Approval of the business case
initiated the release of individual
project budgets to the ODA.
Thereafter, a rigorous change control
process maintained the critical
relationship between scope, schedule
and budget and sought to manage
any emerging ’requirements creep’.

Programme control
Although delivery responsibility was
cascaded down to project level, all
key policies and processes were
determined and implemented at a
programme level. Thus, for example,
all projects followed a standard
approach for risk management, cost
and progress reporting and change
control.

Standardising project control and
reporting was of fundamental
importance in preserving control
of!the overall cost and schedule. It
provided a consistent approach to
project management and allowed
project level data to be easily rolled
up to programme level for overall
review of performance and likely
outcomes. This in turn gave
management key data to enable
tradeoffs of resources or targets to
be!made, to achieve programme
level objectives.

Monthly ’Implementation Reviews’
with senior management reviewed
the progress of every individual
project, and allowed a programme-
wide view of risks, issues and
resources to be taken.

Figure 4: Programme breakdown

Village Transport
Venues and park
infrastructure

Developer

Stratford
projects

Village
vertical

build sub
programme

Operational
and support

projects
Other

projectsOperations
Site

platform
projects

Venues

Transport
sub

programme

Delivery
partner

Transport delivery partnersDevelopment
manager

SCDL CLM

On Park
venues

Off Park
venues

Eton
Dorney

ODA ODA
transport TTL

BAA

Network
Rail

Boroughs Highways
Agency

Lend
lease

Olympic Delivery Authority

ODA
property

Z2-7
infrastructure

Stratford
property

Stratford
infrastructure

Z1
infrastructure

Programme management *

Interface management

Project management

Client representative

* CLM is responsible for programme managing
all other areas of the programme

7

Across all aspects of
managing integration
there were two key
elements; issue
identification and
issue resolution.

Integrated planning
There were several aspects to
managing integration across the
programme. These included
dependency management (schedule
logic/construction sequencing),
design management (coherent and
compatible solutions), physical
integration (for example, two or
more!projects need to be in the same
geographical place at the same time)
and change management
(consequential impact of scope or
schedule changes particularly across
project/organisational boundaries).

Across all aspects of managing
integration there were two key
elements; issue identification and
issue resolution.

Where issues were identified and
resolved within a single project, this
was managed within the project’s
meeting and governance structures.
Generally this involved the Tier One
contractor managing the interfaces
between its Tier Two contracts.

At a programme level additional
processes were required to manage
the cross-project interfaces to ensure
that consequential impacts were
identified and programme priorities
applied in resolution.

Where escalation was required,
then!the criticality of an issue was
assessed in terms of overall
programme impact (both schedule
criticality to key delivery milestones
and managing any ’bow-wave’ effect
of delay). A key requirement for this
was the integrated programme
schedule.

Integration issues and the potential
solutions were ranked in order of
impact upon key milestones (for
example, Venue Beneficial Possession).
This ensured that decisions were
prioritised and options assessed in
the programme (as opposed to an
individual project) context.

Figure 4: Interface management

8

Transparency of the
ODA’s governance and
assurance processes
helped provide
government with
confidence that the ODA
was delivering to plan.

Programme governance
and!assurance
From the outset the ODA instituted
processes and systems, meeting
structures and delegations to ensure
strategic direction, performance
management and value for money.

The DP was fully integrated into
all!aspects of governance, from
the!Executive Management Board
downwards, and was responsible
for!leading programme and project
delivery review meetings, with
participation from the ODA.

Stakeholder meetings were also
held!on every project and for each
priority theme to ensure that key
stakeholders were kept engaged
as!projects developed.

Successful delivery of the priority
theme targets was monitored monthly
by project as part of the overall
project progress review. Dedicated
Boards for each priority theme (with
ODA Board-level participation)
assured that at a programme level
the priority themes were achieving
the!targets, and where shortfalls
were forecast, helped deploy targets
or!resources to enable delivery.

Transparency of the ODA’s
governance and assurance processes
helped provide government and
other agencies with confidence that
the ODA was delivering to plan and
helped reduce outside intervention
into the ODA’s day-to-day work.

Benefits management
and the Learning Legacy
The majority of benefits generated
by!the ODA Programme delivering
venues and infrastructure will be
realised after the transformation from
Games format to legacy, through
future sporting and regeneration
uses. The management of the direct
benefits obtained from hosting the
London 2012 Games will lie with the
London Organising Committee of the
Olympic Games and Paralympic
Games (LOCOG) and HM
Government (Department for
Culture,!Media and Sport (DCMS)-
Government Olympic Executive
(GOE)). The legacy benefits will be
delivered by other agencies, such
as!the Lea Valley Regional Park
Authority (LVRPA) and the Olympic
Park Legacy Company (OPLC).

Figure 5: Programme governance and assurance

ODA board

Executive management
board

Change board Operations board

Procurement board Commercial board Project boards and
implementation reviews

Priority theme boards

Strategy
and policy
approvals

Issues resolution

9

By setting and achieving
ambitious targets for a
range of measures
across the themes, the
ODA believes it has
made a significant
impact.

The ODA’s design philosophy was to
’design for legacy and adapt for the
Games’ and thus the long-term usage
of the buildings and infrastructure
was the primary focus of design
and!construction, with legacy targets
being included in business cases and
design briefs. The ODA has worked
closely with the OPLC to ensure that
the platform left by the ODA is
aligned with OPLC’s legacy
aspirations for the Park.

Despite not being directly responsible
for delivery of the majority of benefits,
the individual project business cases
included anticipated benefits that
were agreed with government or the
responsible agency. As the projects
were completed, and the business
cases were formally closed out,
a benefits handover plan was
created per project to ensure that
responsibility for delivery of the
benefits was passed to the
responsible agency.

An area where the ODA clearly
aimed to provide lasting benefits was
through the delivery of its priority
theme objectives. In these areas the
ODA publicly declared an aspiration
to raise the bar in the UK construction
industry in areas such as Health and
Safety, Sustainability, Equality and
Diversity, and Employment and Skills.
By setting and achieving ambitious
targets for a range of measures
across the themes, the ODA believes
it has made a significant impact.

In order that the lessons learned,
innovation and best practice from
the!ODA’s experience is captured,
disseminated and used in future
projects the ODA has established a
’Learning Legacy’ project, working
with industry and academic partners.
This will be published through a
learning legacy website.

Conclusion
The ODA’s approach to programme management and organisation
did!not contain any one magic ingredient; rather it concentrated on the
establishment of a clear delivery strategy, maintaining a high level of
transparency to all stakeholders, clear definition of scope and focused
delivery.

The appointment of a DP allowed the!ODA flexibility and agility in
responding to the differing skills required at different stages of the
programme, and the effective partnership between the ODA and the DP
underpinned the success achieved in delivery of the objectives. A clear
separation of roles between the ODA and the DP gave the DP the
freedom to execute the programme, while retaining adequate oversight
and assurance from the ODA to satisfy stakeholders that the objectives
would be achieved.

Fully integrated programme management was crucial to ensure that the
complex programme of work delivered the programme-wide benefits the
ODA had committed to, and met the cost and delivery targets agreed
with government.

10

© 2012 Olympic Delivery Authority. The official Emblems of the London 2012 Games are © London Organising Committee of the Olympic
Games and Paralympic Games Limited (LOCOG) 2007. All rights reserved.

The construction of the venues and infrastructure of the London 2012 Games is funded by the National Lottery through the Olympic Lottery
Distributor, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Mayor of London and the London Development Agency.

For more information visit: london2012.com/learninglegacy Published April 2012
Ref: ODA 2012/031

Learning Legacy

Lessons learned from the
London 2012 construction project

Foreword In July 2006, the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA)
published an ambitious timetable for the ‘big build’;
the construction of main venues and infrastructure
for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games.
Just five years later, the project has been delivered on
time and within budget.

The success of the construction project has been the
result of the hard work and dedication of the staff at the
ODA and our Delivery Partner, the 40,000 people who
have worked on the Olympic Park and Athletes’ Village
and the thousands of businesses and suppliers who
contributed to the ’big build’ from across the UK.
Together, we have delivered a world-class performance.

The area around the Olympic Park has already changed
beyond recognition and I am sure that, as well as being
a worthy stage for the world’s greatest athletes, it will
continue to be a fantastic new quarter of London for
decades to come.

To capture the lessons learned from the London 2012
construction project the ODA has worked closely with
contractors, industry partners, government bodies and
academia to document these lessons, innovations and
best-practice examples across 10 Learning Legacy themes.

Using the Learning Legacy website, publications and
associated events, our aim is to share the knowledge
from the construction of the Olympic Park to help raise
the bar within the sector and act as a showcase for
UK plc.

John Armitt
ODA Chairman

About
Learning Legacy

The ODA’s Learning Legacy project has been developed
to share the knowledge and lessons learned from the
London 2012 construction project for the benefit of
industry projects and programmes in the future,
academia and government.

A range of free material is available to download
on the Learning Legacy website, including tools and
templates used on the programme, reports written by
contractors, peer-reviewed case studies and academic
research papers: www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

Additionally, the ODA has worked with industry to
create a calendar of more than 50 events to be run
throughout 2012, providing the opportunity for the
ODA, the Delivery Partner, contractors, designers
and others to share lessons learned from the London
2012 construction project with their peers and other
practitioners in the industry. A list of organisations
delivering these events is on page 22.

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy 1

The key challenge for the ODA was to deliver designs
that met the requirements of the Games and legacy,
while providing value for money, meeting the constraints
of an immovable deadline and also London 2012’s
challenging aspirations for sustainability, accessibility,
employment, diversity, safety and security.

An area of significant design innovation driven by the
ODA was the planned use of temporary Games-time
elements, such as the Basketball Arena, alongside
permanent legacy facilities, like the Olympic Stadium,
the Aquatics Centre and the Central Park Footbridge,
which will be easily converted to a more sustainable
size after the Games. A careful and concerted focus
on design has maximised legacy benefits and
minimised waste.

Design and

engineering innovation

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy2

3

The ODA has
delivered venues
that combine flair
with functionality.

The ODA has worked with designers and contractors
to capture innovations from the design and engineering
on the Olympic Park and these are documented on
the Learning Legacy website and in a series of papers
due to be published by the Institution of Civil Engineers
throughout 2012.

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

4

Equality, inclusion,

employment and skills

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

5

Leaving a legacy
of sustainable
employment
and skills was
a priority.

By the end of the London 2012 construction project,
around 40,000 people will have experienced work on
the Olympic Park or Athletes’ Village, with thousands
of new jobs and training opportunities created. Leaving
a legacy of sustainable employment and skills was a
priority for the ODA, as was its ambition to leave an
equality legacy: to improve the construction industry’s
approach to equality and inclusion, increase the diversity
of the workforce and establish fair and transparent job
and business opportunities.

At the end of the ‘big build’, 20 per cent of the
cumulative workforce employed on the Park was from
the local area, with 15 per cent black, Asian or minority
ethnic. Three per cent were women and 1.5 per cent
were disabled people.

Other successes include implementing the skills
programme on the London 2012 construction project,
the role of the Job Brokerage in increasing diversity
and employment of local people, and the collection
of data to inform the ODA’s strategies.

The material on the Learning Legacy website reviews
the strategies employed to drive the equality, inclusion,
employment and skills agenda, to meet the challenging
targets on the project and how these can be applied to
future projects and programmes.

Equality, inclusion,

employment and skills

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

h Healt
nd safety

a
6 www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

7

The ODA
has achieved
an accident
frequency rate
of less than
1.7 reportable
accidents per
one million
working hours.

Preventing accidents and protecting the health of
the workforce was, from the start, the ODA’s number
one priority and recognised as essential to the success
of the construction programme. By implementing
a robust policy and weaving health and safety
considerations into every activity, from planning,
design and procurement, to on-site management and
clear leadership, the ODA has achieved an accident
frequency rate of less than 0.17 (1.7 reportable
accidents per one million working hours) – significantly
better than the industry average and comparable to
all UK employment sectors.

As well as focusing on preventing accidents, the ODA
operated a full occupational health service, Park Health,
to ensure the well-being of all involved in the project.
More than 2,000 workers were seen each month by
the health teams on the Park and in the Village and
occupational hygienists supported every project team.

The ODA has worked with the regulator, industry,
contractors and academia to produce a body of
independent research on factors that influenced the
health and safety performance on the London 2012
construction programme.

2,000+
workers were seen each
month by the health
teams on the Park and
in the Village.

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

8

Masterplanning

and town planning

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

9

In 2007, the ODA
submitted one of
the UK’s largest
ever planning
applications.

In 2005, when London won the bid to host the 2012
Games, the ODA was faced with the huge task of
transforming a deprived and derelict area of east London
into an Olympic Park within a very short timeframe.

A year later, the ODA published two revised Olympic
Park Masterplans for Games time and legacy
transformation. This early agreement of masterplans
helped to increase cost opportunities, minimise potential
cost increases and enable post-Games legacy planning
to be built in from the beginning.

In 2007, the ODA submitted one of the UK’s largest
ever planning applications, outlining the delivery of
the venues and infrastructure for the Games. Innovative
approaches to securing planning permissions within
the tight programme constraints were achieved through
a dedicated Planning Decisions Team working closely
with an ODA town planning promoter team.

An extensive arts and culture strategy was implemented
on the Olympic Park, which aimed to reflect the
diversity of the Park and the people who will visit it
and use it.

Together, the ODA masterplanning, town planning and
arts and culture strategies have set a new direction for
the way major regeneration projects can be delivered
in the UK and internationally.

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

Procurement and supply

chain management

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy10

11

8,000+
subcontracting
opportunities were
created by the ODA’s
construction programme.

Procurement and supply

chain management

The fundamental aim of procurement was to deliver the
required London 2012 contracts in time for construction.
Engagement of a Delivery Partner was key to this
success, enabling fast mobilisation of high quality
resources. Also at the core of the ODA’s procurement
policy was the delivery of the ODA’s wider policy
objectives in areas such as sustainability, diversity
and health and safety.

More than 8,000 subcontracting opportunities were
created by the ODA’s construction programme. The
supply chain was required to advertise all contracts
on the CompeteFor website and the ODA provided
support to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and
local businesses to apply for these contracts.

The lessons learned in the procurement include best
practice around working effectively with a Delivery
Partner, embedding policy objectives into tender
processes and contracts, supply chain management
(including insolvency prevention) and tools and
processes used to ensure effective, transparent
procurement.

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

12

Project and programme

management

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

13

The rigorous
application of
a suite of ‘best
practice’ controls
within a strict
monthly cycle
was key.

The venues and infrastructure were delivered via a
complex programme of around 50 major, interrelated
projects. These required extensive integration to
manage within the physical, financial and planning
constraints. As well as delivering the physical assets,
the ODA was committed to use the construction
programme to realise a suite of policy objectives in its
priority themes of sustainability, design, accessibility,
employment and skills, equality and inclusion, safety
and security, and legacy.

In order to ensure that all of the programme outcomes
were delivered on time, within budget and high quality,
the ODA appointed a Delivery Partner, with experience
of large-scale construction projects, to be responsible
for project and programme management.

Effective programme management including the
rigorous application of a suite of ‘best practice’ controls
within a strict monthly cycle of performance reporting
was key in providing senior management with objective
information with which to manage the programme and
drive its successful delivery.

The Learning Legacy project captures lessons learned
on the processes used, how these were applied and
the structure required to support them.

Project and programme

management

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

Sustainability

ww.london2012.com/learninglegacy14

15

98%
of materials from
demolition were reused
on the Olympic Park.

From the outset, the ODA aimed to minimise adverse
impacts on the environment and create venues, facilities
and infrastructure for the Games that leave a lasting
social, economic and environmental legacy for London
and the UK.

To achieve its sustainability goals, the ODA set itself
and its contractors working on the Park a challenging
and comprehensive range of targets that were
embedded in systems, processes, tools and the culture
of the project.

As a result, the ODA delivered new energy infrastructure
and low-carbon venues as part of its strategy to reduce
carbon emissions by 50 per cent. The Park also hosts
the largest non-potable water network in the UK, which
distributes reclaimed waste water to the venues and
contributes to a 57 per cent reduction in potable water
use. More than 98 per cent of materials from demolition
were reused on the Park and over 1.5 million cubic
metres of soil has been cleaned on site in the UK’s
largest clean-up of contaminated land, resulting in the
creation of more than 100 hectares of open space and
an enriched biodiversity.

The ODA and its Delivery Partner worked extensively
with industry and the supply chain to capture lessons
learned on sustainability and how they can be applied
to future projects and programmes.

The Park hosts
the largest
non-potable
water network
in the UK.

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

During the Games, systems and technology will
enhance spectator experience and safeguard their
comfort, safety and security. The vast majority of the
competition and management technology required
to deliver the Games will be provided by London
Organising Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic
Games (LOCOG) and its sponsors, which will build on
venue and Park systems and services spaces enabled
by the ODA.

The ODA‘s System and Technology (S&T) team was
responsible for the development and implementation
of a strategy for the delivery of systems that were fit
for purpose, capable of supporting LOCOG’s overlay,
and minimising redundancy after the Games. This
strategy focused on designing spaces to enable fit-out
by others, to accommodate emerging requirements into
venue designs.

Systems and

technology
www.london2012.com/learninglegacy16

Information management was key in handling the huge
amount of data produced during the construction of the
Park and handed over to Games and Legacy operators.

Lessons learned on S&T include issues relating to the
management of systems integration, use of information
and communication technology (ICT) tools and systems
and geospatial technology on the programme, as well
as data handover processes.

Information
management was
key in handling
the huge amount
of construction
data.

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy 17

18

Transport

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

19

It was recognised at the bid stage that creating strong
transport links in and around the Olympic Park in east
London, and providing an integrated transport system
was vital to the success of the Games.

The ODA invested more than £500 million in
infrastructure improvements such as the upgrade of
the North London line and the enhancement of Stratford
Station, to create a safe, reliable and accessible
transport system for the increased numbers of
passengers during the Games. Extensive integrated
planning on public transport and close working with
delivery partners, including Transport for London and
Network Rail, has been fundamental to success. The
result will be an enhanced public transport network to
deliver spectators to the Games, while keeping London
and the rest of the UK moving. The improvements will
also benefit east London for decades to come.

The ODA, along with the wider transport industry,
also focused on the delivery of accessible transport
and in meeting sustainability objectives. For example,
advancements have been made in the field of carbon
management: planning transport arrangements to
minimise journey requirements, and scheduling events
to maximise the available capacity on the public
transport networks.

The transport Learning Legacy will be developed
more fully as the operational aspects of the transport
challenge come to fruition in 2012.

The transport
improvements
will benefit
east London for
decades to come.

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

o gyaeArch lo
20 www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

21

Part of the legacy of the Games has been the creation
of an archaeological record preserving the past of
the Olympic Park: its origins, history, and the story
of the varied communities who have contributed to
its distinctive character.

Between 2005 and 2009, a programme of
archaeological and historical investigations was
undertaken within the Park to record, map, excavate
and analyse different aspects of the site’s past.

Before construction work began, a series of excavations
were undertaken to look for archaeological remains
on the Park site. In total, 122 evaluation trenches were
excavated across the Park with some exciting results.
One of the most spectacular finds was a 19th-century
clinker-built boat, preserved to a length of over
4.5 metres in the silts near the former head of Pudding
Mill River.

Projects were also undertaken within the community
to record the memories of the local population’s
present generations. These provided a unique record
of the area’s recent past – its social life, cultural
diversity, work in its industries and growing up during
its war-time years.

122
evaluation trenches were
excavated across the Park.

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

22

Further information The ODA has worked closely with a number of
industry and professional bodies on the Learning
Legacy project. During 2011/12, the following
organisations will be holding a series of events to
help disseminate the lessons learned from the
construction of the Olympic Park.

Association for Project Management
The Association for Project Management (APM) is
a registered charity that develops and promotes the
professional disciplines of project and programme
management. With over 19,000 individual and 500
corporate members, it is the largest professional body
of its kind in Europe.

APM will be holding a series of events in London, and
potentially elsewhere in the UK, on the lessons learned
and best practice associated with the approach the
ODA’s construction programme took to project and
programme management.

Further details are available from www.apm.org.uk

Chartered Institute of Building
The Chartered Institute of Building (CIOB) represents
professionals in the construction industry. Its mission is
to contribute to the creation of a modern, progressive,
and responsible construction industry; able to meet the
economic, environmental and social challenges faced
in the 21st century.

The CIOB’s events will focus on the lessons learned
within the leadership, project and programme
management themes of London 2012.

Further details are available from www.ciob.org
or follow on Twitter @TheCIOB.

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

23

Health and Safety Executive
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is Britain’s
national regulator for workplace health and safety.
It aims to prevent death, injury and ill health. It does so
through research, information and advice, promoting
training, new or revised regulations and codes of
practice, and working with local authority partners
by inspection, investigation and enforcement.

HSE will use its existing programme of events plus a
full range of communications channels to disseminate
to the construction industry the health and safety good
practice and lessons learned from the London 2012
construction project.

Further details are available from
www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/london-2012-games

Institution of Civil Engineers
Established in 1818, the Institution of Civil Engineers
(ICE) has 80,000 members and provides a voice for
civil engineering, continuing professional development
and promoting best practice throughout the industry.

As well as holding a series of lectures, the ICE has
produced two London 2012 special journal issues,
an online OS map of the Olympic Park and a short film
to promote the Learning Legacy project. Topics to be
covered include the masterplanning, contaminated land
treatment, venues, bridges and structures, water-use
management and transport.

Further details are available from www.ice.org.uk

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

24

Institution of Occupational Safety and Health
The Institution of Occupational Safety and Health
(IOSH) is an international professional health and safety
organisation. A membership body, IOSH supports,
develops and connects members with resources,
guidance, events and training, as well as setting
standards for health and safety.

Forthcoming events will focus on the application of
behavioural safety systems, and will give delegates the
chance to hear about ODA strategies for occupational
health and safety, contractor approaches and selected
research findings.

Further details are available from www.iosh.co.uk

Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors
The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS)
is a membership body that provides the professional
qualification in land, property, construction and
associated environmental issues. RICS acts in the public
interest to regulate high standards of competence and
integrity among members, and provides impartial,
authoritative advice for business, society and
governments worldwide.

RICS will be holding a series of events on procurement
issues surrounding the construction of the Olympic Park.
Key areas include: design and masterplanning, supply
chain management and sustainability.

Further details are available from www.rics.org/London

The Institute of Engineering and Technology
The Institute of Engineering and Technology (IET) is
Europe’s largest professional body for engineers and
technicians, with more than 150,000 members in
127 countries and offices in Europe, North America
and Asia-Pacific. The IET provides a global knowledge
network to facilitate the exchange of ideas and promote
the positive role of science, engineering and technology
in the world.

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

25

The IET will be holding a series of events in London, and
potentially the UK, on the lessons learned, innovations
and best practice on engineering for sustainable utilities
on the Olympic Park.

Further details are available from www.theIET.org

The Landscape Institute
The Landscape Institute (LI) is an educational charity
and chartered body responsible for protecting,
conserving and enhancing the natural and built
environment for the benefit of the public. It champions
well-designed and well-managed urban and rural
landscape. The LI represents 6,000 members who
include chartered landscape architects, academics,
scientists and students.

The LI will be holding a series of events around the
UK on the planning, design, construction and legacy
management of the parklands and public realm
on the Olympic Park.

Further details are available from
www.landscapeinstitute.org

UK Green Building Council
The UK Green Building Council (UK-GBC) is a
membership organisation that campaigns for
a sustainable built environment through leading
industry action, building capacity and influencing
government policy.

UK-GBC will be holding a series of events to disseminate
the sustainability lessons learned from London 2012
construction project. The series will capture a strategic
and detailed account of the successes and challenges
in constructing a sustainable Games.

Further details are available from www.ukgbc.org

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

26

Acknowledgements The ODA would like to thank the following organisations
for their contribution to the Learning Legacy project.

Action Sustainability Chartered Institute
of Building Services Allies and Morrison Engineers

Art in the Open Chartered Institute of
Arup Environmental Health

Association for Project CIRIA
Management Contaminated Land:
Atkins Applications in Real

Environments (CL:AIRE)Balfour Beatty
CLMBAM Nuttall
Constructing ExcellenceBarhale
Construction Products BDSP Association

Bentley Construction Skills
Bip Solutions Community and Trade
BioRegional Union Learning Centre

Bravo Department for
Environment, Food and Buckingham Group Rural Affairs (Defra)

Building Research Department for Work and Establishment Pensions (Job Centre Plus)
Business in the Community Equality and Human
Buro Happold Rights Commission

Commission for Entrepreneurs in Action
Architecture and the Built Engineering Construction Environment (CABE) Industry Association
Cambridge University Environment Agency
Cardiff University Expedition Engineering
Carillion Fenton Hollway
Chartered Institute Frontlineof Building

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

27

G4S

Greater London Assembly

Health and
Executive

Safety

Health and
Laboratories

Safety

Homes and
Agency

Communities

Hopkins Architects

Imperial College, London

Institute of Engineering
and Technology

Institute for Sustainability

Institution of
Civil Engineers

Institute
Studies

for Employment

Institution of Occupational
Safety and Health

ISG

Klassnic

KLH Sustainability

Lagan

LDA Design
Hargreaves


Associates

Lend Lease

London Borough
of Hackney

London Borough
of Newham

London Borough
of Tower Hamlets

London Citizens

London Concrete

Loughborough University

Major Projects Association

Manchester Business
School

Natural England

Philips

Populous

QinetiQ

Reading University

Royal College of Art

Royal Institute of
British Architects

Royal Institution of
Chartered Surveyors

RPS Group

Skanksa

Southfacing Services

Sir Robert McAlpine

Sutton-Vane Associates

The Landscape Institute

Thames Water

Transport for London

University College London

UK Green Building
Council

UK Power Networks

Up Projects

Waste
Action

& Resources
Programme

Waterwise

Wessex Archaeology

Zaha Hadid Architects

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

Recognition The ODA is proud to have won the following awards
that acknowledge the successes and achievements
of the London 2012 construction project.

2008
Remediation Innovation
Awards: Best use of a
combination of techniques

2009
RTPI National
2009: To
Award

Awards
day’s Leaders’

RTPI National Awards
2009: Equality and
Diversity Awards

Association for Project
Management: Project of
the Year – Power Lines
Underground (PLUG)

Noise Abatement Society:
John Connell Awards

Edie: Sustainable
Construction Award

Landscape Institute: Urban
Design/Master Planning
Category

Constructing Excellence
National Awards: Legacy
Award – Sustainability

Regen and Renewal
Awards 2009:
Environmentally
sustainable regeneration
scheme of the year

Procurement Leaders
Awards: Best Procurement
Team

2010
Opportunity Now:
Innovation award

ICE London Civil
Engineering Awards:
Greatest Contribution to
London Award: London
2012 Olympic Park
Enabling Projects

First Women Awards:
Business of the Year

PPMA Awards: HR Awards

British Construction
Industry Awards: Major
Project category –
Enabling works

Breakthrough UK
Independent Living
Awards: Accessible
Public Transport

Structural Steel Design
Awards: Structural Steel
Design Awards 2010 –
Aquatics

Women of the Future
Awards 2010: Women
of the Future Corporate
Award

Building Public Trust
awards: Excellence’
in Reporting in the
Public Sector

Institution of Civil
Engineers: Edmund
Hambly Medal – Enabling
Works

www.london2012.com/learninglegacy

2011
ICE London Civil
Engineering Awards:
Building Award –
Velodrome

Faculty of
Medicine:
Award

Occupational
Wilf Howe

Building Magazine:
– Personality of the Year
(then ODA Chief
Executive David Higgins)
– Client of the Year
– Integrated Supply Chain

of the Year

Business Commitment
to the Environment (BCE):
The Sir Peter Parker Award

RIBA: London Awards
(shortlisted for Stirling
Prize) – Velodrome

Chartered Institute for
Purchasing and Supply:
– Best Public Procurement
– Overall Winner

Constructing Excellence
(London and South East):
– Project of the Year
– Health and Safety

Award

RoSPA Occupational
Health Award: The Astor
Trophy

The British Safety Council:
Sword of Honour

28

Olympic Delivery Authority
23rd Floor, One Churchill Place
Canary Wharf, London E14 5LN
Reception +44 (0) 20 3 2012 000
Fax +44 (0) 20 3 2012 001
london2012.com

This publication is available on request in other languages and formats.
To obtain these please:
Email [email protected]
Phone +44 (0)3 2012 000
Quoting reference number ODA 2011/263
This document can be found in the publications section of london2012.com

© 2011 Olympic Delivery Authority. The official Emblems of the London 2012 Games
are © London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Ltd
(LOCOG) 2007. All rights reserved.

The construction of the venues and infrastructure for the London 2012 Games is funded by
the National Lottery through the Olympic Lottery Distributor, the Department for Culture,
Media and Sport, the Mayor of London and the London Development Agency.

The emblems of the National Lottery, the London Development Agency, the Department
of Culture, Media and Sport, and the Mayor of London are reproduced with the permission
of the Crown and the other copyright holders respectively. All rights reserved.

This document is printed at an environmentally aware ISO14001-certified
printer on recycled paper.
Published October 2011. ODA 2011/263

  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 1
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 10
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 11
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 12
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 13
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 14
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 15
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 16
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 17
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 18
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 19
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 2
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 20
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 21
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 22
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 23
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 24
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 25
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 26
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 27
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 28
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 29
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 3
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 30
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 31
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 32
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 4
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 5
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 6
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 7
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 8
  • ODA_Learning Legacy_AW 9

Transport for London
investment programme
report
Extended Quarter 1 2020/21
(1 April 2020 – 1 August 2020)

Contents

3 Introduction

5 Mayor’s Transport Strategy themes

6 Business at a glance

7 2020/21 strategic milestone performance strategy

8 Major projects
8 Line upgrades
11 Network extensions
16 Future projects

17 London Underground
17 Stations
18 Accessibility
19 Track renewals
19 Power, cooling and energy
20 Rolling stock renewals
21 Signalling and control

22 Surface
22 Healthy Streets
25 Air quality
27 Asset investment
28 Public transport
30 Surface technology

32 Other
32 Technology and data
35 Growth Fund
36 Elizabeth line
38 Crossrail

39 Appendix
39 2020/21 strategic milestone performance

Please note that safety and sustainability information will no longer be
referenced in this report. There is a quarterly Safety, Sustainability and
Human Resources Report published on our website, which provides an
overview of health, safety and environmental performance for London
Underground, TfL Rail, Surface Transport and Crossrail services.

Transport for London quarterly performance report 2

Introduction
This report provides an update on a range of projects that will create
world-class transport services in London

The quarterly investment programme
report gives a progress update on the
major projects and sub-programmes
that seek authority each year (unless
extraordinary approvals are needed) to the
Programmes and Investment Committee.

For each major project or programme, the
financial and milestone data represents
the position at the end of the quarter
and we include commentary for key
achievements and progress made. The
report also contains, as far as possible,
updates on any notable progress made
after quarter end.

For a programme and project with a defined
start and end, we include when it is planned
to be substantially complete and being used
by customers. Works that are delivered
in a prioritised sequence, such as road
resurfacing or track renewal, are referred
to as ‘annual’ as they are controlled and
measured within each financial year. This
report only includes progress on committed
projects and programmes.

Financial records of spend to date,
authority and Estimated Final Costs
(EFC) represent the entire duration of
each separate project or programme,
except for annual portfolios where
spend to date, authority and EFC figures
represent the current financial year. Where
authority is significantly lower than EFC,
it has been given for the current stage
of works and further authority will be
sought when appropriate.

To ensure continued transparency across
our organisation, the reporting EFC for
projects is based on the current risk profile
and opportunity realisation at the time of
publication. As a result, project EFC could
fluctuate every quarter, however, this
does not automatically mean there is an
increase in spend authority.

Owing to the coronavirus pandemic
there is an unprecedented impact on our
projects and programmes. As such, we are
unable to accurately assess the full impact
on our EFCs.

We also include cumulative EFC
movements for savings and efficiencies
that have been embedded since our 2018
Business Plan, while protecting safety,
services and reliability. Numbers in
brackets represent an EFC increase and
numbers without brackets represent an
EFC decrease. Commentary is provided for
cumulative movements greater than £2m.

This report does not contain commercially
sensitive information and therefore some
EFCs and authorities are marked with
an asterisk until the main contract has
been awarded. On schemes where there
is commercial confidentiality, the EFC,
authority and spend to date may also
be withheld.

All financial figures are gross and may
not appear to align with costs detailed
in the TfL Budget, which are net of any
third-party funding. In addition to the
committed projects and programmes
included in this report, we will be seeking
to obtain capital spend authority for
schemes such as the Bakerloo Line
Extension and Crossrail 2.

Each programme or project also has an
overall RAG milestone status, which
represents the average forecast date
variance against plan for 2020/21
strategic milestones:

On time or early:

Up to 89 days late:

90 or more days late:

N/A (without 2019/20 strategic milestones):

Transport for London investment performance report 3

The strategic milestones for the first half
of 2020/21 – the key milestones listed in the
TfL Budget – are detailed in the Appendix
(page 39).

Our investment programme is delivered by
the following areas of the business: Major
projects, London Underground, Surface
and Other and the report structure
reflects this

• Major projects is responsible for our
largest and most complex projects. It
comprises line upgrades such as the
Piccadilly line upgrades and the Four
Line Modernisation, network extensions,
and major station upgrades, which are
covered on pages eight to 15 of this
report. Future projects (see page 16) will
be reported in detail following financial
authority approval

• London Underground comprises
stations, accessibility, track renewals,
power, cooling and energy, rolling stock
renewals and signalling and control,
which are covered in pages 17 to 21

• Surface Transport comprises Healthy
Streets, Air quality, Public transport and
Asset investment. These are covered in
pages 22 to 31

• Other comprises technology and data,
TfL Growth Fund and the Elizabeth line
(including Crossrail), which are covered
in pages 32 to 38

The impact of the coronavirus pandemic
In March, to help fight the spread of
COVID-19, the Government and the
Mayor gave clear instructions to stay
safe and to stop travelling in all cases
other than people making absolutely
essential journeys.

For this reason, we brought all our
construction projects, including Crossrail,
to a temporary Safe Stop unless they
needed to continue for operational safety
reasons. We continued with essential
maintenance of the transport network.

This was done to ensure the safety of
our construction and project teams and
also to further reduce the number of
people travelling on the public transport
network. It was vital that the transport
network is only used for absolutely
essential journeys.

For each project where work has restarted
on site, a full review of the working
practices was undertaken, together with
submissions from the supply chain on how
they would manage their site and their
workforce in accordance with the social
distancing guidelines. These were then
subject to a peer review of construction
managers and work only restarted once
this process had been completed.

Safety is at the heart of everything we do Transport for London investment performance report 4

Mayor’s Transport
Strategy themes
The Mayor’s Transport Strategy sets out a bold vision for a
growing, welcoming London, where 80 per cent of journeys
will be made by walking, cycling or public transport by 2041.

We are making streets healthy, pleasant and productive places
to stop at, travel through and live on. Listening to and acting
on suggestions from our customers will enable us to make
walking, cycling and public transport the first choice for the
vast majority of trips, and everyday operational excellence
will unlock the new jobs and homes our city needs.

This report looks at our investment programme in respect of
the following themes from the Mayor’s Transport Strategy:

• Healthy Streets and healthy people

• A good public transport experience

• New homes and jobs

Streetspace opens up more space for Londoners to walk and cycle

Business at a glance
Keeping London moving, working and growing to make life in our city better

How we report on our business

Underground
London Underground

Elizabeth line
Currently operating as TfL Rail

Buses, streets and
other operations
London Buses, Transport for London
Road Network, London Dial-a-Ride,
London River Services, Santander
Cycles, Victoria Coach Station and
Emirates Air Line

Rail
DLR, London Overground and
London Trams

Major projects
Responsible for our largest and
most complex projects

Property development
Our commercial and residential
estate and building portfolio

Media
Advertising estate and digital
marketing infrastructure

Facts and figures

979 Trains on the
TfL network

580km
TfL-operated
highways

755km
TfL-operated Rail and London
Underground routes

9,330
Buses on the
TfL network

6,300
Traffic signals
operated by TfL

2020/21 Emergency Budget at a glance

Grants
£4.7bn

Passenger
income
£1.5bn

Other
income
£0.6bn

Use of borrowing,
working capital
and cash reserves
£0.6bn

Crossrail
funding
£0.8bn

82%
spent on running and operating
the network every day

18%
spent on renewing and improving

the network through one of the
largest capital investment

programmes in Europe

Sources of funds

£8.7bn

!”#$%&’$&(#$#)*$+ &,$-&*.”(‘/*$+&%0#&$#%)'(1&%0(‘2+0&’$#&’3&%0#&4,(+#!%&5,”*%,4&*$/#!%.#$%&
“(‘+(,..#!&*$&62(‘”# &

Cash reserve
movements
£0.5bn

Total passenger income

TfL RailBuses

RailLondon Underground

£0.9bn
(60%)

£0.1bn
(7%)

£0.4bn
(26%)

£1.5bn
total passenger

income

£0.1bn
(7%)

Total costs

Net financing

Crossrail New capital investment

Capital renewalsOperating cost

£0.5bn
(6%)

£0.8bn
(9%)

£0.3bn
(3%)

£6.4bn
(74%)

£0.7bn
(8%)

£8.7bn
total costs

Transport for London investment performance report 6

2020/21 strategic milestone
performance strategy
The overall performance for all
TfL 2020/21 strategic milestones is
summarised as follows:

Late – 90 or more days

Late – up to 89 days

On time or early

0

(0%)

2
(18.2%)

9
(81.8%)

The late milestones are shown in the
Appendix on page 39.

Project milestones are shown as green, amber or red

Major projects
Line upgrades

Four Lines Modernisation

Forecast
completion year

2023

Spend to
date (£m)

4,926

Spend
authority (£m)

5,412
EFC (£m)

5,339

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

14

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

We have introduced 192 new S-stock trains on
the Circle, District, Hammersmith & City and
Metropolitan lines.

The first section of the signalling system operating
between Hammersmith and Euston Square and
up to Finchley Road on the Metropolitan line, was
extended in Quarter 2 2019/20.

The operation of the new signalling system was
extended from Latimer Road to Euston Square
on the Circle and Hammersmith & City lines, and
from there to Finchley Road on the Metropolitan
line, and to Paddington on the District and Circle
lines. This was a significant step for the project as it
continues to boost capacity.

Quarter 1 2020 saw a Safe Stop of all site works in
response to the coronavirus pandemic. To mitigate
the financial impact of this, 55 per cent of our team
were furloughed. The programme was authorised
to restart site works from 6 June 2020. Due to
much of the works being inside and/or in small
spaces, such as cabs, a staged approach was taken
to maintain the safety of staff while restarting
targeted works.

Signalling software development work
continued with Thales throughout the
pandemic and continues to support
testing and go-live plans for year 2020/21.

While virtually all works were
stopped a small number of targeted
interventions were undertaken to further
drive system reliability. These works
required innovation and cooperation
during the lockdown to ensure staff
safety and deliver increased reliability.

The coronavirus pandemic resulted in
the suspension of District line operator
training for the new Communication Based
Train Control. While this is being restarted
there remains a risk on the availability
of trained and familiarised operators
to support service. This may result in a
further delay of the planned go-live date.

In response to the ongoing financial
challenge, the programme has
implemented a number of measures to
minimise expenditure through furlough,
challenging scope and rephasing of works.

The above measures, combined with the
Safe Stop and progressive return to site
works, have had an impact of up to five
months on a range of key milestones. The
complex interaction of these changes in
combination with the annual timetable
change cycle is under review. However,
it is likely that the introduction of new
timetables, increasing train frequency in
the central area, may be delayed.

The programme continues to drive toward
delivering within the Emergency Budget.
There are a number of pressures however
work is ongoing, in collaboration with our
key suppliers, to determine confidence in
the outcome for the year.

The combined effect of the coronavirus
pandemic delays and the complexity of
re-planning the closure-based works
integrating future events in London, is
expected to lead to an extension of the
programme. While this planning activity
remains ongoing it is anticipated that the
EFC will increase to reflect this delay. The
re-planning and revised cost estimate
will be complete in line with the next
Investment programme report.

The EFC reflects the revised
budget and is based on
information available at that time.
Within Major projects a series of
deep-dive reviews is underway,
assessing and challenging cost
and schedule. These reviews
will provide an update on the
full impacts of the coronavirus
pandemic and related issues.

There was a strategy to drive down
costs to ensure later increases in
the complex programme could be
dealt with efficiently. Reductions
were achieved through value
engineering solutions, innovation
and providing optimum scope to
bring the planned benefits.

Transport for London investment performance report 8

Railway System Enhancements (formerly World Class Capacity)

Forecast
completion year

2024

Spend to
date (£m)

130

Spend
authority (£m)

245
EFC (£m)

181

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

14

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

This programme includes upgrades to signalling,
power, trains and track to maximise capacity on
the Jubilee and Northern lines with the existing
train fleets.

While many of the works are standalone, a
significant proportion are essential to other
programmes, including further upgrades to the
Jubilee line, the opening of the Northern Line
Extension, as well as the reconfiguration of the
Northern line at Bank.

To enable the new capacity works, we have
completed speed improvement and track works
to the Northern line and continue to focus on
delivering power enhancement works, including an
upgrade to the signalling software on the Northern
line. A new wheel lathe has been delivered to
Morden depot and its commissioning is getting
underway. We have remobilised our sites following
the Safe Stop and are now operating in a COVID-19
secure way, the full impact of this is being assessed.

On the Jubilee line, a new wheel lathe has been
delivered to Stratford Market depot and the tender
response for a signalling upgrade has been received
and is being considered as part of the wider Jubilee
line enhancements. The continued business
requirement, priority and timing of proposed
capacity enhancements to the Jubilee line are
being reviewed as part of the challenges caused by
the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.

The EFC reflects the revised
budget and is based on
information available at that time.
Within Major projects a series of
deep-dive reviews is underway
assessing and challenging both
cost and schedule. These reviews
will provide an update on the
full impacts of the coronavirus
pandemic and related programme
issues. The output of the reviews
will be reflected in the next
Investment programme report.

The EFC has reduced since the
2019 Business Plan as a result
of realising savings of £18m on
uncommitted power works,
following an assessment of
the required resilience works.
This has been offset by an
increase in risk of £2m across the
programme and an increase of
the uncommitted cost estimate
of £2m – this is being reviewed
further. The impacts of the
coronavirus pandemic remain
under review.

DLR Rolling Stock and Systems Integration

Forecast
completion year

2025

Spend to
date (£m)

56

Spend
authority (£m)

603
EFC (£m)

603

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

0

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

New DLR trains and infrastructure are vital to
support the regeneration of the east London area.

Sixty per cent of the existing DLR fleet will be
replaced as part of this programme and it will
provide increased capacity on the line. The
Beckton depot will be extended, with sidings for
the new trains, a new maintenance facility and a
new automatic train operation test track. Thales
automatic train operation signalling system will be
updated and the traction power strengthened.

The contract for the next generation of DLR trains
by Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles is
under way. Preliminary design is complete and final
design has started. The manufacture of fixtures
and items for the new trains has begun. A 1:1 scale
mock-up of the train has been manufactured and
is being shipped to the UK.

There has been a 12-week impact on train manufacture
as a result of the coronavirus pandemic and a revised
depot delivery strategy has been implemented,
resulting in the deferral of the Southern Sidings works
from 2020/21 to 2022/23. This allows the Northern
Sidings to proceed to the revised programme. The
Thales signalling system update has proceeded to
plan with the completion of the Preliminary Design.

Cost impacts and additional risk has increased
by £6m however it is proposed to offset these
increases through reduction in other risk allowances.

The EFC reflects the revised
budget and is based on
information available at that time.
Within Major projects a series of
deep-dive reviews is underway
assessing and challenging both
cost and schedule. These reviews
will provide an update on the
full impacts of the coronavirus
pandemic and related programme
issues. The output of the reviews
will be reflected in the next
Investment programme report.

Transport for London investment performance report 9

Piccadilly Line Upgrade – rolling stock (formerly Deep Tube Upgrade Programme)

Forecast
completion year

2027

Spend to
date (£m)

196

Spend
authority (£m)

3,294
EFC (£m)

2,936

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

28

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

This programme is designed to deliver a fleet of
newly designed, high-capacity, walk-through, air-
cooled trains to replace some of the oldest on
our network.

Due to affordability challenges caused from the
coronavirus pandemic, we had to enact a six-month
deferral to key infrastructure works supporting the
new train introduction. Trains are now due to arrive
prior to infrastructure works being ready to receive
them. The forecast date for first train into passenger
service is now April 2025 (from October 2024). The
ambition is to pull this delay back over time.

The preliminary design for the new trains has
continued to plan. Collaborative discussions are
ongoing with Siemens Mobility Ltd about the
impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the train
delivery schedule, which has resulted in a forecast
four-month delay to detailed design completion.
This is now forecast for completion in February
2021 (from October 2020). This is still in advance of
the planned milestone in March 2021.

The One Person Operation CCTV contract
has been awarded.

To introduce new rolling stock, we need
to reinforce and upgrade the London
Underground High Voltage power network.
We have approval for the High Voltage
Power Procurement Strategy, this will
enable the High Voltage Design and Build
Framework Supplier Questionnaire to be
released to the market, the first step in
this process.

The current train radio systems are
obsolete, so we are working with Connect
to develop a new radio in time for the
introduction of the new rolling stock. The
concept design work for this is complete.

The Piccadilly Line Upgrade will drive
down costs while delivering significant
safety and sustainability improvements.
As part of this we are working with
the Department for Transport (DfT),
Network Rail and the supply chain
under the Transport Infrastructure
Efficiency Strategy and will be delivering
three example projects. An updated
Collaboration Agreement was issued and
is close to being settled from respective
legal teams. This agreement will facilitate
supplier contracts to be issued to allow
full commencement of these projects.

The EFC reflects the revised
budget and is based on
information available at that time.
Within Major projects a series of
deep-dive reviews is underway
assessing and challenging both
cost and schedule. These reviews
will provide an update on the
full impacts of the coronavirus
pandemic and related programme
issues. The output of the reviews
will be reflected in the next
Investment programme report.

Since the 2019 Business Plan
£54m of cost reductions have
been identified. Of this, £29m
relates to risk and uncertainty
mitigation. These savings are
offset by a £10m increase in
project length as a result of the
emergency budget decision to
defer third party contract spend
by six months where possible,
increase in new rolling stock
scope for anti-dragging doors and
enhanced cab security and other
minor increases.

Transport for London investment performance report 10

Network extensions

Northern Line Extension

Forecast
completion year

2021

Spend to
date (£m)

952

Spend
authority (£m)

*

* This information is withheld for reasons of commercial sensitivity

*

* This information is withheld for reasons of commercial sensitivity

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

*

* This information is withheld for reasons of commercial sensitivity

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

The Northern Line Extension is a twin-tunnelled
extension from Kennington to a new terminus
at Battersea Power Station, via a new station at
Nine Elms. This supports the regeneration of the
Vauxhall Nine Elms Battersea Opportunity Area.

As a result of the coronavirus pandemic all site
work on the Northern Line Extension was safely
stopped on 24 March 2020. Site work restarted
on 27 May 2020, which resulted in a 64-day
construction delay across the programme. We
continue to work with our supply chain to assess
the coronavirus-related impacts and our target
date for achieving train service availability between
Kennington and Battersea remains Autumn 2021.
However, we have now used up our contingency
so any further events like a second wave of
the coronavirus pandemic would impact the
completion date.

During the site Safe Stop period we
continued working remotely, undertaking
off-site manufacturing where possible,
detailed design and producing Assurance
documentation required for achieving the
High Voltage 22kV Power-on milestone
which was due in June and as a result of
the coronavirus-related stoppage is now
reforecast for early October 2020. We
were able to undertake some limited but
critical works on site, using an exemption
process to work within the High Voltage
switchgear rooms at Kennington which
were undertaken adhering to Public Health
England guidelines.

In dealing with the impact of the
coronavirus pandemic on our works
programme, we have embraced new ways
of working, including the use of technology.
The Railway Systems team has successfully
undertaken virtual factory acceptance
testing of the Emergency Traction Current
Discharge System and train radio, with all
tests passed successfully.

To facilitate the re-opening of the
Northern Line Extension sites on 27 May
we implemented measures across all sites
to comply with social distancing, such
as coronavirus-related signage, thermal
cameras at site entrances, and segregation
screening in the communal areas.

At Battersea, the remainder of the roof
slab of the new station box was handed
over to the Battersea Power Station
Development Company, to enable the
continuation of the next phases of their
oversite development.

At the new Kennington Park and Green
shafts, external brickwork cladding is
being applied to the headhouses. Cable
management system, CCTV, tunnel
ventilation and ducting installation have
all restarted. Landscaping works are due to
start in late August.

Our main focus beyond Quarter 1 will be
fitting-out the new stations, installing
and switching on the High Voltage power
supply, and extending the signalling used
on the Northern line into the extension.

The EFC reflects the revised
budget and is based on
information available at that
time. In Major projects a series of
deep-dive reviews is underway
assessing and challenging both
cost and schedule. These reviews
will provide an update on the
full impacts of the coronavirus
pandemic and related programme
issues. The output of the reviews
will be reflected in the next
Investment programme report.

Assessment of the full impact
of the coronavirus pandemic is
ongoing and discussions continue
with the main works contractor
over both cost and schedule.

EFC (£m)

Transport for London investment performance report 11

Silvertown Tunnel

Forecast
completion year

2025

Spend to
date (£m)

65

Spend
authority (£m)

*

* This information is withheld for reasons of commercial sensitivity.

EFC (£m)

*

* This information is withheld for reasons of commercial sensitivity.

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

*

* This information is withheld for reasons of commercial sensitivity.

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

The Silvertown Tunnel will tackle traffic congestion at the Blackwall Tunnel and the knock-on
effects on travel, the environment, the economy and growth across the southeast of London.

The tunnel will connect Silvertown
and the Greenwich Peninsula, which
are areas subject to significant planned
redevelopment in future. The new tunnel,
within the extended Ultra Low Emission
Zone (ULEZ), will effectively eliminate
congestion and help improve air quality,
with no increase in carbon emissions. It will
allow for a transformative new cross-river
bus network for east London, with plans for
at least 20 buses per hour in each direction,
all of which are expected to be zero
emission. There is currently only a single
bus route through the Blackwall Tunnel –
the least reliable TfL bus route in London.

User charging at the Silvertown and
Blackwall Tunnels, set by us, is a
fundamental part of the scheme, helping
to manage traffic levels for the long term.

Following an extensive tender process,
the design, build, finance and maintenance
contract was awarded to Riverlinx
consortium on 21 November 2019. We are
in discussions to arrange the relevant
agreements for land access. We are

working with the utility companies to
plan the required service diversions.
We keep monitoring existing structures
and noise levels ahead of construction.
Contracts have recently been awarded
for support to the next stages of traffic,
environment and socio-economic
monitoring and associated mitigations.

Ground investigation works have begun
along with utility surveys and pavement,
ecological and contaminated land survey
works. Marine works began in June 2020.
The start of construction notice was placed
in the London Gazette on 5 August enabling
new byelaws at the Blackwall Tunnel to
support existing network operations.

The programme impact in relation to the
coronavirus pandemic Safe Stop on 25
March 2020 and subsequent restart of
the works from 27 May 2020 is likely to
extend the Planned Permit to Use date. We
are continuing to work through a revised
programme with Riverlinx, including
potential acceleration measures.

The Silvertown Tunnel project will link Silvertown to Greenwich Peninsula

Barking Riverside Extension

Forecast
completion year

2022

Spend to
date (£m)

172

Spend
authority (£m)

287
EFC (£m)

*

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

*

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

We are delivering a new rail link to serve the 10,800
new homes planned for the Barking Riverside
development area.

We will build a spur from the Tilbury Loop line
east of Barking, to extend our service to a new
station at Barking Riverside. The overall length of
the extension is approximately 4.5km from Barking
station; it includes modifications to the existing
Network Rail infrastructure and new lines running
on a viaduct of approximately 1.5km. A four-carriage
London Overground service running at 15-minute
intervals is planned.

During Quarter 1, the coronavirus pandemic
severely hampered project progress. A safe site
shut down was completed on 26 March 2020 and
on-site activities restarted on 8 June 2020. During
this time only safety critical activities, such as
inspections of temporary works, or high priority
tasks which could be delivered in accordance with
Public Health England’s guidelines, were granted
‘exemptions’ to be undertaken.

While the site was closed, an exemption
was granted for a contractor working for
the City of London to remove a series
of pylons adjacent to the viaduct. The
opportunity to complete these works,
while the main works contractor was off-
site, has de-risked the programme and
achieves a key condition for the eventual
hand back of land at the end of the project.

Other activities that were granted
exemptions include delivery of materials
to the station site, ensuring the team
were well placed for remobilisation, and
preparations for the installation of the
steel framework for the Barking Riverside
station building. The implementation of
coronavirus mitigation measures that
enable greater social distancing of the
workforce, such as additional welfare
facilities, one way walking routes and
installing body temperature cameras, was
also completed prior to the restart.

During the safe site shut down we
completed the designs, asset protection
agreements and procurement arrangements
required to resolve the remaining utilities
issues preventing piling for the viaduct.
Also, following the cancellation of a
major signalling stage (Stage 9) that
was due to take place at Easter 2020,
extensive re-planning of the Rail System
workstream was undertaken. Stage 9
signalling commissioning is now planned
for December 2020 and stakeholder
engagement to secure the possessions of
Network Rail infrastructure required to
deliver the revised plan is ongoing.

Easing of national lockdown arrangements
and confirmation that the site is COVID-19
Secure enabled the project to restart.
Following a period of remobilisation,
including inductions to revised working
arrangements, works to divert the Thames
Water sludge main at Pier 14 have been
completed. This allows removal of the
redundant main prior to commencement
of piling in this area. At Pier 13, completion
of the pile cap redesign, engagement
with UKPNS and establishment of vibration
monitoring to safeguard High Speed 1 power
cables, has enabled installation of sacrificial
sheet piling ahead of the bored piling.

Rail systems works during weekend
possessions has restarted with successful
delivery of permanent way, overhead
line equipment, signalling and telecoms
activities through June and July. All
signalling gantries on the existing network
required for the Barking Riverside Extension
have now been installed. Possessions have
also been used for viaduct construction
adjacent to and crossing the operational
railway, including piling for the approach
ramp and lifting of steel beams into place
for deck spans.

At the station, the main steel frame and
platform canopy are complete, the lower
canopy steelwork is well underway, and
blockwork has started. On the south
viaduct all pile caps have been poured,
pier walls are well progressed and deck
spans have been installed. On the north
viaduct piling is required at the last two pier
locations (Piers 13 and 14) and piling for the
approach ramp continues.

During Quarter 1, the EFC has
been significantly impacted
by the delay costs from the
coronavirus pandemic, and the
impact of buried utility services
and mitigations to redesign the
infrastructure and settle a number
of compensation events.

The full impact of these factors on
the EFC is still to be determined,
with a full project review under
way. The project continues to
review all options to mitigate cost
increases, as well as formalise the
contractual position with the main
works contractor.

* This information is withheld for reasons of commercial sensitivity

Transport for London investment performance report 13

Bank station upgrade

Forecast
completion year

2022

Spend to
date (£m)

525

Spend
authority (£m)

656
EFC (£m)

701

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

(38)

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

We are boosting capacity at Bank station by 40 per
cent. This includes creating a new Northern line
tunnel, platform and circulation spaces, a new
entrance on Cannon Street, the introduction of
step-free access to the Northern line, additional
interchange between the DLR platforms and two
new moving walkways between the Central and
Northern lines.

The project was significantly impacted by the
coronavirus pandemic with all site activities
safely stopped for nine weeks. The project has
remobilised following extensive reconfiguration
of the site including implementation of one-way
systems, additional welfare facilities and updated
working procedures so that social distancing
guidelines can be followed. The project is fully
mobilised and has returned to pre-coronavirus
activity levels.

All four of the new escalator barrels in the new
parts of the station are now completed. The last
of these being from the Northern line to the DLR
level. All but one of the additional new cross
passages are now completed. Tunnelling is now
nearly completed and by Quarter 3 the project will
have completed all civil and tunnelling works.

With tunnelling and secondary lining
works that form a new link to the Central
line, now complete, work has started on
installing the support structures for the
new moving walkways. This will reduce the
journey time from the Northern line to
Central line.

The new station entrance on Cannon
Street continues to take shape with
interior wall construction and floor
screeding completed. Works to fit out
services have now started. We have taken
delivery of nine of the 12 new escalators
that have been manufactured. These
are now undergoing final preparation in
readiness for installation in early 2021.

In this quarter we have carried out
enabling works during several Northern
line and DLR closures to prepare the
existing parts of the station for the new
tunnel connections.

Due to the impact of the coronavirus
pandemic, the proposed window for the
start of the Northern line (Bank branch)
closure has been delayed to October
2021 – January 2022. The closure will tie
in the new southbound running tunnel
constructed as part of the project, which
creates wider Northern line platforms at
the station.

Cable pulling of the High Voltage cables
that will feed the new station entrance has
been completed and the remaining works
are on schedule to enable the power to be
turned on in early 2021.

The EFC reflects the revised
budget and is based on
information available at that
time. In Major projects a series of
deep-dive reviews is underway
assessing and challenging both
cost and schedule. These reviews
will provide an update on the
full impacts of the coronavirus
pandemic and related programme
issues. The output of the reviews
will be reflected in the next
Investment programme report.

The increase in EFC since the 2019
Business Plan reflects the latest
view of the programme’s risk and
opportunities and the impact
of the coronavirus pandemic
which includes Safe Stop, Safe
Start and prolonging the project.
Further analysis of the impact
of the coronavirus pandemic
is ongoing which could affect
the current EFC. Risk mitigation
reviews are continuing, along
with opportunities to reduce
the current EFC. We continue
to collaborate with the main
works contractor to identify
and realise potential savings
and mitigate the impact of the
coronavirus pandemic.

Transport for London investment performance report 14

High Speed 2

Forecast
completion year

2028

Spend to
date (£m)

12

Spend
authority (£m)

11
EFC (£m)

80

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

(34)

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

High Speed 2 (HS2) is a new high-speed railway
connecting London to the West Midlands and the
North of England. Our work consists of new TfL
assets, infrastructure and operational facilities at
Euston and Old Oak Common.

The HS2 project has not suffered any material
delay or setback from the coronavirus pandemic,
with project teams in both organisations
successfully transitioning to a remote working
environment and are continuing to collaborate with
each other. HS2 Ltd’s construction partners carried
out a safe-stop of all their London construction
sites in March, but the majority were back in
operation by the end of April following a carefully
planned and risk-based review.

Following the Government’s announcement in
February to give the project the go ahead and the
publication of the Oakervee review we have taken
part in the DfT-led ‘OneEuston’ high level review of
requirements which concluded at the end of July.
The review seeks to determine the most effective
way to deliver HS2 at Euston, while recognising
the design requirements and constraints from all
stakeholders, including HS2, Network Rail, Lend
Lease, the London Borough of Camden and us.

We are working with HS2 Ltd to support
the early works programme to minimise
disruption at Euston and on the
Hampstead Road, including alternative
solutions for utilities diversions to
minimise the impact on the road network,
and at Old Oak Common on their planned
works near the Elizabeth line depot. We
are continuing to review designs for our
elements of the new HS2 Euston station
and the substation and ventilation building
and have facilitated piling enabling works
at Old Oak Common. We have continued
working with HS2 Ltd and its supply
chain in finalising the Blue Book suite of
management processes that define the
long-term working arrangements between
ourselves and HS2 Ltd.

This project is fully refundable
by HS2 Limited and the scope of
works is dependent on third party
requirements. The new EFC is
based on more detailed analysis
of the scope and impacts of the
HS2 works as we understand
them at the current time.

However, this EFC does not yet
take into account the impact
of the Oakervee Review as
the Government has not yet
responded to the Oakervee
Review recommendations. The
main changes to the EFC arise
from increasing staff resources
and bus mitigation costs.

Transport for London investment performance report 15

Future projects

We continue to develop major projects
– currently at an early stage – that will
deliver the new homes and jobs that
London and the UK need.

Crossrail 2
The Independent Assurance Panel (IAP),
led by David Orr, has recently carried
out a ‘health check’ on the methodology
and outcomes of Crossrail 2’s 2019 Cost
Estimate. Their review supports the work
done to date and confirm it is a credible
figure and provides significant confidence
in the Strategic Outline Business Case
Estimate. The IAP have put forward several
recommendations that the Team will
address and put forward relevant advice
to the Senior Responsible Officers later
this year.

Due to the ongoing financial impact from
the coronavirus pandemic, we continue
to discuss options with the Government
about the future of the scheme. The
Team have therefore been focusing on
putting Crossrail 2 ‘in good order’. Our
priority in discussions with Government
going forward will be asking the Secretary
of State to refresh the 2015 safeguarding
directions in order to protect the route
from future development.

Bakerloo Line Extension
We continue to develop aspects of the
scheme, including liaising with the DfT,
developing and cementing the business
case for the scheme, securing greater cost
certainty and confirming the shortlist
of options and assessment criteria for
the further stages of work. This includes
an integrated ticket hall at Elephant &
Castle station. We are also working with
the boroughs and other stakeholders to
determine further funding sources for
the scheme and safeguard the preferred
route alignment.

The extension of the Bakerloo line would
open up wider opportunities to more
people and improve air quality. It would also
support thousands of much-needed jobs
and homes in the New Cross, Lewisham and
Catford and Old Kent Road Opportunity
Areas – something that is ever more crucial
in light of the coronavirus pandemic.

We are working closely with Network Rail,
the Greater London Authority (GLA) and
the London Boroughs of Southwark and
Lewisham, to make sure we safeguard
the best possible scheme. This will
reflect the feedback received from our
last round of public consultation, which
closed in December 2019. We received
8,749 responses to the consultation and
are analysing the results. We will publish
our consultation report and responses to
issues raised later in 2020. We continue to
develop aspects of the scheme, including
liaising with DfT, developing and cementing
the business case, securing greater cost
certainty and confirming the shortlist of
options and assessment criteria for the
further stages of work.

We continue to discuss the future of Crossrail 2 with the Government

London Underground
Stations

Forecast
completion year

2022/23

Spend to
date (£m)

173

Spend
authority (£m)

535
EFC (£m)

1,132

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

0

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

The targeted renewal of existing assets will improve safety and reliability. Station
enhancements will reduce congestion and improve customer journey times.

Station enhancements
At Knightsbridge, the shell of the new
parts of the station has been built and
is ready for fit out. The coronavirus
pandemic has impacted the procurement
of contractors to carry out the fit out
works throughout Quarter 1, delaying
the opening date of new Brompton
Road entrance.

The Colindale station project was brought
to a Safe Stop in line with government
guidance. There was no progress in
Quarter 1 but we will now proceed with
detailed design starting in September
2020. The project will bring significant
improvements, including a spacious new
entrance, a new lift providing step-free
access to the platforms and new homes
around the station.

The Stratford south western entrance
project has also been paused.

At Tottenham Hale, site works to upgrade
the station were stood down on 24 March
2020. Having gone through the Safe Start
process, work restarted on 30 June 2020.
Construction works restarted on 6 July
2020. The existing Network Rail ticket
gateline and associated structures have
been demolished and excavations and
foundation works are progressing.

Station developments and retail
In August, the ‘start on site’ milestone
was met at West Ham, as works to
redevelop land alongside the Jubilee
line began. The site is being developed
by Berkeley Homes and will provide
around 4,000 new homes for London.
It will improve transport connectivity
through three new pedestrian, cycle and
road bridges, as well as a new station
entrance over the Jubilee line eastbound
track. Works started following four years
of negotiations between ourselves and
the developer, which were successfully
concluded in March 2020. Works are fully
funded by the developer.

At Paddington, we are working with Great
Western Developments to construct a
new station entrance to the Bakerloo
line, with a much-enlarged ticket hall and
step-free access to the platforms as part
of redevelopment of adjacent buildings.
Design work and demolition of redundant
assets continues.

At Walthamstow Central we are working
with developer Capital and Regional on a
capacity enhancement scheme. Following
commercial negotiation, a Cost Indemnity
Letter has been signed which allows us to
recover associated internal resource costs.
An internal resource has been remobilised
to progress design development relating to
the planned station enhancement works
in preparation for submission of a revised
planning application later this year.

At Waterloo, negotiations with H B
Reavis to progress the demolition and
redevelopment of Elizabeth House,
a 1960’s building over the station, are
progressing after the scheme obtained
planning permission in Autumn 2019.
Subject to legal agreements, the developer
will deliver a lift shaft proving a step-
free connection to the Northern line.
The developer contribution of £4.5m
will deliver, at a minimum, the lift shaft.
Consideration is being given as to how
best to deliver the lift fit-out works. The
Waterloo York Road ticket hall, which
closed in November 2019 to enable the
developer to undertake unforeseen
remedial works, was successfully brought
back into use in March 2020.

Transport for London investment performance report 17

Accessibility

Forecast
completion year

2023/24

Spend to
date (£m)

79

Spend
authority (£m)

176
EFC (£m)

176

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

0

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

We are working on a wide programme of accessibility improvements, customer service and
information enhancements across the Underground network. We will make more than a third
of stations accessible by 2022 by providing step-free access at a further 12 stations.

We are working on a wide programme of
accessibility improvements, customer
service and information enhancements
across the London Underground network.
As part of the Mayor’s step-free access
programme we are planning to make 12
stations accessible. Four of these stations
have already been completed: Newbury
Park, Buckhurst Hill, South Woodford and
Mill Hill East. Cockfosters is due to be
completed by the end of October.

The impact of the coronavirus pandemic
on the programme is being assessed.
The accessibility programme undertook
the Safe Stop initiative and ceased on
site work on 23 March. In June, eight
projects restarted works on site in
accordance with government guidance
and following a rigorous review of site set
up and protocols to ensure the safety of
operatives and customers at our stations.

The impact of revised ways of working,
the agility of the wider supply chain, and
its impact on on-site productivity and the
delivery of step-free access is currently
being reviewed.

Due to the impact of the coronavirus
pandemic on our finances, work has now
been paused while we await the outcome
of funding discussions for three projects
which were in the very early stages of
construction and six projects were in the
design phase before the pandemic.

Step-free access enables more people to travel on our network

Track renewals

Forecast
completion year

Annual

Spend to
date (£m)

11

Spend
authority (£m)

73
EFC (£m)

73

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

0

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

We are replacing our ballasted and deep Tube track, points and crossings, and track drainage
infrastructure to improve reliability, reduce maintenance costs and increase capacity.

We implemented Safe Stop status in
response to the coronavirus pandemic.

Following this, the only works delivered
during Quarter 1 were those deemed
operationally safety critical. These
were 1,218m of rail replacement works
completed on the Piccadilly line at
Heathrow and 101m on Croydon Tram
Link at Love Lane.

Signalling preparation work has started on
site for the Acton Town Christmas works,
where 11 Points and Crossings units will
be replaced. The programme of agreed
holding works for planned work sites
cancelled due to the coronavirus pandemic
has started. Additionally, planning has
enabled Deep Tube Renewals to recover
to previous levels of delivery for 2020/21.

Power, cooling and energy

Forecast
completion year

2023/24*

* The figures represent power and energy projects until 2023/24
and authority is sought in stages for future unapproved works

Spend to
date (£m)

55

Spend
authority (£m)

90
EFC (£m)

88

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

0

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

We continue to support a number of third party and major projects by providing power
works, such as relocating the substation at Euston station for HS2, installing cable routes for
the Northern Line Extension and works for the Piccadilly line and Bank station upgrades.

Power
We are delivering a rolling portfolio of
power renewal works to improve the
condition of assets. The first projects are
complete, including replacing substation
emergency battery systems, power
generation fire control systems and Central
line traction power protection systems.
Others are in delivery phase including
depot traction isolation replacement and
high voltage network switchgear.

Progress has been impacted by the
coronavirus pandemic and risk-based Safe
Stop control. Works continued where safe
to do so, such as remote design work,
procurement and site works on assets
essential for safe operation of the railway.
This included completing key objectives
of replacing uninterruptable power supply
equipment at two operational signal
control centres ensuring constant power
supply and station emergency lighting
power supply equipment.

Approximately 40 per cent of works
planned for 2020/21 have been rephased
to be delivered within current financial
constraints. A project extending the
life of the main power control system
to address obsolescence risks and
combine three power control systems
into one has continued largely to plan,
achieving design and manufacturing phase
milestones. Once completed, this system
will monitor and safely operate traction,
station, signalling and depot power
supplies on all lines.

Cooling
We continue to upgrade the cooling of
our power assets to support the new Four
Lines Modernisation signalling system and
good progress continues to be made.

Energy
The Solar programme has been paused
due to funding constraints.

Transport for London investment performance report 19

Rolling stock renewals

Forecast
completion year

2023/24

Spend to
date (£m)

247

Spend
authority (£m)

525
EFC (£m)

970

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

0

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

We are modifying our passenger rolling stock to improve safety, accessibility, reliability
and customer satisfaction, as well as to reduce maintenance costs. We are also modifying
or replacing some of our existing engineering vehicles that support track maintenance and
infrastructure renewals.

A Safe Stop was applied to all of the depot
work on our passenger fleet projects.
These are now operating in a COVID-19
Secure system of work.

We carried out the installation of the first
Bakerloo four-car unit with LED saloon
lighting. This unit has been in service since
February 2020. We are now embarking
on the fitment of the LED system to a
three-car unit which will be in service
by November 2020. The fleet will then
start the installation throughout while
incorporating the scope to deliver Rail
vehicle accessibility requirements across
the fleet.

On the Central line improvement
programme, we are centralising our
production process at Acton Rail
Engineering Workshop.

We continue to work with our supply chain
to enable the installation facilities for the
improvement programme on the full fleet.

Construction work continues on a new
train workshop building to support the
Train Modification Unit at Acton Works
Depot. The majority of civils works have
been completed and the project has
moved onto mechanical and electrical
fitout works. Works to connect the new
building to the depot’s substation have
also started.

In China, the first seven pre-production
engineering wagons manufactured by
CRRC have successfully passed static
testing. Four of these wagons are on a ship
bound for the UK with expected arrival
early September. Upon arrival they will
undergo dynamic testing off network

before being joined by the remaining three
pre-production wagons on our network
early 2021 for infrastructure testing. Once
these wagons have been fully tested and
approved, the remaining 66 wagons will
be built and shipped. Minor delays were
experienced due to coronavirus pandemic
restrictions and local lockdowns in China,
however, CRRC were quick to get back up
and running and are working to mitigate
these delays to ensure timely delivery.

The two Kirow cranes are now approved
for use within Ruislip Depot supporting
lifting and loading operations. The
introduction of these cranes delivers
safety and productivity benefits to the
engineering operations in Ruislip Depot.

The mechanised renewals vehicle will
improve the way track is renewed in
the deep Tube sections of the Bakerloo,
Central, Jubilee, Northern, Piccadilly
and Victoria lines. The three allocated
wagons have been fully overhauled and
have returned to Ruislip Depot where the
fitment of the track renewal equipment
will begin shortly. This project was able
to continue throughout the coronavirus
pandemic period as the overhauler and
component manufacturers were able to
put safe and socially distanced practices in
place quickly. They are due to be in service
later this year.

The tender documentation for replacing
our track recording vehicle, which
records and monitors the alignment and
condition of the track, is almost ready for
market engagement.

The project to give train operators better
control over unauthorised entry into the
cab from the saloon has been progressing
well. The contract was awarded and the
first train installation on the Waterloo &
City line has been done.

Transport for London investment performance report 20

Piccadilly line signalling control systems have now been commissioned

Signalling and control

Forecast
completion year

2023/24

Spend to
date (£m)

90

Spend
authority (£m)

196
EFC (£m)

180

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

0

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

We are extending the life of our track-based signalling and control assets. This ensures they
can continue to support a safe, reliable and maintainable service.

Siemens is continuing the design for the
life extension of the Central line signalling
and control systems. This project will
maintain the reliability, availability
and safety of the signalling assets and
resolve obsolescence concerns. Once the
design has been finalised, we will work
with Siemens to deliver pilot sites and
complete trials.

We have finalised commissioning of all
the new Piccadilly line signalling control
systems at the control centre in west
London. The migration of control has
progressed well and is now complete.

Works to replace the signalling system
in Northumberland Park depot on the
Victoria line has started, the concept
design phase will be finalised in Quarter 2.

Completion dates for the signalling and
control projects have been impacted by
the coronavirus pandemic and the revised
budget. For this reason, most works on
these projects have been suspended.

Transport for London investment performance report 21

Surface
Healthy Streets

Forecast
completion year

2021/22

Spend to
date (£m)

669

Spend
authority (£m)

811
EFC (£m)

811

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

0

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

The Healthy Streets Approach prioritises health
and wellbeing, with the overall objective of
creating a transport system where everyone can
travel safely by the healthiest and most resource-
efficient means, specifically walking, cycling and
public transport. It is central to achieving the
80 per cent mode share target in the Mayor’s
Transport Strategy.

Following the decision to pause all construction
work on our sites in March, there were some
20 schemes within Healthy Streets where work
was safely stopped on site and resulted in
traffic management barriers, and in some cases,
temporary signals remaining on site.

While the projects were in Safe Stop, regular checks
were undertaken by us and the supply chain to
ensure the sites remained safe.

In late April, work on all but two projects were
paused and most of the teams placed on furlough.
The two exceptions were Old Street Roundabout
and Highbury Corner Gyratory.

Design work for Old Street Roundabout
continued due to the safety critical nature
of the scheme and the cost to pause all
works on the project was prohibitive.
Construction was temporarily stopped but
restarted in eary June 2020. On Highbury
Corner Gyratory the only remaining
activity on the scheme was to install the
Hostile Vehicle Mitigation measures so
work on this continued due the safety and
security implications. The works started in
June 2020 and are planned to complete in
late September 2020.

The previous budget for the first half
of 2020/21 was £82m and the revised
budget is £34m, £11.7m of which is for our
Streetspace activities.

The Streetspace for London plan was a
new scheme with a specific allocation of
funds to deliver temporary measures as a
response to the coronavirus pandemic.

Given the significant reduction in
available budget, many projects continue
to be paused, this includes most of
the transformational schemes and the
permanent cycling routes. Design activities
have restarted on the Bus Priority
programme, small safety related schemes
and local junction improvements.

With the exception of Old Street
Roundabout, Highbury Corner Gyratory,
Bus Priority and the safety schemes, all
other projects and programmes in the
portfolio are undergoing a cost review
to identify savings before they can
restart activity.

Highbury Corner
The main highway and urban realm works
were completed in Autumn 2019. During
the Safe Stop period, design continued on
the Hostile Vehicle Mitigation measures.
Installation began on 22 June 2020 and are
due to complete by late September.

Old Street Roundabout
Construction is progressing at Old Street
Roundabout, where a new design will
improve safety for cyclists and pedestrians
with new and improved crossings, fully
segregated cycle lanes and a new public
space with an accessible main entrance to
the station and shopping arcade.

Construction work was temporarily
paused during lockdown, but the design
activities continued and were not
impacted by the pause. A soft restart
began on 8 June to prepare the site ahead
of the main works restarting two weeks
later. An interim traffic switch is planned
for October 2020, ahead of the main traffic
switch in January 2021.

The EFC is based on the
July 2020 Programmes and
Investment Committee paper.
In 2020/21 the programme and
project authority includes the
delivery of the Streetspace for
London plan and the restart of
some projects in the first half of
the year, following Safe Stop due
to the coronavirus pandemic. The
EFC also covers the continuation
of Old Street Roundabout.

A further Programmes and
Investment Committee paper
is required to set out estimated
project spend in the second half
of the year and future years.

Transport for London investment performance report 22

Due to the impacts of the coronavirus
pandemic, and also several significant
changes on the project, there has been
a delay to the completion date of up to
two years, and we are now forecasting an
Autumn 2022 finish.

Cycleway 4
Work on the section between Tooley
Street and Rotherhithe Roundabout
restarted on 15 June and officially opened
on 11 September. The remainder of the
route is being considered under the
Streetspace for London plan.

Cycleway 9
Work restarted on the Kew Bridge junction
on 6 June and it officially opened on 3
September. The remainder of the route is
being considered under the Streetspace
for London plan.

Safer Junctions
Of the five remaining schemes that were
paused on site due to the pandemic, we
have returned to site and completed
Camberwell town centre and Clapham
Road/Union Road. We are on site and will
complete the works in the first half of the
year for Edgware Road/George Street and
Britannia junction in Camden. The Edgware
Road corridor and Kingsland Road/Balls
Pond Road have been prioritised for
completion in late October.

Streetspace for London plan
When the coronavirus pandemic took hold
earlier this year, it was clear that we and
boroughs needed to act quickly to adapt
London’s streets and public transport
system to respond to the challenge London
faced. In May 2020 the DfT issued statutory
guidance urging local authorities to
reallocate road space to people walking and
cycling, both to encourage active travel and
to enable social distancing during restart.

As a result, the Streetspace for London
plan was formed, providing a strategic
framework to rapidly respond to the
coronavirus pandemic and subsequent
recovery following the end of lockdown
by creating more space for people to walk
and cycle safely. Millions more journeys
will need to be made by walking and
cycling while capacity on public transport is
constrained by social distancing needs.

As part of this plan we are transforming
London’s main roads and funding
boroughs to repurpose general traffic
lanes and parking spaces for temporary
cycle ways and wider footways. Types of
schemes cover:

• The introduction of strategic corridors
for walking, cycling and bus journeys on
our road network

• Town centre, station and interchange
schemes on our and borough roads to
increase space for pedestrians

• Low Traffic Neighbourhoods and School
Streets on borough roads to open up
residential streets for people, helping
create a safer and more pleasant
environment for walking and cycling and
reduce car traffic

Encouraging more Londoners to walk and cycle helps social distancing on our network

By delivering this programme, it will
make it easier and safer for people to
keep up social distancing and help people
walk and cycle more often. The wider
mental and physical health benefits of
increased walking and cycling are critical in
responding to the pandemic. This includes
helping Londoners stay healthy, therefore
reducing their chance of developing more
severe coronavirus symptoms, as well
as reducing the burden on the NHS from
non-coronavirus related consultations
and admissions, such as those relating
to the health impacts of poor air quality
and traffic collisions. Measures are also
intended to discourage a sharp increase in
car use; if people switch even a fraction of
their previous journeys to cars, essential
deliveries and emergency services will
be gridlocked.

Of the DfT settlement, £55m in funding
was allocated in May 2020 to fund the
programme, with £45m assigned to
borough-led schemes and £10m for ours.
Guidance was issued to boroughs and
published on our website to enable local
authorities to bid for scheme funding,
with us managing the assessment process
on the DfT’s behalf. At the end of July,
boroughs had been assigned more than
£30m to deliver 860 Streetspace schemes
by mid-October 2020, with a further £13m
assigned to borough sunk costs.

Progress continues to reflect the rapid
requirement for roll out of schemes to
support London’s recovery from the
pandemic. By late August more than 220
borough schemes had been completed,
with many more in construction. More
than 27km of new or upgraded cycle
infrastructure had been completed,
including segregated routes along Park
Lane and on CS8 between Chelsea Bridge
and Lambeth Bridge.

On our road network, more than 16,500
square metres of highway space had
been reallocated to pedestrians, reducing
overcrowding at key locations including
Brixton town centre, Camden High Street
and Waterloo Road. Pedestrians also
benefit from more than 2,100 signal timing
changes, providing more than 240 hours
of additional green man crossing time to
pedestrians each day.

Delivery of the programme continues
at pace, with targets for the end of
the first half of the year on track. This
includes complementary schemes such
as installation of new cycle parking on
the TfL Road Network, eight new Cycle
Hire docking stations and the conversion
of 77km of bus lanes on the TfL Road
Network to operate 24/7 Monday to
Sunday, improving bus reliability and
providing improved provision for cyclists.

Direct Vision Standard
The Direct Vision Standard (DVS) was
created to improve the safety of all road
users, particularly the most vulnerable such
as pedestrians, cyclists and motorcyclists,
by assessing vehicle blind spots. The DVS
assesses and rates how much a driver
can see directly from their heavy goods
vehicle (HGV) cab in relation to other road
users and assigns a star rating from zero
(poor) to five (excellent). Any vehicle rated
zero star will be required to fit additional
safety equipment to increase the vehicle’s
safety to meet the minimum one-star
requirement. Upon application, an HGV
Safety Permit recording the vehicle’s star
rating or safe system is issued.

DVS launched in October 2019 on a
voluntary basis, with a 12-month pre-
compliance period within which hauliers
will be able to apply for a permit. To date
more than 94,000 permit applications
have been received and 31,500 granted.
Enforcement of the scheme was due
to begin in October 2020; however, this
date has been revised to 1 March 2021 in
alignment with the LEZ date to support
the freight industry in its recovery from
the coronavirus pandemic and during
the pandemic.

Preparation of the core systems for the
launch of the enforcement element of
the scheme are on track against a
re-planned schedule.

On 2 March, we launched a new 20mph
speed limit on our roads in central London,
which is a key role in the Mayor’s Vision
Zero ambition to eliminate death and
serious injury from London’s transport
network. The new speed limits are being
enforced across all our roads within the
Congestion Charging zone, including
Millbank, Victoria Embankment and
Borough High Street, following strong
public support for the proposals.

To support these speed reductions, we
have recalibrated speed cameras in central
London and are using mobile speed
cameras to ensure drivers comply. A
marketing and communications campaign
was launched to announce the speed limit
change and educate drivers on its purpose.
This is closely aligned with our current
‘Watch your speed’ campaign. More than
50km of our road network is now subject to
a 20mph speed limit.

Phase two of this work has been paused,
owing to funding constraints. This phase
would have introduced lower speed
limits on a further 140km of our roads in
inner and outer London. However, where
opportunities exist, we are introducing
20mph speed limits into social distancing
schemes being delivered under the
Streetspace for London plan.

Transport for London investment performance report 24

Air quality

Forecast
completion year

2023/24

Spend to
date (£m)

274

Spend
authority (£m)

510
EFC (£m)

628

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

(41)

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

The Air quality programme reduces the impact
of transport on air quality and climate change by
targeting vehicles in our contracted and regulated
fleets, and all vehicles driving in London.

In response to the coronavirus pandemic the
Congestion Charge, LEZ and ULEZ Schemes were
suspended between 23 March and 18 May 2020. In
addition, the new LEZ standards and charges, and
enforcement of the DVS have both been postponed
from October 2020 until March 2021.

On 15 May 2020, the Mayor published details of
the Streetspace for London plan, to support this,
he also announced the intention to implement
temporary changes to the conditions and scope of
the Congestion Charge scheme.

Accordingly, in May we re-tasked the internal
and supplier delivery teams and implemented
temporary changes to the charge value, charging
hours and days for the Congestion Charge on 22
June 2020.

Together these changes have entailed re-
prioritisation and re-planning of projects within
the Air quality programme. The ULEZ Expansion
date of October 2021 is unchanged.

Air Quality Management (ULEZ
Expansion, LEZ and DVS)
All office-based work on the Air Quality
Management programme has continued
throughout the coronavirus pandemic and
remote working for the project team has
been implemented.

All on-site workstreams, for example,
camera and signage survey work, that
were paused as part of our Safe Stop in
March were restarted in June 2020 with
appropriate social distancing and safety
measures in place.

Following the resequencing of activities and
development of a revised plan, the delivery
of LEZ, DVS and ULEZ Expansion to the
current launch dates remains feasible.

ULEZ
On 8 April 2019 we successfully introduced
the new ULEZ in central London. It
enforces the world’s toughest vehicle
emission standard and is the first to
operate 24/7. The ULEZ replaced the
T-Charge and operates in the same area of
central London as the Congestion Charge.
The ULEZ expansion project will extend the
central London ULEZ, up to the North and
South Circular Roads. The project is now
progressing with key activities including:

• Implementation of the cloud platform
which will enable the migration of the
back-office systems to the cloud to
manage the larger volumes of data

• Preparation of the individual back
office system elements for the phased
migration to the cloud

• Design and development of the upgraded
data warehouse with Siemens to house
the increased volumes of camera images

• Detailed design development for signage
and camera placement

• Obtaining required consents and
approvals from relevant boroughs

Low Emission Zone 2020
These will strengthen the emission
requirements for the existing Low Emission
Zone that applies to heavy vehicles. The
emissions standards for lorries, vans and
other specialist HGVs of more than 3.5
tonnes, as well as buses, minibuses and
coaches more than five tonnes, will change
from Euro IV to the more stringent Euro VI.
Owners of vehicles that do not meet the
tougher emissions standards will need to
pay a daily charge to drive within the LEZ.

In order to support businesses in their
recovery from the impacts of the
coronavirus pandemic, and to allow them
more time to prepare, the start date for
the enforcement of the new standards has
been revised from October 2020 to March
2021 with the current LEZ charges and
standards operating until then. This was
to support the freight industry during the
coronavirus pandemic and its recovery.

The EFC increase is mainly due
to broadened scope for Bus
Electrification to support Bus
Fleet Opportunity Charging (£5m)
and Grid to Gate (£42m), which
aims to support zero emission
bus fleet, and will enable power
supply at bus garages to allow for
overnight charging. Following the
changes made to the operational
hours of the Congestion Charge
Scheme, expenditure has
increased by a net (£12m).

In addition savings have achieved
across the portfolio due to risk
released for SCR Retrofit, and
other projects, noted reduction
for DVS £2m, and LEZ Stronger
£4m, as well an increased over
programming £3m. The impact
of the coronavirus pandemic has
also resulted in deferred activities
of £6m, which will reviewed as
part of the 2020 Business Plan.

The EFC reflects the revised
budget to 2023/24.

Transport for London investment performance report 25

To ensure a successful launch, the business
and enforcement systems, as well as
the website, will be updated. These
process changes will be supported by a
comprehensive communications campaign.

Fleet compliance
To help meet the Mayor’s air quality
objectives in 2020, we are upgrading the
entire bus fleet to meet Euro VI emissions.
This includes retrofits of more than 4,000
midlife buses, of which more than 3,850
have already been completed.

Responding to the coronavirus pandemic,
the Retrofit programme came to a Safe
Stop in March. Work restarted in July with
appropriate safety measures in place and
is on track to complete by the end of 2020.

Ultra-low emission vehicles – rapid
charging infrastructure
To support the growing number of zero
emission capable taxis and the wider take-
up of electric vehicles, we are spending
£18m and working with the London
boroughs and others to build a network of
rapid charge points across London.

In response to the coronavirus pandemic,
the Rapid Charging Infrastructure project
came to a Safe Stop in March. Work
restarted in July with appropriate safety
measures in place and is on track against
a revised schedule to achieve our target
of 300 rapid charge points installed by the
end of December 2020.

Mayor’s Air Quality Fund
The Mayor’s Air Quality Fund is providing
£22m of investment over 10 years to
support London Borough projects to
improve air quality. The fund has supported
innovative Low Emission Neighbourhoods,
which are providing a targeted package of
measures in nine pollution hotspots across
London. The Low Emission Neighbourhood
in Shoreditch contributed to an estimated
16 per cent reduction of NO2 in the area.
Other highlights from the fund include
the provision of more than 20 new clean
air routes, 300 electric vehicle chargers,
two kilometres of new or improved cycle
routes, and the delivery of innovative
projects to cut construction machinery
pollution and supporting more than 250 car
free schemes and events.

Go Ultra Low City Scheme
The Go Ultra Low City Scheme (GULCS) is
a joint venture with the GLA and boroughs
project aiming to deliver more than 2,150 on-
street electric charge points for London’s
residents and car club vehicles. In response
to the coronavirus pandemic, installation
works came to a Safe Stop in April. Work has
now restarted, with the delivery deadline
extended from December 2020 to the end
of the current financial year.

Additionally, a joint bid for the London
boroughs has been submitted to OLEV for
a new On-street Residential Chargepoint
Scheme – where further residential charging
infrastructure can be delivered to encourage
and support the growing demand for
electric vehicles. Subject to the outcome
of the bid, boroughs would combine any
On-street Residential Chargepoint Scheme
funding with their GULCS allocations,
to ensure the procurement and delivery
process is as efficient as possible.

We are expanding the number of rapid charge points available

Asset investment

Forecast
completion year

2021/22

Spend to
date (£m)

341

Spend
authority (£m)

618
EFC (£m)

646

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

(33)

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

We replace, refurbish or reconstruct our surface
assets to keep them in a safe condition through
prioritised and planned works. This programme
maintains and lengthens the working life of
a wide range of assets, including carriageway,
footway, lighting, drainage, bridges, tunnels,
traffic signals, bus stations and river assets.

At the time of the coronavirus lockdown the
Assets portfolio was working hard to complete its
annualised programme of smaller Asset Capital
Programme (ACP) on various asset groups such
as carriageways and bus stations. At the same
time, it was also progressing site works on key
larger schemes such as the fire systems upgrade
to the Victoria Coach Station (VCS) and the works
at Hammersmith Bridge in conjunction with
Hammersmith and Fulham council. Additionally,
design and planning works were progressing
on a range of schemes such as the Major Asset
Renewal Programme A40 Westway expansion joints
replacement project and the Major Asset Renewal
Programme Vauxhall Bridge topside works.

As part of the Safe Stop review it was
agreed to stop the ACP works on site
but continue high priority safety critical
projects to maintain network safety
and resilience. Projects that continued
included the site works at VCS and
Hammersmith Bridge. The methods of
working on these schemes were changed,
however, to ensure that the risks to the
operatives of contracting COVID-19 were
minimised. The preparatory works for
the A40 Westway project also continued
and a tender for its concept design was
completed over the summer. Design work
also continued on other high priority
projects including Rotherhithe Tunnel and
Hostile Vehicle Mitigation measures on
Thames river bridges.

Due to funding constraints, some work
schemes have been scaled back. However,
by working closely with the supply chain
works are making good progress and the
schemes set out in the revised budget for
the first half of the year, will be delivered
as planned.

For the larger schemes such as VCS fire
systems progress on site has been good
over the summer despite the imposition
of coronavirus safety restrictions on
working practices and this project is on
track to complete ahead of the December
deadline imposed by the required to
meet the London Fire Brigade enforcement
notice. Works on Hammersmith Bridge,
which is owned by the London Borough of
Hammersmith and Fulham, also continued
successfully through the summer and the
removal of the cast iron casings to two of
the pedestals completed as planned. The
tender for the A40 Westway scheme was
successfully completed and the winning
contractor has begun concept design work.
Similarly, the build phase of the Vauxhall
Bridge contract was agreed, and the
works started on site in August as planned.
Feasibility work to replace the Hostile
Vehicle Mitigation on the Thames River
Bridges has been completed and single
options discussed with key stakeholders.
For the ACP works the revised programmes
have been agreed and works are currently
on track with carriageway and structures
schemes accounting for the bulk of the
revised budget for the first half of the year.

The EFC covers 2021/22 to provide
a direct comparison to the
programme as originally approved
in 2017/18.

The majority of the increase
in EFC compared to the plan
is £24m additional funding for
Hammersmith Bridge to start
work on stabilisation work and
construct a temporary walking
and cycling bridge. This is
included as a funding request to
Government to allow the London
Borough of Hammersmith and
Fulham to start this work but, as
with all our major asset renewals,
longer-term Government funding
is required to let the required
contracts and complete the work.

The Safe Stop of our capital
schemes due to the coronavirus
pandemic meant that the
two-year pause of proactive
capital renewals was effectively
extended by four months. We
have continued to prioritise
critical renewals and have
increased investment in 2021/22
to improve the state of good
repair of our assets which has
deteriorated during this pause.

Transport for London investment performance report 27

Public transport

Forecast
completion year

2022/23

Spend to
date (£m)

278

Spend
authority (£m)

387
EFC (£m)

382

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

5

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

The public transport programme oversees London
Buses, London Overground, the DLR, London
Trams, Emirates Air Line, Santander Cycles and
London River Services.

London Overground
The start of Quarter 1 saw all the enhancement
works on London Overground brought to a Safe
Stop in accordance with government guidance and
several project staff being placed on furlough.

At White Hart Lane works to progress handover
documentation continued while the construction
activities were brought to a Safe Stop. Works
were safely restarted in late June to complete the
second phase of works mainly involving completion
of urban realm, telecoms and safe strip out of the
former station building. The pause to works has
pushed the completion of site works from May
until September 2020.

Works at West Hampstead were safely restarted
in early July. The only site works remaining were
minor snagging works which have been completed.

Design work for an increase of services to 18 trains
per hour on this part of the London Overground
was completed, however, this project has been
deferred as a result of the revised budget. The
completion of this work will be reconsidered in
Quarter 2 2021/22.

We have entered into a Grant
Determination Agreement with the
Ministry of Housing, Communities and
Local Government and the GLA to
deliver infrastructure improvements that
support housing growth along this part
of the London Overground. The schemes
delivered as part of this agreement will be
a redevelopment of Surrey Quays station,
a new station at Surrey Canal Road and
infrastructure changes to allow 20 trains
per hour to run. These projects will be
completed by late 2024. The procurement
of the next stage of design has now
completed, however, has suffered some
delay due to key staff being on furlough.

We are continuing to scope up the next
phase of works at Seven Sisters for an
Access for All scheme. This is funded from
the DfT’s Access for All programme in
conjunction with Network Rail.

We are currently procuring a framework
for the delivery of future works. Supplier
selection questionnaires have been
received and at present time are under
review. The market has shown a healthy
interest in bidding to be on the framework.

The roll out of the class 710 units on the
West Anglia route has continued despite
the restrictions caused by the coronavirus
pandemic. Twenty-two new units are now
in passenger service.

DLR
The start of Quarter 1 saw the majority of
DLR Renewals portfolio brought to a Safe
Stop to align with the Government request
to lockdown. Active sites were stopped
and secured. The construction team then
started weekly tours of the sites to make
sure they remained safe and secure.

Mid Quarter 1, most of the team was
placed on furlough and those who
remained worked on projects deemed as
safety critical. If these projects stopped,
they would have impacted the operational
safety of the railway.

Measures were put in place before critical
site works could restart. Our contractors
re-evaluated their safety assessments
to incorporate measures to mitigate
against the coronavirus pandemic. Only
when these revised mitigations were peer
reviewed and approved was work allowed
to resume.

Signalling upgrades of the Vehicle Control
Centre Borders and the installation of
signalling hardware saw key designs being
approved and physical works started
during the last week of June.

The key High Voltage Project replacement
of the East Route Ring Main was sent
out to tender, with limited access to the
railway we undertook virtual site tours
to provide details to the tenderers. Other
associated projects (Replacement Vacuum
Medium Switchgear and Hawker Sidley
Nuclear Power Circuit Breakers) were
made ready to be sent out to tender in
Quarter 2.

The EFC decrease is due to
the impact of the coronavirus
pandemic reflected in the revised
budget. Delivery has been
deferred for projects reducing
spend for Trams, including
the Croydon capacity upgrade
and Trams overhauls. The next
stages for Bus Safety Standards,
will be reviewed in the next
Business Plan.

Lower passengers journeys on
the DLR between April and July,
reduced our liability for the City
Greenwich Lewisham Rail Link by
£11m, in addition to savings across
the portfolio. Reduced spend is
offset by activity to help recovery
from the coronavirus pandemic
including Custom House station
and increasing Cycle Hire
docking stations.

The reduced spend has been
offset by the inclusion of DfT
funded accelerated customer
enhancement schemes (£2m)
included for Hackney Central and
Imperial Wharf. The EFC reflects
the revised budget up to 2022/23.

Transport for London investment performance report 28

Station works at Custom House continued
throughout the lockdown period, using
a COVID-19 Safe System of work. We and
the Government saw maintaining access
to this station, as the main access to NHS
Nightingale Hospital London, as critical
to support the movement of critical
key workers.

Several high priority projects also restarted
back on site during our East Route Closure
on 20-22 June). Depot Conductor Rail
and Re-Railing at Canning Town were
completed successfully.

The Re-Rail site saw the introduction of
innovative technology which assisted
staff in maintaining 2m safe distancing.
The Personal Distance System used at
hospitals, made sure staff wearing an
alarm belt were warned (with a bleep),
if they were closer than 2m from other
colleagues. The technology has moved on
with the system now small enough to sit
inside a normal-sized pocket.

The GLA funded Royal Docks Stations
Programme was unaffected by the
coronavirus pandemic because the six
stations were in the early design phase.
The programme is on track to meet the
milestones of completing concept design
and entering the construction phase for
the first two stations in 2021.

London Trams
As part of our commitment to making the
tram network safer following the tragedy
at Sandilands in 2016, we continue to
address the recommendations from the
Rail Accident Investigation Branch. We have
completed several initiatives including a
new emergency lighting system on each
tram and are currently in the final delivery
phases of the physical prevention of over-
speeding automatic braking system.

Our renewals programme of works
continues across seven asset groups
including fleet, power, civils, systems
and permanent way infrastructure.

Planning has progressed for the Reeves
Corner and Love Lane track renewals
planned to begin in August 2020.

The Oaks Road switchgear replacement
works has been completed and the
substation has been commissioned.

The Systems Integration Project has been
completed brought in to use, and the
handover file is being finalised.

A contract has been awarded for the
CR4000 Cab Cooling works with the
fitment of the first-in-class installation
planned for August 2020. A revised
proposal was received for the blind-
spot CCTV workstream on the Stadler
Equipment Overhaul project and contract
award is now planned for August 2020.

We are improving the capacity on the DLR

Surface technology

Forecast
completion year

2023/24

Spend to
date (£m)

15

Spend
authority (£m)

79
EFC (£m)

124

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

10

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

This is a new programme responsible for
overseeing strategically important technology
projects within our five-year business plan and,
from April 2019, to provide a structure for all
future technology projects being delivered by
surface transport.

Surface Intelligent Transport Systems (SITS)
We are leading the way in delivering innovative
new road traffic management systems to
make journeys on foot, bike and bus, as well as
essential emergency services and freight trips,
as efficient as possible. Delivery of elements of
the SITS programme where we have contractual
commitments has continued without negative
impact from the coronavirus pandemic, with
development teams able to work remotely
without significant disruption. These elements
include the Real Time Optimiser system which
will help us better manage the flow of people on
London’s road network by controlling the phasing
of traffic signals using pre-planned timetables,
manual interventions and optimisation techniques.
In Quarter 1, we agreed a plan to complete this
work with Siemens following a detailed review
of requirements. Following this, in August, we
completed formal witness testing of the current
phase of Real Time Optimiser system development.

Our work with Sopra Steria to design,
develop and implement a new incident
management system has also continued.
This will enable us to increase the speed at
which we detect and respond to incidents
on the road network.

These enhanced systems require better
data than is currently available, and an
improved data storage hub. In August 2020,
we awarded a contract to supply vehicle
journey time data to INRIX and completed
a tactical roadmap to set out our plan to
fulfil SITS data requirements, including
the use of video analytics to better
understand vehicle and cyclist movements
in real-time. Improvements to our data
storage hub have supported continuation
of our highways modelling activities
following the coronavirus pandemic.
Previously, it was not possible to access
historic traffic signal data older than three
months, but in February 2020, the first
version of the new storage hub removed
this constraint. This data has proven
essential for validating traffic models of
road conditions before the coronavirus
pandemic, ensuring new proposals can be
assessed against the conditions as they
were before the pandemic.

Work on the predictive element of SITS
was paused, as there are currently no
contractual commitments for this.

Operational safety and compliance
We are consolidating our approach to
compliance and enforcement so we can
support a more versatile compliance,
policing and on-street services operation.
This will help people feel safe and secure
when travelling in London, supporting
reliable journeys and generating
efficiency savings.

This area includes procuring systems
and services to support our licensing
of taxi and private hire vehicles, drivers
and operators. We will ensure business
continuity is maintained, protecting
customers and ensuring vehicles
are safe, accessible and meet strict
environmental standards.

The new system aims to provide a more
efficient service to our Taxi and Private
Hire customers. We have continued the
procurement process to secure a supplier
for this operationally critical system,
with minimal negative impact due to
the coronavirus pandemic. In July, we
selected suppliers to proceed to the next
dialogue-based stage, with the project on
track to award the contract in Spring 2021.

The EFC is broadly in line with the
2019 Business Plan. The EFC change
since Quarter 4 is mainly over
programming driven – a higher
percentage has been applied.

Surface technology is a relatively
new portfolio and its first
paper was submitted to the
Programmes and Investment

Committee in March 2019. The
Programme and Project Authority
is therefore below EFC as the
portfolio is only part authorised.

Transport for London investment performance report 30

This programme also includes proposals
to introduce body worn video cameras
for more colleagues in front line
roles. A successful technical test of
key infrastructure was carried out at
Stratford, which has informed key areas
such as back office technical design for
the camera system and uniform design.
Footage captured during this trial has
already been used to support successful
prosecution of those who act aggressively
towards our people.

Public transport technology
We are maintaining and developing
technology to operate our public
transport networks and improve customer
experience. This includes upgrading
the technology systems that underpin
the bus network such as improving the
iBus system which is used to provide
real-time information on bus locations.
It also includes improvements to
communications technology used on the
Emirates Air Line, as well as enhancing the
booking and scheduling system for Dial-a-
Ride. This will allow us to book and deliver
trips more efficiently.

Some projects in the area were paused for
two to three months while an emergency
budget was negotiated and have since
remobilised. This resulted in a delay to
delivery, while slowing down the rate of
spend in this area. Activities following
remobilisation have largely focused
on re-planning; key progress highlights
include progress towards finalising tender
documentation to re-procure an upgraded
booking and scheduling system for Dial-
a-Ride and undertaking options analysis
to improve connectivity to Emirates
Air Line cabins to support passenger
communications systems.

Body-worn cameras are being introduced for front-line staff on our network

Other
Technology and data

Forecast
completion year

2020/21

Spend to
date (£m)

137

Spend
authority (£m)

275
EFC (£m)

281

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

(6)

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

The Technology and data programme provide the
core infrastructure, services and technology that
enable us to achieve our strategic priorities.

Payments
On 20 April, we introduced daily and weekly
capping for customers using contactless pay as
you go on train services to Reading, Luton Airport
Parkway and Welwyn Garden City. This has been
a complex project involving changes to how
contactless fares are calculated and significant
changes to the systems which support revenue
allocation. The complexity of the requirements
from the Train Operating Companies, meant that it
was not possible to deliver this at the same time as
pay as you go was introduced in January. However,
in the interim, our Data and Analytics team has
been providing refunds to customers who spent
more than the daily cap.

On 17 May we successfully delivered the fares
revision while maintaining safe working practices
as a result of the coronavirus pandemic movement
restrictions. This meant a reduced scope of
the fares revision by removing non-critical items.
The main changes introduced were in support
of new operational arrangements at Paddington
station introduced by Great Western and
Heathrow Express.

Values shown are for Tech
and data funded projects
only and exclude Emergency
Service Network, Public
Cellular Network, Telecoms
Commercialisation Project and
telecomms projects. Authority
and EFC shown are for financial
years 2018/19 to 2021/22. Spend
Authority includes additional
Programme and Project
Authority approved by the
Programmes and Investment
Committee on 6 March 2020.

Contactless payment options are being introduced on more services

As part of the funding settlement with
Government and to reduce demand
from non-essential travel, on 15 June,
we introduced changes to the 60+ and
Freedom Pass concessions to prevent their
use before 09.00 on weekdays.

Evergreen Programme
The Evergreen Programme is aimed at
renewing more than 80 per cent of our
desktop PCs and moving all users to
Windows 10/Office 365. By the end of
July 2020 30,000 of 32,700 users had been
moved to Windows 10 /Office 365 and
40,000 of 44,000 email boxes to Exchange
Online providing a richer user experience
with access from any device at any location.
Migrations are expected to be completed by
September 2020

The Smart Working Programme closed
at the end of March, having achieved all
its objectives including allowing remote
working for a large part of our non-
operational workforce.

The achievements of the Evergreen and
Smart Working Programmes proved to be
critical enablers for us to successfully move
up to 15,000 staff to work from home in just
a few days at the start of the coronavirus
pandemic lockdown period.

Content and collaboration
Microsoft SharePoint is one of our main
departmental file sharing applications.
However, three older versions exist that
need to be consolidated into a single up
to date version, SharePoint Online, which
is part of the Office 365 suite. Only the six
most complicated 2010 sites remain, with
migration planning currently under way.

Livelink is a key enterprise document
management tool, largely used for
engineering documentation. The current
version is not supported and needs to
be upgraded to run under Windows
10. Final testing of the new application
is underway and implementation is planned
to align with the next Windows 10 rollout.

The new Intranet portal called Platform
was successfully launched at the start of
July 2020. This consolidates three legacy
intranets into one modern solution.

Hosting Data Centre Rationalisation and
Cloud Migration
Hosting continues to develop a hybrid
operating model in which we have
extended our data centre capabilities
into the public cloud through Amazon
Web Services and Azure. The expanded
capabilities to deliver stronger governance,
operational controls and cost transparency
to yield additional efficiencies has
been delivered in Azure and 98 per cent
complete in Amazon Web Services.

Forty per cent of the Compute hosting
platforms have now been refreshed and
data migrated off legacy storage platforms
which have now been decommissioned.
This has mitigated some of our security
vulnerabilities and ensure we are operating
on supported platforms.

Decommissioning of the Ashfield
House data centre is underway, all
apart from one service has now been
migrated into our strategic data centre.
A new Universal Licence Agreement was
negotiated for our Virtualisation services
and went live in June. This delivered
£1.2m operational savings.

Networks
Following the introduction of Safe
Stop, all works on the delivery of
the London Underground Connect
radio system upgrade ceased until an
exemption was approved in June. Work
has now restarted and the new core site
equipment has been fully commissioned.
Activity continues to deploy new control
room dispatchers and re-configure the
base stations prior to the system software
being updated.

We have continued to deliver infrastructure
to support the Home Office’s new
national Emergency Service Network
communications system and have installed
380km of tunnel fibre (90 per cent), pulled
395km of the tunnel leaky feeder (95 per
cent), and fixed 263km of this leaky feeder
(62 per cent) into its final position. We
have completed about 40 per cent of the
required station cabling works, focusing on
59 stations (of 127).

Following the successful launch of the 4G
Pilot on the Jubilee line in March, we have
engaged Capita to design an extension to
the Pilot to add five additional Jubilee line
stations and associated tunnel sections
– this will provide passengers with 4G
connectivity throughout the entire Jubilee
line (both in tunnels and on platform areas).

Subject to available funding the additional
sections would be energised by the end of
Quarter 2 2021. In addition to this, funding
has been requested for further enabling
works for the wider Public Cellular Network
service across the estate including a second
leaky feeder on the Jubilee and Victoria
lines, enabling works in six stations and 30
station designs. The investment will largely
be recoverable via the telecoms concession
at the point that commercial mobile
services are established.

Transport for London investment performance report 33

Our project to secure a partner to
commercialise our telecoms assets
continues. Updated tender documentation
was issued on 3 June and two updated
tender responses were received on 1 July.
These responses are now being evaluated.

Technical Refresh and technical
service operation
In June 2020 the core support service
contracted out to Computacenter for IT
Service Desk and Support went live.

The contract for providing best-value off-
the-shelf IT hardware and software was
awarded to Computacenter in April 2020
following a tender process. The contract
went live in May 2020.

Enterprise resource planning
The SAP Enterprise Resource Planning
team successfully provided improvements
to transactional processing in Accounts
Payable. These optimisations have been
prioritised as they supported home working
during the recent challenges caused by the
coronavirus pandemic.

The SAP Hosting Project has completed
the design phase and initial migration
of the Development environment to
Cloud has started. This project will migrate
SAP on to the Amazon Public Cloud to
increase SAP performance.

We have implemented the anonymised
CV service, so that when shortlisting
candidates during recruitment campaigns,
we are actively minimising the impact of
any unconscious bias.

Contact Centre Operation
During this period, the focus has been on
the retendering of the contact handling
work for Oyster.

The new contract with Eckoh to provide
telephony services for our customer
helplines went live in July.

Data Analytics
During Quarter 1 and with the impact of
the coronavirus pandemic, there has been
a significant increase in demand, internally
and externally, for accurate information to
help understand customer demand and
insight into journeys being made across
our network.

To support this, we have brought forward
the Journeys and Demand initiative, which
in Quarter 1 has seen the development of
London Underground customer demand
reports for use by the wider business,
some of which automate previously
manual processes to improve efficiency
and consistency.

Alongside this need for customer demand
information, we are modernising the ‘Origin
Destination Interchange’ product: this is a
complex tool that infers bus alighting and
passenger loads, and enables crucial
activities across transport planning,
payments, and analytical teams. The project
completed the proof of concept phase and
moved into development.

New enhanced ‘Artificial Intelligence’
sensors have been installed across Central
London which count the flow of traffic/
pedestrians/bikes through junctions. We are
loading live data from these.

Finally, we have continued to deliver the
next increments to the Wi-Fi product which
has given the following enhancements:

Passenger Route Choice – Which went live
with our second feature for our advertising
partner (Global) which will help them
to understand what routes could have
been taken between any given stations,
on a given day and helps improve their
advertising campaign reach.

Transport for London investment performance report 34

Growth Fund

Forecast
completion year

2024/25

Spend to
date (£m)

0

Spend
authority (£m)

157
EFC (£m)

157

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

(1)

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

This programme is dedicated to the third pillar of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy on using
transport to unlock new jobs and homes. The programme allocates funding to support
multi-modal and cross-portfolio transport schemes where there is a specific transport
constraint that is holding back economic and residential development and supports
regeneration opportunities in some of London’s key growth areas.

Existing Growth Fund Programme
The Growth Fund contributes to 16
schemes that will support more than
30,500 new homes and approximately
24,700 new jobs. Recently completed
schemes include the transformation of
the northern roundabout at Elephant and
Castle and Ilford station.

The construction and development of
most Growth Fund schemes has been
paused over the last financial quarter
due to the coronavirus pandemic and
lockdown restrictions. Progress has been
made in developing scheme details and
negotiating third party funding for several
schemes in the programme which are
in the feasibility and design stages. Our
investment in the transport infrastructure
continues to be supported by financial
contributions from developers as well as
other sources, including the GLA with the
programme unlocking more than £122m of
third-party funding.

Progression has been made in upgrading
and developing stations such as
supporting the submission of a planning
application for the Walthamstow Central
scheme, and further development
of Woolwich (Elizabeth line) and
Tottenham Hale stations with all of these
improvements supporting and unlocking
new housing developments and aiding
local economic recovery. Our investment
in the transport infrastructure has been
supported by financial contributions
from developers as well as other sources,
including the GLA.

Our latest budget classifies all Growth
Fund schemes as ‘contingent on additional
funding’. This means that, although all the
following projects already have a strong
commitment and a significant degree of
third-party funding has been secured for
their delivery, a further commitment by
Government or other sources is needed
to complete the funding package for
each of them.

These are:

• An upgrade at Colindale station in the
first phase of a development programme
to bring 10,000 new homes to the area.
The scheme now has confirmation that
the Secretary of State has accepted the
CPO and delegated the decision making
to an Inspector with a Public Inquiry
expected to be held later this year

• An upgrade at Walthamstow Central
station, with improved entrances and
step-free access, to provide additional
capacity to support 2,000 new homes
and 1,000 new jobs in Walthamstow
town centre. A new planning application
has been submitted and the project
team is now planning out activities for
the next stage, including negotiations
and design completion

• Pontoon Dock – station enhancement
works to improve vertical circulation and
directly unlocks 5,000 homes with £7.6m
of developer contributions. The scheme
is currently being redesigned and a new
planning application will be submitted by
the developer, this has caused changes to
the original programme and the funding
profile is likely to change as a result

• Tolworth – Highway enhancements to
improve capacity and unlock the delivery
of more than 2,500 new homes

• Catford – the scheme proposes the
removal of Catford gyratory and road-
space relocation to enhance town centre
place and travel conditions and maximise
new housing delivery and associated
growth (3,000 new homes and 1,000 new
local jobs supported)

• Erith – This scheme proposes significant
improvements to public realm in Erith
Town Centre and improved pedestrian
access to Erith station. There are plans to
develop at least 1,000 new homes in the
town centre which will be supported by
the improvements

• Thameside West DLR station – A new DLR
station, Thames Wharf, to support the
Thameside West development, which is
set to deliver around 7,000 new homes

We are currently working with the GLA,
DfT and Ministry of Housing, Communities
and Local Government to obtain funding
certainty for some of the current Growth
Fund schemes and to explore other
funding options.

Other Growth Fund schemes:
Sutton Link
This scheme entails the extension of the
London Trams network from Wimbledon
to Sutton town centre, via Morden and
Rosehill. A detailed option selection
process, including a public consultation on
a shortlist of choices has been completed
thus far. This project has been paused.

Transport for London investment performance report 35

Stations on the Elizabeth line will be step free by design

Elizabeth line

On-network stations improvement programme

Forecast
completion year

2020

Spend to
date (£m)

90

Spend
authority (£m)

94
EFC (£m)

95

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

0

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

This programme focuses on 22 existing stations, ensuring improved customer experience
and step-free access, and a consistent station environment across the Elizabeth line.

Work on Great Eastern step-free schemes
at Maryland, Manor Park and Seven Kings
was completed in February 2019. A long-
term dispute between the main contractor
and subcontractor has delayed the
formal handover of these assets to Rail
for London Infrastrucure. However, the
dispute now looks to have been resolved
and works on handover will restart with a
view to completing in October 2020.

On the Great Western section, lift schemes
at Hanwell, Iver, Langley and Taplow were
completed between December 2019 and
March 2020 – just ahead of the Safe Stop.
Therefore the coronavirus pandemic’s
impact on the project has been minimal
as all that remains are minor outstanding
works and snags.

Since March attention has been on
completing the paperwork required to
hand the new assets to the asset manager
Network Rail which will assume long-term
responsibility in line with other station

assets on the Great Western section with
all project teams working remotely. The
remaining snags/outstanding works are
being completed with site teams adhering
to social distancing guidelines.

MTR Elizabeth line’s station refurbishment
programme also came to a Safe Stop
in March. The two active projects at
Langley and Hanwell were paused for
approximately six weeks and work has
now restarted in line with social distancing
guidelines. When complete these projects
will provide significant improvements
to the customer experience at the
stations, with Langley also receiving
automatic ticket barriers that will help
with protecting revenue and deterring
antisocial behaviour. Completion for these
schemes, which was scheduled for August/
September, is now likely to be December
the delay being a combination of the Safe
Stop and less productive socially distanced
work after the restart.

Transport for London investment performance report 36

Rolling stock

Forecast
completion year

2020

Spend to
date (£m)

968

Spend
authority (£m)

1,149
EFC (£m)

1,006

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

0

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

We are in troducing the new Elizabeth line train fleet in phases and have built a depot to
provide train maintenance facilities.

Quarter 1 saw the planned continuation
of integration testing of the train and
Automatic Train Operation signalling in the
central section tunnels of the Elizabeth
line, including transitions to the Network
Rail mainline routes to the east and west
and running multiple trains in the same
tunnel under the full control of the
Automatic Train Operation system.

Authorisation from the Office of Rail and
Road to operate European Train Control
System (ETCS) fitted Elizabeth line trains in
passenger service on ETCS infrastructure
was obtained and a significant milestone
was reached when the first nine-car train
was introduced into passenger service
to Heathrow under full ETCS signalling
control on 30 July 2020.

Central operating section
Testing of the baseline class 345 train and
lineside-signalling software versions that
will be safety-assured for use in the next

phase (Trial Running in the central section
under UK ‘Rail and Other Guided Systems
safety legislation) completed in Quarter
1, and the Crossrail safety body started
the safety-assurance process. Testing of
the next iteration of signalling software
that will be used to further enhance the
system functionality in time for Trial
Running starts in September 2020.

Reading and Heathrow
The class 345 passenger services between
Paddington and Reading reverted to
seven-car trains following identification
of a safety related defect in the nine-car
variant which was withdrawn from service
as a precaution. The safety related defect
was subsequently resolved. Reintroduction
of nine-car trains is being prioritised on
the Paddington to Heathrow route.

Stratford to Shenfield
Class 345, seven-car trains continue to
operate this passenger service.

A new depot will provide train maintenance for the new Elizabeth line trains

Crossrail

Crossrail

Forecast
completion year

2022

Spend to
date (£m)

*

* This information is withheld for reasons of commercial sensitivity

Spend
authority (£bn)

17.6
EFC (£m)

*

* This information is withheld for reasons of
commercial sensitivity

EFC movement
post plan (£m)

*

* This information is withheld for reasons of
commercial sensitivity

2020/21 strategic milestone RAG

Crossrail Ltd has continued to work on a plan to drive the Crossrail project to completion.

Although some details are still to be
finalised, has provided us with an initial
proposal that indicates the central section
of the Elizabeth line opening during the
first half of 2022.

Crossrail’s proposal is not a confirmed
opening window and remains subject to
review and validation. While Crossrail
Ltd is reaching the final phases of the
project to safely complete and deliver
the Elizabeth line, it is clear that some
challenges remain.

The leadership team at Crossrail Ltd
is working hard to understand the
financial and delivery implications of the
coronavirus pandemic on the programme.

TfL Rail services continue to deliver
very high performance and service
levels have now reached those
operated before lockdown.

Nine-car trains have been operating on
services out of Paddington and have
started to be operate to Heathrow.

Custom House has now been handed over to us

Appendix
2020/21 strategic milestone performance

Our 2019/20 strategic milestones for the
projects or programmes covered in this
report are listed below. The RAG status
indicates delivery forecast against the current
plan date in line with the following key:

Commentary is provided on milestones
that are forecast to be delivered
significantly (more than 90 days) late.
These milestones also indicate the history
of forecast date movements by showing
the RAG status and variance (the number
of days difference) between the plan date
and the forecast date at each quarter end.
Programme impact and mitigations are
also detailed.

Milestone description Plan date
Actual/

forecast date Status

Major Projects

Four Lines Modernisation

Completion of foundation for train maintenance access platform
at Neasden depot

26-Aug-20 16-Jul-20

Piccadilly Line Upgrade programme

OPO CCTV (Design & Build) Approved by TfL for Contract Award 14-Jul-20 14-Jul-20 Complete

Network extensions

Northern Line Extension

Completion of 22kv Installation, necessary for providing full
traction power for the new extension to Battersea

01-Sep-20 01-Sep-20

Silvertown Tunnel

Completion of pump test boreholes and all geotechnical surveys
for the north site of the Silvertown tunnel

15-Sep-20 15-Sep-20

Barking Riverside Extension

Completion of Thames Water works to divert sludge main
at Pier 14

23-Jul-20 22-Aug-20

Major stations

Bank station – Completion of the tunnel primary lining for the new
DLR triple escalator

01-Sep-20 07-Sep-20

Milestone description Plan date
Actual/

forecast date Status

London Underground

Station renewals and enhancements

52-hour possession on the Piccadilly line to re-rail track
between Heathrow Terminals 2 & 3 and Hatton Cross on
the Eastbound tunnel

06-Jul-20 06-Jul-20

Restart of construction activities at twelve sites (Amersham,
Harrow-on-the-Hill, Osterley, Cockfosters, Mill Hill East, Debden,
Ickenham, Wimbledon Park, Tottenham Hale, Acton Train
Maintenance Shed, Bromley by Bow and Finsbury Park)

31-Jul-20 22-Jul-20

Air quality and environment

Congestion Charge Changes – go live 22-Jun-20 18-Jun-20 Complete

Assets

Victoria Coach Station infrastructure: Complete Fire System
works on site

17-Oct-20 24-Sep-20

Public transport

Reeves Corner: embedded rail track renewal. Section 1 – complete 14-Sep-20 14-Sep-20 Complete

On time or early

Up to 89 days late

90 or more days late

Transport for London investment performance report 39

About Transport for London (TfL)

Part of the Greater London Authority
family led by Mayor of London Sadiq Khan,
we are the integrated transport authority
responsible for delivering the Mayor’s aims
for transport.

We have a key role in shaping what
life is like in London, helping to realise
the Mayor’s vision for a ‘City for All
Londoners’ and helping to create a
safer, fairer, greener, healthier and more
prosperous city. The Mayor’s Transport
Strategy sets a target for 80 per cent of all
journeys to be made by walking, cycling
or using public transport by 2041. To make
this a reality, we prioritise sustainability,
health and the quality of people’s
experience in everything we do.

We run most of London’s public
transport services, including the London
Underground, London Buses, the DLR,
London Overground, TfL Rail, London
Trams, London River Services, London
Dial-a-Ride, Victoria Coach Station,
Santander Cycles and the Emirates Air
Line. The quality and accessibility of these
services is fundamental to Londoners’
quality of life. By improving and expanding
public transport and making more
stations step free, we can make people’s
lives easier and increase the appeal of
sustainable travel over private car use.

We manage the city’s red route strategic
roads and, through collaboration with the
London boroughs, we are helping to shape
the character of all London’s streets.
These are the places where Londoners
travel, work, shop and socialise. Making
them places for people to walk, cycle and
spend time will reduce car dependency,
improve air quality, revitalise town
centres, boost businesses and connect
communities. As part of this, the Ultra
Low Emission Zone scheme and more
environmentally friendly bus fleets are
helping to tackle London’s toxic air.

During the coronavirus pandemic we have
taken a huge range of measures to ensure
the safety of the public. This includes
enhanced cleaning using hospital-grade
cleaning substances that kill viruses and
bacteria on contact, alongside regular
cleaning of touch points, such as poles and
doors, and introducing more than 1,000
hand sanitiser points across the public
transport network.

Working with London’s boroughs we have
also introduced Streetspace for London,
a temporary infrastructure programme
providing wider pavements and cycle lanes
so people can walk and cycle safely and
maintain social distancing.

At the same time, we are constructing
many of London’s most significant
infrastructure projects, using transport to
unlock much needed economic growth.
We are working with partners on major
projects like the extension of the Northern
line to Battersea, Barking Riverside and the
Bank station upgrade.

Working with Government, we are in the
final phases of completing the Elizabeth
line which, when open, will add 10 per
cent to central London’s rail capacity.
Supporting the delivery of high-density,
mixed-use developments that are planned
around active and sustainable travel will
ensure that London’s growth is good
growth. We also use our own land to
provide thousands of new affordable
homes and our own supply chain
creates tens of thousands of jobs and
apprenticeships across the country.

We are committed to being an employer
that is fully representative of the
community we serve, where everyone
can realise their potential. Our aim is to
be a fully inclusive employer, valuing and
celebrating the diversity of our workforce
to improve services for all Londoners.

We are constantly working to improve
the city for everyone. This means using
data and technology to make services
intuitive and easy to use and doing all we
can to make streets and transport services
accessible to all. We reinvest every penny
of our income to continually improve
transport networks for the people who
use them every day. None of this would be
possible without the support of boroughs,
communities and other partners who we
work with to improve our services.

By working together, we can create a
better city as London recovers from the
pandemic and moves forward.

PUB20_032_IPR_Q1_Final_mtt-tmp092951

© Transport for London

October 2020

tfl.gov.uk PUB20_032

  • Transport for London investment programme report Extended Quarter 1 2020/21
    • Contents
    • Introduction
    • Mayor’s Transport Strategy themes
    • Business at a glance
    • 2020/21 strategic milestone performance strategy
    • Major projects
      • Line upgrades
      • Network extensions
      • Future projects
    • London Underground
      • Stations
      • Accessibility
      • Track renewals
      • Power, cooling and energy
      • Rolling stock renewals
      • Signalling and control
    • Surface
      • Healthy Streets
      • Air quality
      • Asset investment
      • Public transport
      • Surface technology
    • Other
      • Technology and data
      • Growth Fund
      • Elizabeth line
      • Crossrail
    • Appendix
      • 2020/21 strategic milestone performance

Elizabeth line:
evidencing the value
Benefits framework

Contents

3 Commissioner’s foreword

4 Permanent Secretary’s foreword

6 Overview

7 The Elizabeth line and its purpose
8 The Elizabeth line
9 Your new east-west railway
10 The case for the Elizabeth line
11 The Elizabeth line and the Mayor’s Transport Strategy
12 The Crossrail project
13 Benefiting businesses across the UK
14 Work continues once the railway is fully operational

15 Our approach to evaluation and benefits management
16 Why are we managing benefits and evaluating impacts of

the Crossrail investment?
17 Our approach
20 Governance – steering this work and overseeing its outputs

21 Outcomes, benefits and insights
22 Benefits monitoring and evaluation: insights
23 Crossrail: outputs, benefits and outcomes
24 Transport outcomes
25 Economic, environmental and social outcomes
26 Recognising and acting on disbenefits
27 Data collection

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 2

Commissioner’s
foreword
We were all very excited about the
opening of the Elizabeth line in May, a
once-in-a-generation stunning addition
to our transport network.

The Elizabeth line has transformed travel
across London and the South East by
dramatically improving transport links,
cutting journey times, providing additional
capacity, and transforming customer
experience with spacious new stations
and walk-through trains.

The new line is crucial to London’s
recovery from the pandemic, helping
avoid a car-led recovery by providing new
journey options, supporting regeneration
across the capital, and adding an
estimated £42bn to the UK economy.

We expect the benefits of the Elizabeth
line to be deep and broad, and to be
felt by many in London and the South
East. These benefits will accrue not
only to travel and to our customers,
but also to our economy, communities,
environment and, importantly, the
wider UK economy as well.

In this document, we set out how we will
gather evidence that the new railway has
generated the benefits we expect. This will
ensure both that the benefits are realised
in full and as soon as possible, and also
that we learn important lessons for future
major projects in London and elsewhere.

The opening of the Elizabeth line was a
truly historic moment for the capital and
the UK, and I am delighted that so many
customers are already enjoying the service.

Andy Byford
London’s Transport Commissioner

Permanent Secretary’s
foreword
The Government was delighted to
welcome the opening of the Elizabeth
line. Its investment in the new railway
demonstrates its commitment to
delivering vital and world-class national
infrastructure projects.

From its inception, it was recognised that
a project of the scale of Crossrail required
a unique partnership between national
Government and London leadership. Joint
working between the Department for
Transport (DfT) and Transport for London
(TfL) has been critical to its delivery. The
Elizabeth line, delivered by Crossrail Ltd,
is a major achievement.

The new railway is already transforming
life and travel in London and across
the wider South East, connecting local
communities across and to the centre of
London more quickly than ever before.

The benefits have also been felt much
more widely. The construction of the
Elizabeth line has already delivered an
economic boost across the country –
more than 60 per cent of the UK companies
supplying Crossrail have been based
outside London and the South East.

The Elizabeth line will connect the UK’s
hub airport, Heathrow, more effectively
to London’s business and tourism centres.
People from across the country and
around the world who visit London – for
work, leisure or to spend time with friends
and family – will enjoy the increased
connectivity the new railway brings.

The scale of this project means it is of
truly national significance. We estimate
it will produce a £42bn boost to the UK’s
economy. We and TfL cannot simply take
these benefits for granted, however. We
need to ensure they are delivered, and
measure progress in doing so. And we need
to do this in a way that sets a new standard
for major projects.

This benefits framework will provide an
overview of how TfL and the DfT will
work with other stakeholders to study the
impacts of the Elizabeth line and maximise
the benefits to be realised.

The opening of the Elizabeth line is a
great achievement. But the opening is
not the end of the story. This framework
will help to ensure that lessons are
captured, and increase confidence that
future investment in transport across
the country delivers for taxpayers, the
public and society.

Dame Bernadette Kelly DCB
Permanent Secretary,
Department for Transport

41 stations, all step-free to platform level, staffed
from the first to the last train, with a turn up and
go service available to anyone needing assistance

Future growth
capability, with stations built to accommodate
an additional two carriages per train

Urban realm
improvements, including better walking and
cycling facilities

Improved
customer information at all stations,
including live journey information

Fully integrated
with the TfL network and interchanges with other
services, including Tube, DLR, London Overground
and National Rail services

Spacious
walk-through trains, with dedicated
spaces for wheelchair users and separate
multi-use spaces for buggies and luggage

New
journey options across central London,
cutting journey times to key destinations
including the City and Canary Wharf

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 5

Overview
This document sets out the approach
TfL will take to:

• Achieve the benefit and outcome
expectations set out in the Crossrail
business case

• Ensure every opportunity has been taken
to maximise the project benefits, and

• Address any disbenefits

The document is divided into three sections:

• The Elizabeth line and its purpose

• Our approach to evaluation and
benefits management

• Outcomes, benefits and insights

Key terms

Benefit
A quantifiable and measurable
improvement, contributing to an
outcome, which is perceived as
positive by a stakeholder. Usually
brought about as a direct result of
the project outputs.

Output
The facility, capability or processes
delivered by the project, which will
result in the benefits.

Outcome
A change, for example economic or
social, which is an aim of the project.

Strategic goal
The broader strategic aim that
provides the context for the outcome.

Disbenefit
A result of the project, expected or
unexpected, that is seen as negative
by a stakeholder. Disbenefits should
be tracked in the same way as
benefits.

The Elizabeth line
and its purpose

The Elizabeth line
The Elizabeth line is the most significant
addition to London’s transport network
in a generation. The new railway will
transform life and travel in London and
the South East: it will reduce journey
times, create additional capacity,
transform accessibility and provide a
huge economic boost.

The new railway, delivered by Crossrail
Ltd, will run for more than 100km through
central London – from Shenfield and
Abbey Wood in the east to Reading and
Heathrow in the west. With a total of 41
stations, including 10 major new stations,
the Elizabeth line will connect London’s
main employment centres, and support

new journeys through central London out
to Essex, Buckinghamshire and Berkshire.

The Elizabeth line will be part of the
Transport for London (TfL) network, and
will have interchanges with the London
Underground, DLR, London Overground
and National Rail services and, when fully

open, the railway will increase central
London’s rail capacity by 10 per cent.

The new railway will be crucial to London’s
recovery from the pandemic, helping to
avoid a car-led recovery by providing new
journey options across the capital, and
supporting regeneration.

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 8

Your new east-west railway
London’s newest railway will be an
accessible route of 41 stations from
Reading and Heathrow in the west,
through central London, to Shenfield and
Abbey Wood in the east.

When fully open, the Elizabeth line will
reduce congestion by increasing central
London’s rail capacity by 10 per cent, and
will bring an additional 1.5 million people
within 45 minutes of central London.

It will improve journey times, offer more
choice and deliver an accessible world-
class experience for millions of passengers
each year.

Step-free from
train to street

Step-free from
platform to street

Ealing
Broadway

Hayes &
notgniddaP notgnilraH

Slough

Iver
Tottenham
Court Road Farringdon

Bond
Street Whitechapel

Liverpool
Street Stratford

Shenfield

Brentwood

Harold Wood

Gidea Park

Abbey Wood

Acton
Main Line

West
Ealing

Maryland Manor
Park

Woolwich

Canary Wharf

Custom House

Forest Gate
West

Drayton

Taplow

Burnham

Langley

Reading

Twyford

Maidenhead

Seven Kings

Ilford

Goodmayes

Chadwell Heath

Romford

Hanwell

Southall

Terminal 5 Terminal 4

Terminals 2 & 3

Circle
Central

Overground

Metropolitan

Central Central Central
JubileeDistrict Northern

Hammersmith
& City

Circle

Metropolitan

Hammersmith
& City

Hammersmith
& City

Bakerloo
Circle

District
Hammersmith

& City
Overground Overground

Overground

District

Trains to
Stansted

Trains to
Southend

Trains to
Southend

Piccadilly

Piccadilly Piccadilly

Central

DLR
Jubilee

Trains to
Gatwick
Trains to

Luton

Heathrow Airport

DLR
Jubilee

DLR

Northern

DLR
Woolwich Arsenal

Overground
Wanstead Park

High-frequency services
Once the Elizabeth line is fully open, 24
trains per hour at peak will run between
Paddington and Whitechapel. The line will
enable new journey options, and make
major international gateways such as
Heathrow more accessible.

New high-capacity trains
• Nine walk-through carriages

• Space for 1,500 customers

• Air-conditioning

• CCTV, Wi-Fi and live travel information

• Energy efficient

Ten new fully accessible stations
All Elizabeth line stations will be step-free
from street to platform, with level boarding
at the new stations between Paddington
and Abbey Wood, and at Heathrow. A turn
up and go service will be available at every
station for those who need help boarding
and alighting from trains.

31 upgraded stations
• New lifts and footbridges provide a step-

free experience from street to platform

• New ticket halls, ticket machines,
information screens, toilets and
waiting rooms

• All stations staffed from first to last train

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 9

The case for the Elizabeth line
Developed over many years as an
imaginative and exciting solution to the
problems of overcrowded public transport
in central London, the Elizabeth line
scheme is:

• At the heart of the Mayor’s Transport
Strategy and the London Plan

• Aligned with a range of national
policies and objectives, including the
Government’s Transport Decarbonisation
strategy, Levelling Up policy, and
Build Back Better vision

The business case
First published in 2005, the business case
for the Elizabeth line has been updated
at key milestones since then. It sets out
a range of outcomes and significant, wide-
ranging benefits for the people of London,
the South East and across the UK.

Transport network outcomes

The transport network
outcomes comprise:

• Transformative network capacity
and connectivity improvements

• Journey time and crowding
benefits to users

• Operational capacity and flexibility

Wider economic, environmental
and social outcomes

The wider economic, environmental
and social outcomes are as follows:

• Regeneration and opportunity,
new homes and jobs

• Social and health impacts

• Sustainable growth and development

Major construction projects such as this
may give rise to some issues, such as noise
and disruption, and considerable effort
has been put into minimising these on the
Elizabeth line. In addition, the new railway
represents a significant transport change,
and as such may give rise to unwanted
consequences (disbenefits), for example a
negative impact on existing communities.
These should be avoided if possible, but
must be monitored and mitigated if not.

The Elizabeth line and the
Mayor’s Transport Strategy

The impact of the Elizabeth line is expected to be felt in the
three main areas of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy.

Healthy Streets
and healthy people

• The Elizabeth line will
contribute to safer, greener
travel in London and the South
East, improving air quality and
reducing carbon emissions

• Integration with bus services
and cycle facilities will
encourage more active travel
to and from stations, leading
to better health outcomes

A good public
transport experience

• State-of-the art trains will
run quickly and reliably to
accessible stations

• The 10 per cent additional rail
capacity in central London
brought about by the new
railway will reduce congestion
on the rest of the public
transport network

• The new railway will
integrate with other modes,
resulting in more people
using public transport

New homes
and jobs

• Better transport to and from
our Opportunity Areas will
stimulate local economies
and encourage developers
and businesses to invest in
these areas, resulting in more
homes and local employment
opportunities

• Improved connections will
help people to take advantage
of more opportunities for
employment and education,
reducing social exclusion

The Elizabeth line also enables
the achievement of wider policy
objectives, including:

• Delivery of live travel information
to customers and operational staff

• Improved links between London, the
South East and beyond through a new
transport hub at Old Oak Common

• Enhanced travel between London,
the rest of the UK and international
destinations

• Good Growth in the Thames
Gateway corridor

• Improved cross-river connectivity,
unlocking growth potential

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 11

The Crossrail project

Crossrail Ltd, the infrastructure project
behind the Elizabeth line, was established
in 2005 to deliver the new railway, including
the new tunnels and stations.

Crossrail Ltd works closely with industry
partners, including Network Rail and
Heathrow Airport Limited. The project
is jointly sponsored by TfL and the
Department for Transport (DfT).

The Elizabeth line will be at the heart of
the national transport network, and is
being designed to effectively integrate at
both the strategic and local network level.

The Crossrail Complementary
Measures programme is a
collection of smaller schemes
around many Elizabeth line
stations, mostly delivered by
boroughs. These are intended
to enhance safety and
pedestrian and cycling facilities,
and improve interchanges

The improvements are
expected to contribute
to the regeneration of
local communities in the
vicinity of the new and
upgraded stations, and to
remove barriers to the
realisation of the benefits
of the Elizabeth line

Gravesend

Sevenoaks

Upminster

Romford

Brentwood

Shenfield

Loughton

Ilford

Barking

Woolwich

Bromley

Croydon

Sutton

Epsom
Downs

Epsom

Chessington

Kingston

Clapham
Junction

Old Oak
Common

Lewisham

Stratford

Hounslow

Heathrow

Uxbridge

Ealing

Harrow

Watford

Barnet

Enfield

Wood
Green

Hampton
Court

Weybridge

Shepperton

Virginia
Water

To Welwyn
Garden City

To
Stevenage

To Broxbourne
and connections

to Stansted
Airport

To the West Midlands,
Manchester, Leeds and beyond

To Reading

To Windsor and
Eton Riverside

To Dorking

5 miles0

0 5 km

Central Activities Zone

Opportunity Areas

London

Transport for London

Existing network

Complete and ongoing
network improvements

Potential network improvements

Strategic Rail Network

Elizabeth line

Northern Line Extension

Crossrail 2

Crossrail 2 route options

High Speed 2

Tram extensions

Bakerloo Line Extension

Elizabeth line extension

DLR extensions

Other London Overground
extensions

Prospective London
Overground services

Strategic Interchange

London Overground extension
to Barking Riverside

National rail

Crossrail 2 indicative alignment 2015 (subject to change)
Map does not include rail links that would be needed

to support an expanded Heathrow

Gravesend

Sevenoaks

Upminster

Romford

Brentwood

Shenfield

Loughton

Ilford

Barking

Woolwich

Bromley

Croydon

Sutton

Epsom
Downs

Epsom

Chessington

Kingston

Clapham
Junction

Old Oak
Common

Lewisham

Stratford

Hounslow

Heathrow

Uxbridge

Ealing

Harrow

Watford

Barnet

Enfield

Wood
Green

Hampton
Court

Weybridge

Shepperton

Virginia
Water

To Welwyn
Garden City

To
Stevenage

To Broxbourne
and connections

to Stansted
Airport

To the West Midlands,
Manchester, Leeds and beyond

To Reading

To Windsor and
Eton Riverside

To Dorking

5 miles0

0 5 km

Central Activities Zone

Opportunity Areas

London

Transport for London

Existing network

Complete and ongoing
network improvements

Potential network improvements

Strategic Rail Network

Elizabeth line

Northern Line Extension

Crossrail 2

Crossrail 2 route options

High Speed 2

Tram extensions

Bakerloo Line Extension

Elizabeth line extension

DLR extensions

Other London Overground
extensions

Prospective London
Overground services

Strategic Interchange

London Overground extension
to Barking Riverside

National rail

Crossrail 2 indicative alignment 2015 (subject to change)
Map does not include rail links that would be needed

to support an expanded Heathrow

Gravesend

Sevenoaks

Upminster

Romford

Brentwood

Shenfield

Loughton

Ilford

Barking

Woolwich

Bromley

Croydon

Sutton

Epsom
Downs

Epsom

Chessington

Kingston

Clapham
Junction

Old Oak
Common

Lewisham

Stratford

Hounslow

Heathrow

Uxbridge

Ealing

Harrow

Watford

Barnet

Enfield

Wood
Green

Hampton
Court

Weybridge

Shepperton

Virginia
Water

To Welwyn
Garden City

To
Stevenage

To Broxbourne
and connections

to Stansted
Airport

To the West Midlands,
Manchester, Leeds and beyond

To Reading

To Windsor and
Eton Riverside

To Dorking

5 miles0

0 5 km

Central Activities Zone

Opportunity Areas

London

Transport for London

Existing network

Complete and ongoing
network improvements

Potential network improvements

Strategic Rail Network

Elizabeth line

Northern Line Extension

Crossrail 2

Crossrail 2 route options

High Speed 2

Tram extensions

Bakerloo Line Extension

Elizabeth line extension

DLR extensions

Other London Overground
extensions

Prospective London
Overground services

Strategic Interchange

London Overground extension
to Barking Riverside

National rail

Crossrail 2 indicative alignment 2015 (subject to change)
Map does not include rail links that would be needed

to support an expanded Heathrow

Gravesend

Sevenoaks

Upminster

Romford

Brentwood

Shenfield

Loughton

Ilford

Barking

Woolwich

Bromley

Croydon

Sutton

Epsom
Downs

Epsom

Chessington

Kingston

Clapham
Junction

Old Oak
Common

Lewisham

Stratford

Hounslow

Heathrow

Uxbridge

Ealing

Harrow

Watford

Barnet

Enfield

Wood
Green

Hampton
Court

Weybridge

Shepperton

Virginia
Water

To Welwyn
Garden City

To
Stevenage

To Broxbourne
and connections

to Stansted
Airport

To the West Midlands,
Manchester, Leeds and beyond

To Reading

To Windsor and
Eton Riverside

To Dorking

5 miles0

0 5 km

Central Activities Zone

Opportunity Areas

London

Transport for London

Existing network

Complete and ongoing
network improvements

Potential network improvements

Strategic Rail Network

Elizabeth line

Northern Line Extension

Crossrail 2

Crossrail 2 route options

High Speed 2

Tram extensions

Bakerloo Line Extension

Elizabeth line extension

DLR extensions

Other London Overground
extensions

Prospective London
Overground services

Strategic Interchange

London Overground extension
to Barking Riverside

National rail

Crossrail 2 indicative alignment 2015 (subject to change)
Map does not include rail links that would be needed

to support an expanded Heathrow

Gravesend

Sevenoaks

Upminster

Romford

Brentwood

Shenfield

Loughton

Ilford

Barking

Woolwich

Bromley

Croydon

Sutton

Epsom
Downs

Epsom

Chessington

Kingston

Clapham
Junction

Old Oak
Common

Lewisham

Stratford

Hounslow

Heathrow

Uxbridge

Ealing

Harrow

Watford

Barnet

Enfield

Wood
Green

Hampton
Court

Weybridge

Shepperton

Virginia
Water

To Welwyn
Garden City

To
Stevenage

To Broxbourne
and connections

to Stansted
Airport

To the West Midlands,
Manchester, Leeds and beyond

To Reading

To Windsor and
Eton Riverside

To Dorking

5 miles0

0 5 km

Central Activities Zone

Opportunity Areas

London

Transport for London

Existing network

Complete and ongoing
network improvements

Potential network improvements

Strategic Rail Network

Elizabeth line

Northern Line Extension

Crossrail 2

Crossrail 2 route options

High Speed 2

Tram extensions

Bakerloo Line Extension

Elizabeth line extension

DLR extensions

Other London Overground
extensions

Prospective London
Overground services

Strategic Interchange

London Overground extension
to Barking Riverside

National rail

Crossrail 2 indicative alignment 2015 (subject to change)
Map does not include rail links that would be needed

to support an expanded Heathrow

Gravesend

Sevenoaks

Upminster

Romford

Brentwood

Shenfield

Loughton

Ilford

Barking

Woolwich

Bromley

Croydon

Sutton

Epsom
Downs

Epsom

Chessington

Kingston

Clapham
Junction

Old Oak
Common

Lewisham

Stratford

Hounslow

Heathrow

Uxbridge

Ealing

Harrow

Watford

Barnet

Enfield

Wood
Green

Hampton
Court

Weybridge

Shepperton

Virginia
Water

To Welwyn
Garden City

To
Stevenage

To Broxbourne
and connections

to Stansted
Airport

To the West Midlands,
Manchester, Leeds and beyond

To Reading

To Windsor and
Eton Riverside

To Dorking

5 miles0

0 5 km

Central Activities Zone

Opportunity Areas

London

Transport for London

Existing network

Complete and ongoing
network improvements

Potential network improvements

Strategic Rail Network

Elizabeth line

Northern Line Extension

Crossrail 2

Crossrail 2 route options

High Speed 2

Tram extensions

Bakerloo Line Extension

Elizabeth line extension

DLR extensions

Other London Overground
extensions

Prospective London
Overground services

Strategic Interchange

London Overground extension
to Barking Riverside

National rail

Crossrail 2 indicative alignment 2015 (subject to change)
Map does not include rail links that would be needed

to support an expanded Heathrow

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 12

Benefiting businesses
across the UK
People in every region across the UK have
helped to deliver the Elizabeth line.

The impact of the Crossrail project on the
UK economy and employment has shown
that businesses from around the UK have
benefited from work connected to the
delivery of the new railway.

• Ninety-six per cent of contracts awarded
went to companies within the UK

• Sixty-two per cent of suppliers were
based outside London

• Sixty-two per cent of direct suppliers
and 72 per cent of indirect suppliers
have been small and medium-sized
enterprises

During construction, the Crossrail project
has supported thousands of jobs all around
the UK. It has trained a new generation
of engineers in tunnelling, underground
construction and railway engineering
through the purpose-built academy in
Ilford. It has recruited more than 1,000
apprentices, injecting new talent into the
construction industry. Hundreds more will
be employed by TfL, MTR Elizabeth line
and the wider supply chain in the operation
and maintenance of the new railway.

A snapshot of suppliers by region

0-10

Number of suppliers

11-50

51-165

166-600

601-1,100

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 13

Work continues once the
railway is fully operational

Pre-2008
History
Following an
unsuccessful scheme in
the 1990s, the Crossrail
Bill was submitted
in 2005 and received
Royal Assent in 2008.

2009
Design and start
of construction
Crossrail Ltd was set up to
manage the build of the railway.
Design work started and main
contractors were procured.
Enabling works began as utility
diversions and demolitions. The
formal start of construction
was 15 May 2009.

2011
Main construction
Main construction started in 2011 with
eight tunnel boring machines (TBM)
tunnelling 42km of new rail tunnels
between 2012 and 2015. Further
works on stations, platform tunnels,
shafts and portals continued after
TBM tunnelling finished.

2015
Railway systems
Installation of railway systems
such as track, power and
signalling began once the
tunnels were ready. Systems
were also fitted into stations
and other structures, then
tested and commissioned
as an overall system. Trains
were introduced into the new
tunnels in 2018 for testing.

2016
The Elizabeth line
The railway was officially
named the Elizabeth line.
This was marked by a visit by
Her Majesty The Queen in
February 2016.

2016-2021
Station
completion
The outstanding
construction and
systems integration
work at stations was
completed, followed
by commissioning
and handover to TfL.

2021
Railway trials
Extensive commissioning of the
railway commenced in spring 2021.
Trains ran to a timetable, building
reliability in the system. At the end
of 2021, the railway entered into
Trial Operations, the final phase of
testing before passenger service.

2022
Opening
The central section
of the Elizabeth line,
between Paddington
and Abbey Wood, opened
on 24 May 2022. Full
services across the entire
route will be introduced
within 12 months of the
central section opening.

Project and
outputs

delivered

Benefits/outcomes
analysed, progress

evaluated

Optimisation
activities

with partners

Benefits
realisation

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 14

Our approach to
evaluation and
benefits management

Why are we managing benefits and evaluating
impacts of the Crossrail investment?

Understanding the benefits and outcomes of Crossrail and
the Elizabeth line will enable us to:

Maximise the return
on investment

• Manage what we have
direct control of, including
optimising the railway’s
operation and services

• Intervene if benefits are not
being realised

• Influence partners to maximise
wider opportunities for
regeneration, and environmental
and quality of life improvements

Demonstrate
value for money

• Showcase to the public and our
funders what their money has
delivered to London, the South
East and across the UK

• Build evidence on the economic
and social impacts of transport
investments

• Respond to public scrutiny on the
investment case, including the
National Audit Office, London
Assembly Transport Committee
and Public Accounts Committee

Learn important
lessons

• Inform ourselves and a wide
range of stakeholders about the
economic, social and transport
contributions being made by
the Crossrail investment

• Inform future policies,
investment programmes and
land use planning decisions

It is valuable for us to understand and
document if and how we delivered the
benefits we set out to achieve with
our investment.

While there is often information available
about the transport impacts of rail projects,
a 2021 review by the What Works Centre
for Local Economic Growth found: ‘There
are notable gaps in the evidence on the
local economic impacts of rail investment.
We need more evidence from the UK
of the effects on employment, number
of businesses, property prices and the
composition of residents. We also need
more evidence on impacts on commercial
property prices and land use’.

The approach outlined in this document
seeks to address these gaps.

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 16

Our approach
TfL is responsible for realising the direct transport benefits of the Elizabeth line.
We will work with a broad range of stakeholders, including business groups and
local authorities, to ensure that the wider benefits are also optimised.

Two exercises will take place:

Benefits management
and optimisation

• Tracking indicators to draw an
early picture of how well the
railway is performing against our
expectations

• Focusing on information needed
to take any necessary action to
ensure we realise the benefits in
full and on time

Evaluation
• Working with partners to

analyse those impacts of the
Elizabeth line that will take
longer to emerge, such as
transport mode shift, economic
growth and other social impacts

• Examining the return on
investment offered using actual
observations of benefits

It is more than 20 years since the project
to design and construct the Elizabeth line
began. In that time, the thinking around
best practice for evaluating the success of
projects and for managing project benefits
has developed significantly. As a result, our
approach has evolved over the course of
the project.

Alignment with best practice
Our benefits management approach
aligns with industry best practice, with
clarity about:

• The relationship between the project
outputs and the benefits (and
disbenefits) being monitored

• The responsibilities and accountabilities
for gathering and analysing data

• The process for recommending and
deciding upon courses of action to
ensure benefits are realised in full
and on time

Our impact evaluation has been developed
in collaboration with colleagues in
central Government, and aligns with the
Government’s Magenta Book guidance
for evaluating the success of projects
and policies.

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 17

Benefits
management
and optimisation

The two key questions are as follows:

• Is the railway performing as we expected?

• What can we do to make sure we
are realising the benefits?

TfL, working with the DfT and a range of
other stakeholders, is setting out a series
of performance indicators and measures
(see pages 24-25) to enable an early picture
to be drawn of how well the railway is
performing against our expectations.

We will track the metrics and, where
necessary and achievable, action will
be taken with operational and service
planning colleagues, with the GLA and local
authorities and with other stakeholders as
appropriate. In this way, we will manage
underperformance and ensure that benefits
are realised in full and as quickly as possible.

Some optimisation activities may include:

• Marketing, in cases where the public
are not aware of the opportunities
offered by the railway

• Re-planning connecting services to
improve access

• Assessing changes to stations
and facilities to address under-
performance or access issues

We will keep the opportunities
under review to respond effectively.

Benefits profiles
Each of the benefits we plan to
measure will have a documented
‘benefits profile’, setting out:

• How, when and by whom the
benefit will be measured

• Any known risks and mitigations
to realising the benefit

• Details of who owns the benefit and
who is accountable for realisation

• Timeline of when we expect the
benefit to be realised (if possible)

Evaluation

The main question is:

• What effects is the
railway having?

London’s transport system and
economy are complex and ever-
changing. It can be challenging to
distinguish the effects of a single
factor – even one as large as the
Elizabeth line – from other general
background change. We will
therefore be working with external
analysts to produce two thorough
and robust studies:

First post-opening study (2022-2024)

Transport effects of the
new railway, including:

• Mode shift from cars to
public transport

• Relief of congestion on
the public transport
network and the road
network, and

• Implications for pollution,
carbon use and the
change in journey patterns
in and around London

The study will consider
the integration of the
new railway with other
transport service modes,
including bus and cycle
networks, helping us
to understand its role
within a larger sustainable
transport network in
London and the South East.

This study will be
published around two
years after the opening
of the Elizabeth line.

Second post-opening study (2024-2027)

Broader social and
economic effects of the
Elizabeth line, including:

• Effect of improved
connectivity on new
homes and jobs

• Changing patterns of
employment and land use

• Residential and commercial
property prices

• High street activity, and

• Environmental impacts

The study will look
at the positive and
negative impacts on the
communities affected by
the new railway.

These wider economic,
social and environmental
effects will take longer to
emerge and this second
study will be published
around five years after the
opening of the Elizabeth line.

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 18

Evaluation: Overall value for money

One way of examining the return on
investment offered by major projects is to
calculate a benefit-cost ratio – a common way
of expressing the project’s ‘value for money’.
This is arrived at by calculating a monetised
net value of the benefits and disbenefits that
will arise over the project’s many-decade
lifetime and comparing this figure (or range
of figures) to the total cost of implementing
the project and operating the railway.

As costs have changed through the course
of project delivery, we continue to assess
the project’s value for money. We still
expect the Elizabeth line to represent
good value for money – in other words,
the value of its benefits will significantly
outweigh its costs.

TfL will re-assess the benefit value
after scheme implementation and
in light of the evaluation studies, to
update understanding of its value
for money, and the accuracy of our
forecasts and expectations.

Value for money
Identifying Crossrail’s actual return on investment

Governance – steering this work
and overseeing its outputs
A Benefits Forum was initiated in 2021 to
assess the early indicators of the Elizabeth
line’s success. Drawn from TfL, the DfT
and other partner organisations such as
the GLA and local authorities, the Forum
brings together those accountable for
realising the Elizabeth line’s benefits
with those responsible for analysing and
understanding the measures and indicators.

The Benefits Forum will continue to
analyse the performance metrics and other
data and will report to TfL leadership on
progress towards our expectations. Where
relevant, the Forum may propose any
actions necessary to optimise the benefits.

Benefits Forum workstreams

Capacity, connection
and growth
The value delivered to our
communities and stakeholders.
Initially, this means monitoring
increased capacity and better
connections; in time, it will
mean understanding the
impacts on the economy,
society and the environment.

Accessibility, inclusion
and customer satisfaction
Feedback from our customers
on their experience of travelling
on the new railway, which must
be as accessible and inclusive
as possible.

Journey time, performance
and financial sustainability
Operation of the new railway and
whether service performance and
use are at the expected levels.

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 20

Outcomes, benefits
and insights

Benefits monitoring
and evaluation: insights
In this section, we outline the:

• Key benefits, and the measures being
monitored

• Relationships between outputs, benefits
and outcomes

• Challenges of how we will gain insights

Gathering and assessing data on
outcome performance is both
for immediate use in optimising
benefits, and longer-term use in
informing thinking about future
policies and projects. Ongoing
benefits monitoring and reporting
will continue as long as the
activities continue to add value
– eventually they will merge into
business as usual.

Some of the data will be available
quickly, for example via our in-
house monitoring and customer
feedback processes. Other
elements will take longer to
emerge and will come from a
broader range of sources, such
as economic and social data and
longer-term travel trends; this
data will be collected as part of
the evaluation process but will be
fed into the benefits management
process as it becomes available.

Taking a wide view of the full range of
data, and the connections between
outputs, benefits and outcomes,
will offer the best insights into the
impacts of the new railway.

Crossrail: outputs,
benefits and outcomes

Outputs: what
was delivered

New railway
connecting Reading/
Heathrow with
Shenfield/Abbey
Wood through
central London

New trains, with up
to 24 trains per hour

Step-free access
to platforms at
all stations

Stations staffed from
first to last train

New stations
and facilities

Benefits: measurable improvement as a result of introducing
the outputs

Intermediate benefits

• Economy stimulated in
affected areas

• Improved public realm

• Increased transport capacity

• Increased station accessibility

• Increased public transport ridership

• New homes and jobs

• Mode shift to sustainable modes

• Digital support to control and
maintain the assets

End benefits

• Reduced crowding on London
Underground and DLR

• Congestion relief on the
road network

• Improved environmental outcomes

• Employment and population growth

• Reduced journey/travel times

• Increased access to employment

• More accessible network

• Safety benefits

• Reduction in operating costs

• Increased revenue – direct
and indirect

Outcomes: the aim
of the investment

Relieving congestion

Improving
connections

Reducing
journey times

Improved accessibility,
inclusion, public
transport experience

Supporting
Good Growth

Financial
sustainability

Transport

Economic, environmental
and social

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 23

Transport outcomes

Outcome Expectation Measure

Reducing journey times It will be quicker for customers using the line to travel into (and inside)
central London, as well as across London

Generalised journey time: an assessment of travel time
taking delays, wait time and crowding into account

Relieving congestion • More journeys will be taken using public transport, and fewer private
vehicles will be used, reducing congestion and pollution on the roads.

• The Elizabeth line will relieve pressure on existing public
transport services

Levels of crowding/congestion on the:

• London Underground network

• Rail network in London and the South East

• Roads in affected areas

Improving connections • Improved cross-London connectivity from outer London suburbs,
and within central London

• Reduced commuting times from suburban areas

• Better connection to Heathrow Airport

• Improved cross-river connectivity

• Increased network capacity

• Number of people living within 45 minutes’ commute
of central London

Public transport experience • Trains on the Elizabeth line will have air-conditioning, live travel
information and walk-through carriages

• Reduced crowding will make travel on public transport more pleasant

Customer feedback on the service, including accessibility,
comfort, safety and quality of customer information

Improved inclusion Each station will have increased accessibility for those needing step-free
access

• Proportion of the network that is step-free

• Reduction in ‘journey time penalty’ (average additional
time required to make a step-free trip)

• Feedback from customers on accessibility

Safety and security • The Elizabeth line will encourage a shift to a safer mode of transport,
and reduce the occurrence of road accidents

• New trains will have increased CCTV to create safe environments for
passengers

• Incidence of crime and anti-social behaviour on the
trains and in stations

• Road danger in affected areas

Transport network outcomes

The transport network outcomes
comprise:

• Transformative network capacity
and connectivity improvements

• Journey time and crowding
benefits to users

• Operational capacity and flexibility

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 24

Economic, environmental
and social outcomes*

* The assessments outlined above are expected to be part of the
first and second evaluation studies; these are in the process of
being designed and commissioned, and therefore the measures
are subject to change

Outcome Expectation Measure

Regeneration and opportunity • Better connections and increased capacity will make it easier for
people to travel for work or leisure, broadening opportunities
for employment and education

• Better connections will make some areas more attractive, especially
to developers and employers, resulting in new homes and jobs

• Levels of employment in affected areas; numbers of
people not in employment, education or training in
affected areas

• Numbers of planning permission applications in
affected areas

• Number of new homes and workplaces built

Economic recovery Better connections and economic regeneration will help the local
economies affected by the Elizabeth line to recover from the effects of
the pandemic

Assessment of rates of recovery in affected areas against
those in comparable areas

Social impacts Increased employment and education opportunities will reduce poverty
and social exclusion

Assessment of levels of deprivation and social exclusion

Health impacts More active travel in the form of walking and cycling will result in
health benefits

Levels of cycling and walking; health indicators in
affected areas

Sustainable growth:
improved air quality

Mode shift to public transport from private vehicles moves people
into cleaner travel, resulting in reductions in both emissions and
particulate pollution

Net change in air quality from travel, based on change in
traffic volumes attributed to the new railway

Sustainable growth:
reduced carbon

Mode shift to cars moves people into lower-carbon travel modes Net change in carbon emissions from travel, based on
change in traffic volumes attributed to the new railway

Financial sustainability Increased fare revenue and reduction in operating costs contributes to
TfL’s financial sustainability

Increase in fare-paying customers across the TfL network

Wider economic, environmental
and social outcomes

The wider economic, environmental
and social outcomes are as follows::

• Regeneration and opportunity,
new homes and jobs

• Social and health impacts

• Sustainable growth and
development

Elizabeth line: evidencing the value 25

Recognising and acting
on disbenefits
Projects can have negative impacts as
well as positive: we call these negative
impacts ‘disbenefits’.

Some disbenefits are anticipated: where
we cannot avoid these, we work to
mitigate them. Other disbenefits may
arise unexpectedly – we will do our best
to identify these through monitoring and,
where we can, we work to put them right.

Examples of project disbenefits include:
the loss of local facilities to make way
for the new infrastructure; increases
in crowding at key interchanges on the
network; and the displacement of existing
communities in the areas affected by the
construction of the Elizabeth line.

We have incorporated disbenefit
management into our approach and
will act to mitigate them as required.
Feedback from customers, stakeholders
and partners in particular will help
identify unexpected disbenefits. We may
also identify disbenefits as part of the
evaluation studies. Learning from the
identified disbenefits and mitigations will
be assessed and applied where appropriate
to other parts of our network and future
investments. We will include our findings
on disbenefits and the actions taken to
mitigate them in our regular reporting
through the Benefits Forum.

Anticipated disbenefits
We work to minimise these and to
mitigate their effects where they
cannot be avoided.

Example: disruption caused
by the implementation of the
project itself

Unexpected disbenefits
Some disbenefits may arise
after the railway is opened.
Where we think these are a
possibility, we will monitor them,
take any necessary action and
keep listening to customers,
stakeholders and partners.

Example: increased crowding
at key interchanges

Data collection

We will use a broad range of data from
inside and outside our transport system
to analyse outcomes. Some operational
data will be available quickly, while other
elements will take longer to emerge.

Measuring and analysing the effects
of a such a complex project presents
challenges, including:

• Isolating the transport and economic
effects of the Elizabeth line from the
ongoing changes happening within
London and the South East

• Isolating Elizabeth line ridership from
wider network ridership due to common
access and multiple route choices across
National Rail, London Underground and
DLR services

• Tracking benefits to customers across
multiple modes, including buses and
active travel

To generate a good understanding of the
comparative impacts of the Elizabeth line,
we will use a counterfactual approach.
This entails considering what would have
happened if the Elizabeth line had not
been built, and using those estimates as a
comparator to observed outcomes.

To help with this analysis, a baseline
study was carried out to describe the pre-
opening conditions and provide a reference
point for assessing post-opening impacts.
The outputs of this study will be available
on our website. The framework is expected
to be published first, with the baseline
study to be published in the summer.

Coronavirus pandemic
The coronavirus pandemic has been
a time of significant disruption
to all our lives. This disruption
has included unpredictable shifts
in transport demand through
lockdown as well as changes to our
patterns of work and leisure. These
fluctuations in demand have not yet
fully stabilised, and travel continues
to be affected by the pandemic.

This instability in travel patterns and
demand will cause complications
for benefits management and
evaluation because it may not
always be clear what changes have
come about as a result of the
opening of the Elizabeth line, and
what differences we are seeing as
a result of the recovery from the
pandemic in London, the South
East and the UK as a whole. If we
do not see as many customers
on the Elizabeth line as expected
during the first months of its
opening, this may be as a result of
the pandemic suppressing demand
on an ongoing basis.

We will take account of these factors
when assessing and evaluating
benefits and, wherever viable, we
will compare the effects we see on
and around the Elizabeth line with
the travel patterns in similar areas
not affected by the new railway.

© Transport for London

July 2022

tfl.gov.uk PUB22_020

  • Elizabeth line: evidencing the value
    • Contents
    • Commissioner’s foreword
    • Overview
    • The Elizabeth line and its purpose
      • The Elizabeth line
      • Your new east-west railway
      • The case for the Elizabeth line
      • The Elizabeth line and the Mayor’s Transport Strategy
      • The Crossrail project
      • Benefiting businesses across the UK
      • Work continues once the railway is fully operational
    • Our approach to evaluation and benefits management
      • Why are we managing benefits and evaluating impacts of the Crossrail investment?
      • Our approach
        • Benefits management and optimisation
        • Evaluation: Overall value for money
      • Governance – steering this work and overseeing its outputs
    • Outcomes, benefits and insights
      • Benefits monitoring and evaluation: insights
      • Crossrail: outputs, benefits and outcomes
      • Transport outcomes
      • Economic, environmental and social outcomes
      • Recognising and acting on disbenefits
      • Data collection

Writerbay.net

Do you need help with this or a different assignment? Even when your task is complicated and the deadline is in less than 2 days, you still have every chance to get a good grade for it. How? By completing the order form, you will get the finest custom-written assignment at an affordable price. We also deliver a number of services for free (e.g., revisions, editing, checking the text for authenticity). Use our paper writing service to receive effective help with your homework.


Order a Similar Paper Order a Different Paper